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ABSTRACT
This dissertation engages with two analytical frameworks to explore questions of social
transformation and structures of power in rural society in India. The first is a specific
critique of various types of development discourse and development projects that have
been elaborated by national and international elites during the last forty years, focusing
on the dryland Malwa region in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. This includes
a project to introduce soyabean cultivation to the region in the 1970s, which has been
post-facto labeled as a yellow revolution, and a discourse which argues that providing
market information through new information and communication technologies is
empowering farmers. I argue that these projects and discourse have mostly steered away
from engaging with the structures of power framing rural society, and thus, have failed to
bring about much change in the condition of rural people in central India.
The second analytical framework is a recovery and foregrounding of alternate arenas of
struggle that rural people in the Malwa region have been participating in. The platform of
democratic politics is one such avenue that marginalised groups have used to make
demands upon the state to provide them with support and allows them to hold the state
accountable for the same. Participating in cultural projects that question and subvert the
forms of caste and gender based exclusion that frame the lives of people is another such
arena which provides women and adivasis (tribals) with a language of empowerment.
This research argues that for the language and practice of development to have more
relevance to the lives of the poor and for it to engage with the deeper aspirations in their
lives, the role of these political and cultural projects as vital platforms for rural people to
exercise agency and bring about change, must be recognized.
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Map 2. Location of Madhya Pradesh in India
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Map 3. Location of the Malwa region (outlined in black) and Dhar district (shaded)
in Madhya Pradesh
Map 4. Dhar district showing the approximate location of Ranipura (inside black
box)
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Introduction
Since the 1990s widespread changes have occurred in how development has been
conceptualised. The idea of participatory development gained prominence as a response
to the accusations against development organisations and governments of pursuing high
modernist agendas unrelated to the lives of ordinary people (Scott 1998), which some
saw as reinforcing power structures rather than bringing about development (Ferguson
1994). It coincided with the end of the Cold War and the fall of the dirigiste state in many
countries of the world, and the subsequent shift away from state-led models of
development. Organisations like the World Bank promoted participatory development'
alongside a push towards market-led models of development through structural
adjustment programs and an agenda of good governance (Marquette 2003). The
encouragement of civil society organisations, which were considered to be separate from
the state and a balance to bureaucratic power (Taylor 1990, Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001)
were regarded as pivotal to the successful implementation of the participatory agenda
(Cooke and Kothari 2001).
Towards the end of the 1990s, the information technology revolution provided a
new set of tools in the hands of development practitioners to encourage participation of
the poor and provide them with relevant information on markets, health, and livelihoods,
which they were deemed to lack (World Bank 1995, Dahlman 1999). The idea was that
' Such a shift in the agenda of the World Bank can be traced to the international impact of the Narmada
Bachao Andolan that brought to the attention of people around the world the condition of adivasi villagers
in the state of Madhya Pradesh in central India due to displacement by the Sardar Sarovar Dam. The World
Bank withdrew from funding the project amid concerns that proper rehabilitation measures had not been
taken up and people had been uprooted from their villages without much concern for their livelihood and
future survival (Baviskar 1995).
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empowered with this information, the poor could then become responsible for their own
development. This fit in very well with the neoliberal, market-based understanding of
development that was being implemented in places like Chile and Egypt under the aegis
of the World Bank (Paley 2001a, Elyacher 2002).
Rural India became a crucible for numerous experiments and projects that sought
to bring information technology to rural areas and villagers were expected to become
empowered by obtaining information on market prices, government schemes, agricultural
technologies, health, and so on.2 One of the first such projects was started in January
2000 by a young dynamic bureaucrat in the district administration of Dhar district in the
central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh (MP). Dhar lies at the edge of the Malwa plateau
in western Madhya Pradesh and is one of the poorest districts of the country. MP has
historically placed at the bottom of the list of human development indicators in
comparison to other states (Shah 2005b, Vijay Shankar 2005, Ghosh 2005). It is also
home to the largest adivasi (tribal) populations in the country (20.3%) and nearly 55% of
the population of Dhar district is adivasi. Known as Gyandoot (Messenger of
Knowledge), the project used information technology to provide villagers with access to
government services and a means to air their grievances to the district administration. 3
2 For a sample of some descriptive and some critical studies on several ICT projects in India see Bhatnagar
and Schware 2000, Kumar 2001, Keniston 2001, Centre for Electronic Governance 2002, Kumar and
Jhunjhunwala 2002, Hudson 2002, Malhotra 2002, Singh 2004, Keniston and Kumar 2004, Kumar
Rajendra 2004, Kumar 2004, Benjamin 2005, Dileepkumar 2005, Kiran 2005, Srinivasan 2004, Kumar
2005a, Punathambekar 2005, Sreekumar 2007.
3 The project established computers in 21 villages of the district and linked them through radio wave
technology. Each computer ran software, which enabled villagers to access to government services such as
application forms for birth, death, caste and income certificates, complaints for non-working services like
broken handpumps, and market prices of major crops. A few anecdotes about benefits such as receiving old
age pensions, overdue salaries, repairing handpumps, and higher prices for produce became nuggets that
would repeatedly surface in newspaper articles, email listservs, and academic writing (See Kumar 2001,
Centre for Electronic Governance 2002, and Sreekumar 2007). See Map 2 for the location of Madhya
Pradesh in India and Map 3 for the location of Dhar district in Madhya Pradesh.
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The chief minister of MP, Digvijay Singh proclaimed that the project would bring the
benefits of information technology directly to the people and make the bureaucracy more
transparent and democratic (The Hindu 2000). The project won the prestigious
Stockholm Challenge Award for using information and communication technologies
(ICTs) for Community Development that year.
Yet, less than a year later, the Gyandoot project was floundering. Like several
other IT for development projects in India, Gyandoot became one in a long list of
failures. In most projects, few people participated, it was unclear whose needs were met,
and the road towards development was littered with unused computers and broken
equipment. In 2000, I interned with TARAhaat, one of the earliest organisations to put
computers in villages in northern Madhya Pradesh and then in 2001-2002, I worked with
n-Logue Communications to implement internet-based services for villagers in Tamil
Nadu. But having implemented and studied rural ICT projects and having seen them fail,4
the question that deeply troubled me was "What is it that we are trying to change?" It is
very exotic to show images of villagers in colourful turbans and women in saris
surrounding a computer-I had taken enough such pictures myself. But was the
information empowering them? If people used the kiosks did that amount to
"participation"? Did this mean we were bringing development? From whose perspective
was any change labelled as development?
4 I did a comparative study of three rural Internet kiosk projects in India based upon field work in northern
Madhya Pradesh with TARAhaat, as part of my honors thesis at Georgetown University in 2000-2001.
Then I spent a year (2001-2002) establishing village internet centres in the southern state of Tamil Nadu
and developing and driving various commercial online applications in agriculture, e-governance, health and
veterinary support under the aegis of the Indian Institute of Technology, Madras and the company n-Logue
Communications. In the summer of 2004, I conducted fieldwork in Sirsa district, Haryana, studying an e-
governance project started by a private company, Drishtee Dot Com Ltd. None of these projects were
successful in sustaining the provision of development-related services to villagers and most of the kiosks
have either closed down or have been converted to commercial cybercaf6s or computer training centres.
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Around the same time, ITC-IBD, India's largest agribusiness started another set of
village internet centres known as eChoupal, in the soyabean5 growing areas of Madhya
Pradesh, known as the Malwa plateau.6 The eChoupal was to provide farmers with
information on market prices of soyabean and help them get a better price for their crops
while helping the company reduce its procurement costs and increase its market share. By
2002, there were nearly 800 eChoupals in Malwa, in 2003, business schools like Harvard
and Kellogg were including them as a case study on how to use information technology
to connect with underserved market segments (Assisi and Gupta 2003), and in 2004, the
eChoupals also won the Stockholm Challenge Award in the e-Business category. Despite
the failure of many ICT projects, the eChoupals were consistently labelled a success.
My initial research in Malwa in 2002-03 started out with the aim of understanding
what had changed in the lives of villagers with the introduction of the eChoupals in the
context of a liberalised India post-1991. But, claims that the eChoupals were
transforming rural India and connecting farmers to a digital age rang hollow in face of
evidence that computers were not being used for obtaining information or conducting
transactions (Kumar 2005b). During my fieldwork, it soon became evident that much
more extensive change had happened in Malwa with the introduction of soyabean
cultivation starting in the 1970s itself. This was a cash crop which could only be
converted into value by processing it into soyabean meal or deoiled cake (DOC) and
soyabean oil. This linked farmers through a chain of intermediaries to processing
companies in India and consumers of meat abroad, where soyabean meal was used as
5 1 use the Indian spelling of 'soyabean' rather than the American 'soybean' because that is how it is
pronounced and understood in the Indian context by farmers, scientists, traders, processors, journalists, and
academics.
6 See Map 1 for the extent of soyabean cultivation in India in 2006 and Map 2 for the location of Madhya
Pradesh in India. See Map 3 for the location of the Malwa region in Madhya Pradesh.
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cattle-feed. Christened as the "Yellow Revolution" by scientists and policy makers, the
introduction of soyabean cultivation was considered to be the foremost achievement by
the state government to bring about the development of Madhya Pradesh.
Building upon this in my subsequent dissertation research I wanted to understand
the meaning of development as a historical transformation from the perspective of rural
villagers in Madhya Pradesh. However, when I started fieldwork in Ranipura village in
Dhar district in 2006,7 I could not connect computers or even the yellow revolution to the
lives of everyday villagers. The informational view of development embodied in ICT
projects was too narrowly transactional and ignored the broader agrarian context which
influenced any rural intervention. But even the view of development embodied in the
yellow revolution created a singular, heroic, teleological narrative that ignored increasing
concerns amongst farmers about growing water scarcity and problems related to mono-
cropping of soyabean. Further, the narrative enabled state actors to entirely appropriate
the agency for bringing about change.
In this dissertation I explore the narratives of development in relation to the
yellow revolution and the eChoupals based on fieldwork in Malwa for 18 months. My
fieldwork raises a different set of questions about development. Why are the realities on
the ground so different from what certain discourses of development lead us to expect?
What are the underlying social relationships and historical dynamics taking place that are
made invisible in these singular narratives of development? In trying to answer these
questions, I want to join other ethnographic analyses of development that shift the focus
of development from more abstract policy discussions to specific experiences of rural
7 See Map 3 for the location of Dhar district in Madhya Pradesh and Map 4 for the approximate location of
Ranipura in Dhar district.
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residents and their lives. Rather than narrowly utilising only the language of
development, which assumes a certain teleology and evolutionary dynamic, I want to
think about the transformations that have taken place in Malwa as "change" in a broader
sense because that is how rural informants in Malwa themselves talk about it. Given the
constant uncertainties present in the agrarian cycle, those I knew in Malwa did not
immediately assume there is a teleological direction to change.
In addition, as opposed to focusing on the impact of projects that seek to bring
about "development," this research shifts the emphasis to the agency of rural people and
to their own conceptions of "change." In the development literature, the question of
agency of those who are the "targets" of development projects has been conceived in two
distinct but problematic ways. On the one hand, postdevelopmentalists8 have argued for
abandoning the development apparatus altogether and to allow communities to figure out
on their own how to manage their resources and their lives (Escobar 1995b, 2000). But
their romanticised notion of communities denied agency to those who were marginalised
by social hierarchies at the community level; communities could be patriarchal, ecocidal
or casteist (Agarwal 1996, Corbridge 1998). Moreover, the assumption that communities
acted as cohesive units disguised the multiple, cross-cutting identities that members
usually inhabited and which often created conflicting goals. On the other hand, those
promoting market-led development have argued against state planning and development
schemes, which they claim are ineffective (Panagariya 2008, Kapur et al. 2008a, 2008b).
Instead, they call for empowering individuals with tools like information, credit, and even
8 The idea of postdevelopment originated in Latin America. Postdevelopmentalists argued that development
had done nothing except to promote a project of control and appropriation of resources from the world's
poor (Esteva and Prakash 1998). But their monolithic construction of development discourse and uncritical
glorification of community suppressed the heterogeneity of voices within both.
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direct cash transfers, and trusting them to be utility maximizing agents who would make
choices in their own best interests. However, this approach ignores structural constraints
as well as issues of power and inequality that circumscribe the choices people face and
fails to acknowledge the importance of people's institutions, infrastructure, material
inputs, skill development, and public investment in creating conditions for people to be
able to make choices in the first place (Shah 2008a).
This research approaches the question of agency in relation to development
somewhat differently. It asks, what are the ways in which rural people exercise agency
that are not recognized by dominant narratives of development? It places the narratives of
change framed around the eChoupal and the yellow revolution against the actual
struggles for change that rural people participate in. This research asks, what is the locus
of agency when rural people want to bring about change? What kinds of languages do
they deploy in talking, demanding, and understanding change? What gets excluded and
what is included in such conceptions of change? In doing so, I seek to invert prevailing
notions of participatory development where rural people are the "targets" of projects
conceived and implemented by someone else and instead focus on the agency of rural
people themselves in bringing about change.
The paradigm of participation has become widespread in development discourse
in recent decades. Yet it has also been increasingly questioned by scholars studying
development projects. Some have criticised its neoliberal version as a means to divest the
state of all responsibility for ensuring the welfare of poor populations and to put the onus
on the poor themselves (Paley 2001a, Sharma 2008). Others have shown how it is an
exercise limited to discussions and consultations with "target" populations but without
Introduction
Richa Kumar
giving them or their representatives, actual decision-making powers (Walley 2004). Still
others see it as continuing the problems inherent in older development projects-that of
reproducing the social hierarchy rather than empowering the poor and the marginalised
(Mosse 2005).
This research argues that development projects and discourses of development,
even when attempting to be participatory, usually fail to engage at a deeper level with the
structures of power that frame people's lives. I show how this is the case in Malwa where
a prevailing discourse on information and empowerment speaks past farmers' everyday
struggles in the marketplace; how depoliticised schemes of the state fail to engage with
questions of livelihood that are of vital importance to adivasi labourers; and where the
language of rights and entitlements fails to help women overcome oppression. While the
people subjected to such projects are "always refraining, rethinking, and reshaping
virtually everything that [comes] their way," (Ortner 2001: 78) they are also involved in
other struggles to overcome exclusion and exercise agency, which the language and
practice of development does not recognize. In Malwa, these arenas include political
struggles to obtain employment and higher wages and cultural projects such as religious
revivalist movements like Swadhyay. Swadhyay is a Hindu religious movement started in
the 1950s in western India that emphasizes the equality of all human beings and erases
the boundaries of caste and patriarchy. It has become very popular in parts of Malwa in
the last 20 years and has given an opportunity to women and lower caste groups to
exercise agency and bring change to their lives. This research argues that such struggles
need to be taken seriously and the arenas in which these struggles take shape must be
included in thinking about change.
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This dissertation engages with two analytical frameworks to explore questions of
social transformation and structures of power. The first is a specific critique of various
types of development discourse and development projects that have been elaborated by
national and international elites during the last forty years. These grand schemes, to
invoke James Scott (1998), have mostly steered away from engaging with the structures
of power framing rural society, and thus, have failed to bring about much change in the
condition of rural people in central India. The second is a recovery and foregrounding of
alternate arenas of struggle that rural people in Malwa have been participating in. This
research argues that these political and cultural projects, although unrecognized by the
language and practice of development, are vital platforms for rural people to exercise
agency and bring about change.
Historicizing and Critiquing the Idea of Development
The term "development" gained currency in the historical juncture after WWII
when decolonisation began and the model of the nation-state with its fixed borders,
permanent militaries, and massive bureaucracies was replicated all over Asia and Africa.
People of vastly different cultural and political histories were classified as citizens
belonging to countries that were either 'developed' or 'under-developed' and
development was defined a set of practices to improve economic growth in countries as
measured through state-defined economic statistics (Abraham 1998, Escobar 1995a). The
word "develop" originally related to "certain ideas of the nature of economic change,"
which in the 19"' century became the "idea of a society passing through definite
evolutionary stages" (Williams 1985: 103). The idea of development can be traced back
to colonial projects of improvement in Africa and Asia, which were central to the
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establishment, exercise and expansion of the colonial state's power (Hodgson 2001,
Chatterjee 1993). In the 1930s and 40s, faced with nationalist protests in the colonies and
labour unrest at home, colonial powers such as France and Britain used the idea of
development to reassert their authority and expertise and relegitimize their imperial
mandate (Cooper 1997).
With decolonization, development provided a new conceptual framework to
stratify countries along a continuum from developed to under-developed which supported
continued engagement of imperial powers in shaping the future of their ex-colonies. But
at the same time, development was appropriated by national elites in the newly
independent countries as a language of entitlement based on a "repudiated past and an
imagined future" allowing them to reject the oppression and assimilate the best that
Europe had to offer-a modem life and improved living standards (Cooper and Packard
1997). Multilateral institutions like the World Bank and United Nations formed at that
time along with bilateral aid agencies became the sites where meanings of development
were debated and contested. The Cold War created opportunities for the United States
and the USSR to intervene in newly independent countries and increase their influence by
offering technical assistance, and development became their mandate to enable the
transition to a capitalist, industrial economy or a modem, socialist one (Ludden 1992,
Cooper and Packard 1997). In the 1970s the meaning of development shifted towards the
amelioration of poverty and material want (Ferguson 1994, Sen 1988) led in part by new
aggregations of poverty statistics presented by development economists and shifts in
leadership at the World Bank (Finnemore 1997).
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In the 1980s and 1990s, there were several ideological shifts in thinking about
development that set the stage for some of the changes that I saw unfolding during the
time I did my fieldwork. By this time, disillusionment with development had set in. All
the hopes of transformation raised by the demise of colonialism and the promise of
development in the newly independent nation-states in Africa and parts of rural Asia had
come to a nought. Amidst this failure, there emerged several critical studies of
development projects by anthropologists. James Ferguson's influential book on Lesotho
pointed out that the technical and bureaucratic language of development projects
obscured the deeply politicized role they played in reconfiguring power relationships,
especially in extending bureaucratic power (Ferguson 1994). Other critics argued that
development projects increasingly reproduced unequal power relationships locally and
disempowered the poor (Scott 1985, Mosse 2005). Development was further criticized for
its teleological associations with progress (Ferguson 1999), its bias towards high-
modernism (Scott 1998), and privileging expert (usually western) knowledge over
indigenous forms of knowledge (Gupta 1998, Lansing 1991, Agrawal 1995, Pigg 1996,
Walley 2004). 9
Second, there was a shift away from conceptualizing development as the
responsibility of the state, especially in the context of the demise of communism and the
end of the Cold War, and the resurgence in free market models of "development". A
credit squeeze in the 1980s created further financial pressure to slow down interventionist
programs by the state. The views of a small group of neoliberal economists deriding
corrupt and extractive (dirigiste) states became dominant especially in the context of
9 In places like Nepal, the language of development was also used by elites and development brokers within
countries as a social marker to stratify people as traditional and backward and themselves as modem and
developed (Pigg 1992, Shrestha 1995).
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failed programs of state-led development (Cooper and Packard 1997, Harvey 2005).
Development increasingly became about promoting free markets, free trade, and
individual entrepreneurship. Further, neoliberal development promoted and relied upon
the growth of information and communication technologies to enable aggregation of vast
stores of information to guide actions in the marketplace (Harvey 2005). This was
accompanied by the agenda of good governance where governments were expected to
enforce contracts, uphold the law and prevent corruption, to ensure free markets worked
efficiently (Corbridge 2007).
Third, the concept of civil society was revived as a counterpoint to the power of
the state in countries shifting away from communism towards democratic forms of rule
(Paley 2001b). Civil society usually refers to a public space of discourse that is separate
from the state and is able to influence state policy to a varying degree (Taylor 1990,
Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001). A sovereign democratic state's legitimacy is often derived
from the popular will of civil society (Chatterjee 2004). In the 1990s, multilateral
development organisations started describing the failure of forming stable democratic
governments in Africa to a supposed lack of a thriving civil society, a discourse criticized
by anthropologists (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999). Anthropologists like Julia Paley
(2001b) have argued that rather than promoting greater democracy, strategies to promote
civil society have become synonymous with legitimizing the weakening of the state's
welfare functions and shifting the onus of development to the poor themselves. Paley
further argues that such a shift erases the historical distinction between the state and civil
society and raises questions whether the state can be held accountable for its development
functions any longer (Paley 2001b: 3).
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Fourth, there was a shift towards participatory development which was a response
by multilateral and bilateral development agencies with the aim of involving local people
in discussions of development and including non-governmental organisations as partners
in development. Although people were "led to believe that participation meant the right
to share in decision making," in practice, participation could often be "ignored entirely"
by project organizers or "reduced to the mere solicitation of opinions" (Walley 2004:
258). Participatory development was usually about target populations taking part in
someone else's projects. Neoliberal models of development conceptualized participation
as empowering rational individuals and giving them the means to become responsible for
their own well-being or development (Elyacher 2002, Sharma 2006). In efforts to reduce
the welfare state, these models took away resources from the poor and marginalised and
expected them to pay for making development interventions in education and health
sustainable (Paley 2001a).
This research argues that the idea embodied in ICT projects like the eChoupal that
providing information alone can empower farmers and bring about development frames
empowerment as narrowly transactional, and overlooks broader structural processes of
disempowerment that function in global agrarian markets like those of soyabean. Instead,
it ethnographically demonstrates how farmers engage in struggles over power in the
marketplace that are not recognized by this dominant discourse of information.
In doing so, this research argues that the focus of development must shift from
seeing how target populations are resisting or reshaping projects of others, to
understanding and participating in projects formulated by "target" populations
themselves. Anthropologist Sherry Ortner (2001) makes a distinction between a form of
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agency that expresses the ability or inability to exercise power within relationships
(through domination and resistance), and another form of agency that expresses the
ability of people to formulate and enact their own projects in the world.10 The latter is
defined by Ortner as the "agency of intention." Focusing on the agency of intention
allows us to see "people having desires that grow out of their own structures of life,
including very centrally their own structures of inequality" (Ortner 2001: 81). This
research illustrates how such projects become frameworks for people to exercise agency
and engage with their fundamental aspirations about their lives.
Unlike the postdevelopmentalists, this research does not argue for uncritically
glorifying a village community in places like Malwa. It acknowledges that communities
come together on the basis of identities and interests that are constantly shifting and
coalescing (Sharma 2008, Walley unpublished manuscript). People's relationships and
social positions produce cross-cutting multiple identities and interests that are often in
conflict. This research argues that the platform of development does not allow the role of
power in framing social relationships to be discussed. Development scholars have argued
for engaging with development, despite its multiple failings, because it has kept poverty
on the agenda as a discussable issue (Ferguson 1994, Cooper and Packard 1997, Parpart
1995, Corbridge 1998). But by framing the question of poverty outside the question of
power, development refuses to recognize struggles of power that people are involved in.
10 See Karp 1986, Abu-Lughod 1990, Ortner 1996, and Ahearn 2001 for further discussions of the concept
of agency as theorized by anthropologists.
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State-led versus Market-led Development in India
Internationally, the shift towards market-led development took place on an
intensive scale in countries of Latin America and Southeast Asia. The idea that the state
was expected to create the conditions to enable an institutional market framework
(enforcing contracts and framing rules of engagement), but then it was to stay out,
became popular in these places. The self-regulating market was expected to allocate
resources efficiently and bring about economic growth (Colclough et al. 1991). Much of
the critical discussion against market-led models of development has come from those
studying Africa where international development agencies play a dominant role in
organising development projects and most countries are characterised by weak states
lacking control over resources.
In India, however, the neoliberal emphasis on markets to the exclusion of the state
played out somewhat differently than in other regions. The state has remained central to
discussions of development even in the period after liberalisation for two main reasons.
First, India has been a mixed economy from the time of independence in 1947, even
though planning played a vital role in shaping policy during the 1950s and 1960s. For
instance, the state intervened in agrarian markets by establishing government-owned
market yards in the 1970s to regularize and monitor the sale of agricultural produce. But
more than 85-90% of the purchases in these market yards were undertaken by private
traders holding licenses to trade (Hanumantha Rao 2006: 56). Hence, it is a misnomer to
view projects like the eChoupals as a market intervention in agriculture competing with
state actors-in effect they are competing against older private intermediaries in the
Introduction
Richa Kumar
marketplace." Further, even the staunchest supporters of free markets in India such as
economists like Arvind Panagariya (2008) and Jagdish Bhagwati (1998) acknowledge the
necessity of the state in supporting areas of market failure and providing a safety net for
the millions of people below the poverty line, even as they disagree about the kind of
support that should be given. Second, India has been governed by a stable democratic
state that has used development as a justification for rule and has allowed groups to
successfully make claims upon it in the name of development. For example, agrarian
elites have been able to demand and obtain subsidies for electricity and fertilisers within
the framework of the green revolution that spread across several parts of India starting in
the 1960s. The state further announced minimum support prices (MSP) of various crops
and directly purchased 10-15% of foodgrains produced in the country at MSP, mostly
from the states of Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. Post-liberalisation in 1991, only a
few quantitative import restrictions on certain agricultural products were removed and no
action whatsoever was taken on phasing out agricultural subsidies, ceasing state
procurement of grain and the fixing of MSP for crops (Hanumantha Rao 2006). The
history of development in India raises important questions about the stark opposition that
is usually assumed between state and market actors and allows us to ask meaningful
questions about what are the actual transformations taking place in the lives of rural
residents.
1991 is considered to be a watershed year when the Indian economy was
liberalised by the Congress government and the tenor of development shifted away from
planning and towards the market. The government removed several trade barriers, de-
" Just like other private traders the eChoupal is also regulated by market yard officials and its promoter
company, ITC-IBD has to obtain a license to trade.
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licensed industries, and opened sectors such as the media, telecommunications,
automobiles, and others to private industry (Bhagwati 1993, Panagariya 2008). Short
term compulsive circumstances arising out of a balance of payments crisis and a
consequent structural adjustment program of the International Monetary Fund gave the
impetus for this shift. Although neoliberal economists considered this to be an ideological
victory and praised the central political leadership for keeping vested interests at bay
(Bhagwati 1993), others have argued that the reforms proceeded by stealth (Jenkins 1999)
and they primarily affected elite welfare, leaving areas more relevant to the masses
relatively untouched (Sachs et al 1999).
However, emphasis on this shift as a critical break in the history of development
in India, by policymakers and academics alike, has obscured much about the actual
transformations that have taken place in rural India over the last 20 years. Corbridge and
Harriss (2000) have rightly characterized the era of liberalization as the "reinvention of
India as a market economy." Such a reinvention serves to negate the history of the mixed
economic practices adopted by the state throughout the years of planning and the
existence of a vast private sector throughout the post-independence period (Sachs et al
1999, Gidwani 2008: 84). In the case of agriculture especially, the distinction between
state and market-led development has never been clear at any point of time. After
independence interventions in agriculture were a result of a variety of juxtapositions of
state actors and market actors. 12
12 Even in the green revolution, which was claimed by the state as a state-driven process of development of
agriculture, the technologies of water extraction (tubewells, pumps, etc.), technologies of mechanization
(tractors, tillers, spray pumps, etc.), and technologies of managing pests (pesticides) were all manufactured
and sold by private companies, ostensibly in a relatively unregulated marketplace (apart from the safety
regulations).
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By exploring the history of the introduction of soyabean cultivation in Malwa, this
research shows how global markets, private companies, government scientists,
government-promoted cooperative societies, and farmers themselves were all critical
actors in the story-one which began in the 1970s and not post-liberalisation. Each actor
had a different, possibly competing, conception of development ranging from alleviation
of protein malnutrition to self-sufficiency of edible oil in the country, and from saving the
country precious foreign exchange to becoming "good farmers." But more importantly,
the yellow revolution was the result of an imbrication of a variety of forces stemming
from a myriad set of human and non-human actors, such as the technical characteristics
of soyabean, the geology and cropping practices of Malwa, and the properties of water
and wheat (Bijker and Law 1992, Latour 1992, Mitchell 2002, Caliskan 2007, Gidwani
2008).
This framing of the state in opposition with the market is a symbolic construct
that is the foundation of the neoliberal framework. Such a symbolic ideological
distinction is used by policy makers and academics to emphasize issues of efficiency of
using resources as technical matters (that should not be in the hands of a messy,
politicized state) and thus, to mask political questions of access to resources and of
inequality and power. This approach collapses complex relationships between credit, land
endowment, and access to infrastructural facilities, for instance, into a singular variable-
"lack of information"-that is deemed to be ailing farmers. The focus of development
then becomes the following: is the state a better (or more efficient) provider of
information to farmers or is it the market? This takes attention away from more pressing
concerns of farmers such as availability of proper roads, cheap transport, and access to
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institutional credit, which may require both private and public interventions. Further,
recognizing that the state and the market are deeply imbricated in each other and cannot
be separated, forces one to go beyond questions of mere allocation towards understanding
how the power of these institutions is reworking social relationships and is also being
shaped by them.
Participating in Alternative Arenas of Struggle
In thinking about alternative arenas of struggle, I have found Partha Chatterjee's
concept of "political society" (2004) drawn from Michel Foucault's notion of
"governmentality" as a fruitful device to "think with and against" (John and Deshpande
2008: 83). Chatterjee is amongst the foremost theorists of postcolonial society and
politics today who foregrounds larger issues of justice and to some extent, historical
change. He may be amongst the earliest to transfer the concept of "governmentality"
described by Michel Foucault (1991) to understand colonial and postcolonial rule in his
path-breaking work, The Nation and its Fragments (1993).
In contrast to sovereignty, which is characterised by rule over territory,
governmentality, according to Foucault, is rule over populations with the explicit purpose
of the welfare of the population, which is achieved by transforming the conduct of the
population using technologies of rule (Foucault 1991). While Foucault's analysis drew
upon the experience of modern European states, Chatterjee reconfigured his concept to
describe colonial rule. Chatterjee (1993) argued that colonization was a different form of
political rationality where the colonial project was to improve the population and
transform it into a self-governing, self-disciplined civil society like the west. Yet, at the
same time, this project always considered colonized populations as the 'other',
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specifically along racial lines, and thus, incapable of self-governance (cf. Scott 1999,
Prakash 1999). In the late 1980s, historians of South Asia such as Bernard Cohn were
amongst the earliest to describe how technologies of rule under colonialism helped mould
and essentialise many of the identities and images of colonized people that came to be
thought of as traditional and, thus, requiring transformation to become developed (Cohn
1987, 1996, Pant 1987, Dirks 1992).13 However, Chatterjee's work was amongst the first
to describe and theorise such a process in India as governmentality.
David Ludden (1992) has traced the roots of India's development regime to this
form of colonial governmentality where technologies of rule such as enumeration,
surveying and measurement are used create knowledge of populations and thus, expand
state power. Historians have argued that the postcolonial Indian state continued to
exercise this form of political rationality, using development as the instrument to claim
legitimacy for centralized state power (Bose 1997).
In the particular context of central India, the work of anthropologists Amita
Baviskar and Nandini Sundar has focused on the plight of adivasis or tribals who form
more than 20% of the population of the state of Madhya Pradesh and who are amongst
the most marginalised groups in India today. Their work describes how technologies of
enumeration and permanent settlement to make populations legible to the colonial powers
for taxation and control, marginalized adivasis from access to land and forests, making
them more vulnerable and dispossessed (Baviskar 1995, Sundar 1997). Development
projects ignored such past histories of inequality and oppression, reframing the problem
in depoliticized terms as one of overpopulation or overgrazing, and blamed the failure of
13 See Dorothy Hodgson's book, Once Intrepid Warriors, on the Maasai for a similar argument made in the
context of Africa (2001).
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their solutions on the stubbornness and backwardness of the people (Ferguson 1994,
Hodgson 2001, Mitchell 2002).
Against this depoliticized history, there was a shift in the 1990s in the strategy of
development organisations to include a mandate to revive civil society in non-western
countries. Historically, the concept of civil society has its roots in western European
thought and refers to a public space of discourse that is separate from the state and is able
to influence state policy to a varying degree (Taylor 1990). As I argued earlier, civil
society was deemed to be the space of democratic politics and the failure of development
was blamed on the lack of a thriving civil society, especially in countries in Africa.
Whereas academics have questioned whether the western concept of civil society can be
transferred to explain political processes in non-western societies (Comaroff and
Comaroff 1999), Chatterjee (2004) has questioned the concept of civil society more
fundamentally from a postcolonial perspective.
He argues that "most people in the world" are governed not within the framework
of a state and civil society where they are individual rights-bearing citizens who can
make claims upon the state using the language of rights. Although theoretically, all
individuals in a democratic nation-state are rights-bearing citizens, Chatterjee argues that
in practice, such a framework is limited to a demographically limited subset, that he
labels the urban bourgeois civil society. Rather, he invokes the notion of a "political
society" which is the space created by "governmentalisation of the state." Here, people
are not individual citizens but are a part of populations that are enumerated and
categorised. The state derives "legitimacy not by the participation of citizens in matters of
state but by claiming to provide for the well-being of the population" (Chatterjee 2004:
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34). Chatterjee argues that groups in political society inhabit a space of illegality. 14 Yet
they make claims upon the state using the language of rights and invoke the moral
obligation of the state to think about their welfare.15 In effect, he inverts Foucault's
structuralist argument to give agency to the people who are governed through
technologies of rule, calling it "politics of the governed." 16
Recently, this issue has emerged as a high profile contested arena of argument in
relation to democratic politics and development particularly in India. Chatterjee's book,
The Politics of the Governed (2004), and his article "Democracy and Economic
Transformation in India" (2008a) which applies the framework of political society to
rural India, have generated responses from various academics studying issues of
development and equity in India (Corbridge 2007, Sharma 2008, Shah 2008b, Baviskar
and Sundar 2008, John and Deshpande 2008), many of them studying and working in
Madhya Pradesh. 17
Stuart Corbridge (2007) has highlighted Chatterjee's work as an important
contribution towards critiquing the new agenda of participatory development, which
glorifies civil society and good governance. Chatterjee suggests that the very rules that
14 Chatterjee's analysis centres on urban India and his use of illegality reflects the illegal nature of the
existence of most slum dwellers and migrants in India's burgeoning cities. Taking his examples from
Kolkata, Chatterjee describes the political action undertaken by slum dwellers to continue to occupy the
land on which they live (in the face of constant threat of eviction), to obtain electricity connections, install
drainage and sanitation systems, and to obtain officials papers such as voters' ID cards and ration cards
without which they cannot claim an existence as legal citizens. However, this framework of illegality does
not map onto rural India in quite the same way and can further marginalise the poor as I argue later on in
this introduction.
15 Groups which form a part of political society can be based on identities such as ethnicity, caste, race,
religion, or tribe or based on interests such as living in a squatter settlement or being part of an unorganised
firm.
16 1 owe this insight to Peter Perdue.
17 A discussion on the applicability of Chatterjee's framework to rural India has taken place in recent issues
of the journal Economic and Political Weekly. See Chatterjee 2008a and responses to it by Shah 2008b,
Baviskar and Sundar 2008, and John and Deshpande 2008, as well as Chatterjee's comments to their
responses (2008b).
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govern civil society frame the actions and claims of the groups in political society as
illegal. Thus, although these groups make claims upon the state using the language of
rights and morality, because their existence and their claims are deemed illegal, state
agencies only treat these claims as entitlements which are distributed on the basis of
political expediency (Chatterjee 2004: 40). Projects to promote civil society in
conjunction with good governance reject such politically-motivated (re)distributions as
corrupt and illegal. But this has the effect of furthering the marginalisation of "most
people in the world" who can only make their claims within political society, argues
Corbridge. In thinking about the agency of marginalised groups in rural India, does the
notion of political society help us characterize the alternative arenas for struggles that
rural groups are participating in?
Chatterjee maps civil and political society along the lines of class, arguing that
political society is composed of the poor and the rural. But this emphasis, at the risk of
excluding other lines of stratification such as caste, religion, region, and gender to name a
few, can be problematic when mapping it over the rural, agrarian landscape in India
(Shah 2008b). Chatterjee removes low caste groups and tribals, who constitute the bulk of
poor farmers and landless labourers, from the category of political society arguing that
they are marginal groups who do not have enough political power or representatives they
can hold accountable (Chatterjee 2008a: 61). Instead, he frames the opposition between
civil and political society as one between urban bourgeois corporate capital and
"peasants," presumably medium and large farmers. 18 This mapping is based upon his
18 More than 70% of farmers in India farm less than one hectare of land and are considered to be marginal
farmers who are also dependent on other sources of income. A further 16% are small farmers cultivating 1-
2 hectares of land (NSSO 2006). Having excluded marginal farmers from political society, Chatterjee
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experience of the agrarian milieu of West Bengal, which has seen increasing peasant
unrest in the face of land acquisition by the state for the purpose of industrialisation. He
argues that peasants are making morally righteous demands upon the state in the face of
the looming threat from corporate capital, particularly after liberalisation of the Indian
economy in 1991 (Chatterjee 2008a, 2008b).
However, in the context of the yellow revolution in Madhya Pradesh, medium and
large farmers have used categories like "good farmers" [acche kisan] to make claims
upon the state which are at the same time deployed to exclude poor and marginalized
farmers from any access to the land or to subsistence. Can these claims be considered
morally righteous? Moreover, rather than being a recent response to the looming threat of
corporate capital, the claims made upon the state by these farmers go back to the green
and yellow revolutions that took root in the 1960s and 1970s. 19 By positioning this group
against corporate capital exemplified by companies like Cargill, Monsanto, and ITC-IBD,
which are penetrating the rural agrarian market, Chatterjee positions it as a marginalised
group. But this research argues that by generally valorizing the methods of medium and
large farmers to make claims upon the state as a legitimate expression of "political
society," Chatterjee's framework is reinforcing the power of those who are already
presumably is referring to the 30% small, medium and large farmers, who are usually upper caste, and who
continue to have a stake in agriculture and can expect their next generation to live off the land.
19 In the 1960s, a combination of the availability of hybrid seed technologies, populist measures of the state
to ensure its own survival, and a growing demand for state support of rural interests through subsidies
coalesced into the green revolution and subsequently brought benefits to a group of middle to large farmers
in select areas of the country (Varshney 1995, Rudolph et al. 1987, Gupta 1998, Frankel 2005). These
benefits included waiver of unpaid cooperative society and national bank loans, subsidized electricity, and
subsidies on fertilisers, and an increase in the minimum support price (MSP) when the state purchases food
crops such as wheat and rice. Since then such demands are routinely promised in various election
manifestos and usually fulfilled prior to the next round of elections. The cooperative societies became one
of the primary means for politically-mediated (re)distribution of government largesse, which was always "a
matter of constant political negotiation and the results [we]re never secure or permanent" (Chatterjee
2008a: 58).
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powerful members of rural society.20 Mapping the rural has to take into account specific
geographies, agricultural histories and practices, and social and political relationships, for
it to reflect spaces of struggles inhabited by marginalised members of rural society. All
these specificities can be distinct and different for various parts of India, including within
the vast state of Madhya Pradesh itself.
On the other hand, Chatterjee's framework of political society recovers hitherto
maligned spaces of democratic political action as important avenues for making claims
upon the state and making it accountable. It is important to this discussion of
development because it brings up the question of accountability. Development projects
are generally accountable to the donors and project organisers as opposed to the people
who they are supposed to develop, in contrast to elected representatives who are
accountable to the people in their constituencies. It is within the space of political society
that the latter respond to the claims of various constituents. Even when representatives of
marginalised groups, such as landless adivasi labourers, are co-opted by more powerful
political interests, the space to make morally righteous claims upon the state is still
available to them in the form of political action. Compared to depoliticised development
interventions that usually redistribute resources to marginalised populations without
specifically addressing the question of marginalisation itself, political action is a crucial
platform where marginalised groups can overcome their weaker position by holding a
democratic state accountable and by obtaining entitlements. By rejecting the claims of
20 Ludden (1992) historicizes this process when he argues that the nationalist state inherited the discourse of
improvement of agriculture using scientific techniques from the colonial state. This discourse enabled the
entrenchment of the centralized state's power to provide productivity-enhancing inputs and change agrarian
property relations and at the same time enabled agrarian profit makers, not subsistence-oriented peasants, to
increase their economic and cultural power in a process that was a continuation from late pre-colonial
times.
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political society in the name of good governance, development fails to recognize the
importance of these alternative arenas of struggle that engage directly with questions of
power and that strongly influence any possibilities for change.
I would like to push the point of recognizing alternative arenas of struggle beyond
the importance of politics alone. As James Ferguson (1994) and now Partha Chatterjee
(2004) have argued, development discourse leaves out politics from the frame of
discussion. This research seeks to show that development discourse also considers "un-
discussable" other aspects about people's social and cultural lives (cf. Walley
unpublished manuscript). The lines of exclusion 21 that frame rural society are often taken
as a given by development projects. Even if development assistance is targeted to
marginalised groups such as "poor women" or "adivasis," such projects might hope to
overcome the forms of social exclusion that people find themselves in but they don't lend
themselves to critiquing the nature of those lines of exclusion or how they came to be in
place. At the same time, development discourse sees as extraneous any cultural projects,
including those that provide a platform to engage in struggles against the lines of
exclusion in society. Development discourse views culture either as traditional, and hence
something to be overcome, or as a justification for certain practices and hence, to be
valorised. Between the modernizers and the cultural relativists, the idea of culture as a
process of meaning making and a means of social organisation through ties of kinship
and ritual, as well as other ways, is lost.
This research suggests that cultural projects can be fruitful arenas of struggle
against exclusions in society. In the case of Malwa, this has emerged through a religious
21 I owe this phrase to Christine Walley.
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revivalist movement known as Swadhyay which has helped marginalised groups
overcome exclusion generated by a caste-based and patrilineal society. Swadhyay does
not accept caste differences and is based on the central tenet that each person is equal-
the same blood flows through all our bodies. It is based on Hindu philosophy espoused by
the Gita, a holy book part of the mythical epic of Mahabharata and was founded in the
1950s by a Brahmin from Maharashtra. It is popular in parts of western India (Hardiman
2007: 57-60), and took root in Ranipura in 1995. Development practitioners might expect
to see Swadhyay as supporting Hindu religious practices that marginalise women and
lower castes. But in contrast, by participating in this movement, upper caste women and
semi-educated adivasi families in Ranipura have been able to exercise agency and feel
empowered through culturally constructed subject positions. Young girls and married
women are able to challenge patriarchal controls over their physical movements, their
voices, and their ability to become literate-creating possibilities for even greater control
over choices made in their lives.
Sherry Ortner, in a discussion of agency amongst the Sherpa mountaineering
community in Nepal, argues that although symbolic orders like cultures or discourses are
systems of domination, such forms generate meanings through which subjects are able to
formulate actions and enact their intentions and desires (1997). This enables a discussion
of empowerment that can take place within cultural contexts, with the recognition that the
same context is also structuring the actions and intentions of subjects. Swadhyay provides
one such cultural context that enables some women and some adivasis to resist
marginalisation while at the same time has the potential to disempower upper caste men
who have customarily formulated and maintained lines of exclusion in rural society. The
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discourse of development does not acknowledge that cultural projects like Swadhyay can
play a role in providing alternative arenas for struggles of marginalised groups, and in the
process, bring about change that addresses the deep aspirations of their lives in ways that
discourses of development may not. In paying attention to cultural projects like
Swadhyay, this research also resists an uncritical condemnation of all religious activities
as fundamentalist. The heterogeneity in cultural practices and the possibility of positive
transformation through cultural politics should be explored as an equally important
alternative arena of struggle.
Negotiating Social Respectability in Malwa
Before I could begin extensive ethnographic research in Malwa, I had to first
learn the importance of creating and maintaining social respectability to make people
comfortable in their interactions with me and enlist their support for long term research. I
first conducted research in Malwa in December 2002 and January 2003 when I was
specifically studying the eChoupals, internet centres started by ITC-IBD, India's largest
agribusiness. I returned to Malwa in July 2005 for another short stint researching the
eChoupals, this time in Sehore district. My dissertation research began in January 2006
and my first task was to find a village. I intended to spend a year or so living there and
doing research, and to explore what ordinary farmers thought about the yellow revolution
and the eChoupals. Since the Malwa plateau was the region in MP which grew the most
soyabean, I decided to choose a village around its main city of Indore. But I did not
realise how difficult it would be to find the "right" village for my research. The difficulty,
I would later realise, stemmed less from the characteristics of different villages from
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which I was trying to choose and more from my own social positioning as a lone woman
researcher with no suitable local connections to categorize me in a respectable role.
Since I had no personal connections to the Malwa region, I started with meeting
agricultural policy-makers and soyabean scientists to ask about potential villages I could
study. I met people at the Agricultural Department in the capital city of Bhopal and
scientists at the main soyabean research centres in MP-Sehore Agricultural College in
Sehore town and the National Research Centre for Soyabean in the city of Indore.
Through them I was directed to meet farmers in Dewas, Ujjain, Indore and Dhar districts
who had connections with these research institutes. These farmers were described to me
as "good farmers" [acche kisan] who implemented new techniques, participated in seed-
breeding programs and pursued the goal of higher productivity. I stayed in the city of
Indore and travelled by myself using a hired car and driver to visit these farmers who
lived within a 100-kilometer radius of the city. Their homes and farms reflected a
revolution. With multiple tractors, threshers, even harvesters in their houses, small
warehouses to stock their produce, and large houses made of concrete and with modem
furniture and appliances, they looked as prosperous as any urban middle class or even
upper middle class family. But after meeting four or five of them, I increasingly felt that
these were not the farmers I wanted to study.
I was looking for the bullock farmers rather than the tractor farmers, who I had
met in various villages during my earlier stints of research. I wanted to pick an ordinary,
average, not-so-well-off Indian village and study the yellow revolution from the
perspective of the people inhabiting it. My main criteria included a plurality of castes,
average population size of about 500-600 people, somewhat distributed landholding, and
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not very rich farmers. Even if I wanted to choose one of the villages of these rich farmers,
none of them agreed to host me in their own village nor offered to help me in finding a
village to study. One of them, a young farmer in his late twenties from Dewas district,
whose family I visited several times during my first six months in the field, even
dissuaded me from my quest. He cited practical concerns and said that a young woman
like me should not think about living in any village. However, I did not pay heed to his
advice. I kept travelling to different villages around Indore and meeting farmers,
scientists, government officials, soyabean processing company owners, and other
acquaintances I had made during my stay in the city.
As I learnt more about Madhya Pradesh, I realised that part of my problem
stemmed from the diversity of the place. At the end of colonial rule in 1947 Madhya
Pradesh was created as fractious union of areas made up of princely states in Malwa and
Bundelkhand, which had been under indirect British rule, and tribal areas in Central
Provinces and Berar, which were directly ruled by the British. In 1956, after the linguistic
reorganization of the states in the country, anything leftover in the central part of the
country became a part of MP, making it an amalgam of differences (Wilcox 1968). The
southern-eastern part of the state and the south-western edge was thickly forested forming
part of the Vindhya and Satpura mountain ranges. These hilly regions were mostly
inhabited by adivasis, who had been pushed into less fertile areas in the 19t" century with
the conquest of parts of MP by Rajputs and Marathas. South of the mountains were the
plains of Nimar through which the majestic Narmada river flowed along the southern
boundary of the state, and which were inhabited mostly by Patidar farmers from Gujarat
(Baviskar 1995). The northern and north-eastern areas received heavy rainfall and were
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part of the Indo-Gangetic plain. The western part consisted of the Malwa plateau, a
section of the of the large Deccan trap that was a result of layers and layers of volcanic
rock and lava melt. This area has historically been the most prosperous part of the state
both agriculturally and through links with trading networks in Bombay and Gujarat. It
received medium rainfall and farmers grew cotton, opium, sugarcane, and primarily,
wheat. Each of these regions has disparate geographies, languages, cultural practices, and
political organisation, making any comparative analysis across the entire state riddled
with difficulties. More problematically, the districts of Sehore, Dhar and Dewas straddle
the Malwa plateau, the Vindhya mountains, and the Nimar plains-hence any
information about these districts as a whole is a result of a generalisation across a chasm
of difference. Further, Madhya Pradesh does not have a systematic railway network
connecting important centres because it was part of two different historical units-
princely states and British India. The railway was established by the British in the late
19th and early 20th century. It followed either networks of commerce or places of military
importance. Consequently, many districts in MP are still off the railway grid entirely,
making commerce and travel within the state very difficult.22
While preparing for fieldwork amongst farmers in rural MP, I also realised it was
one of the most under-studied parts of India. There were umpteen ethnographic
monographs and economic studies on agriculture in Punjab, Bengal, and Tamil Nadu.
The existing ethnographic research on rural Madhya Pradesh consisted of an ethnography
of a village in Dewas district conducted in the 1950s by Adrian Mayer (1960), whose
22 The total population of the state in 2001 was 60 million. The literacy level was 65% (female literacy was
50%). See www.mpinfo.org/ mpinfonew/english/factfile/mp.asp for a compilation based on the 2001
Census of India. According to government estimates in 2004-05, 38.3% of people in the state lived below
the poverty line, which was calculated at a consumption of Rs. 425 per person per month (PIB 2007).
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main focus was on caste and kinship, and two monographs on adivasis in the western and
eastern parts of the state (Baviskar 1995, Sundar 1997). Historical research on Malwa
focused on the opium trade during colonial times (Farooqui 1998) and on the competing
narratives of conquest and transformation of the region by the Marathas, the Rajputs and
the British during the 18th and 19t century (Sinh 1936, Srivastava 1966, Srinivasulu
1996). Socioeconomic research on the yellow revolution was limited to studies by
economists, such as those conducted by the Jabalpur Agricultural University in Sehore or
the National Research Centre for Soyabean in Indore. Their main concern was a cost-
benefit analysis of cultivation of soyabean and whether it remained a profitable crop for
farmers after 30 years of its introduction (Badal et al. 2000). There was no analysis of the
social, political, and cultural transformations associated with and taking place alongside
the introduction of soyabean cultivation, nor was there any recent study of ordinary
farmers in the state and how they saw such transformations over the last forty years. This
ethnographic research is an attempt to contribute towards filling this gap.
I had planned to move quickly to a village and start my detailed ethnographic
research in early 2006 but I had been unsuccessful and my stay in Indore had now
extended to more than two months. By this time, I was frustrated with not being able to
find a village and by the negative responses of farmers and traders towards my requests
for follow-up interviews. I could sense that my being a woman had caused some
consternation but I could not understand the reason for it. During my earlier research in
Haryana, Tamil Nadu, and Madhya Pradesh, I had always travelled alone and had never
faced difficulties being a woman. In fact, on the contrary, many people had trusted me
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more, let me into their homes, and I had obtained access to interview women and other
family members which a male researcher would have found difficult.
It was a fortuitous meeting with Karan Singh Pawar, the erstwhile Raja of Dhar,
which finally ended my quest. His uncle was the last ruler of the Dhar principality before
it was annexed to the Indian union in 1947. The district of Dhar is described as one of the
most "backward" districts of Madhya Pradesh, with an adivasi (tribal) population of
54.5%, scheduled caste population of 6.5%, 23 and literacy rates are less than 53% (Census
of India 2001a). The northern third of the district falls in the fertile Malwa plateau while
the southern two-third falls in the Vindhya mountains. Two main rivers of MP, the Mahi
and the Chambal originate here. The mountains are also home to one of the most
beautiful historical sites in MP, Mandu, famous for the tragic love story of Rani
Roopmati and Baz Bahadur in the 16th century. 24 The lower boundary of Dhar runs along
the Narmada river, and it is home to a number of oustees from the Sardar Sarovar dam.
Villages dotting the mountains are inhabited mostly by adivasis whereas villages on the
plateau have a mix of castes including many adivasis, Rajputs from Rajasthan, and
Patidars from Gujarat.
When I first arrived in Dhar in April 2006, the dry, empty landscape on both
sides, dotted with faded yellowing houses and broken wire fencing, looked tired and old
in the devastating heat of summer. A few old jeeps dotted the highway which was too
narrow for two buses to pass each other without one getting off the metalled section.
23 Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste, Backward Caste and Upper Caste are categories under the Indian
constitution which gives reservations in government jobs and educational institutions to backward caste,
scheduled caste, and scheduled tribe groups. Scheduled caste (SC) groups are the lower castes also known
as dalits or harijans. Scheduled tribes are tribals or adivasis who are also considered to be lower caste.
Backward caste groups are considered to be the lowest level of upper castes.
24 The ruler of Mandu, Baz Bahadur was defeated by the advancing Mughal army in the late 16th century
and Roopmati took poison and died to avoid capture.
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Dhar district is off the railway grid; there is no industry, and no business, except
agriculture.25 When the harvest is good, clothes shops, utensil and kirana [sundry] shops,
and other local businesses do well. In years of drought, businesses fail. The crumbling
infrastructure of the town of Dhar, including the constantly pot-holed roads, the lack of
drainage and continuous flooding in the rainy season, the extreme water shortage during
the summer months, are typical of many other towns in MP.
Karan Singh Pawar was in his early fifties and had studied at boarding school in
Dehradoon and completed his college from Delhi University. He came back to Dhar in
the late 80s when his father suddenly passed away to take care of the family's agricultural
business and farms. He started his political career standing for elections to the post of an
MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly of MP state) in 1993 from Dhar under a
Congress party ticket. He lost then, but in 1998 he won and became the MLA for five
years. He lost again in 2003. He had studied law after which he had also completed a
Ph.D. in agriculture. He immediately understood what had been going on with my
interactions with farmers and traders. To my surprise, he suggested that I needed to hire a
male research assistant. He explained to me, "The research assistant is not to help you in
your work. You probably do not need help on that front. But it is to make you socially
acceptable. People will feel more comfortable talking to you. And you will be safe."
I did not realise that I had been lacking social respectability all this while. But
then it finally made sense to me. In all my past research, I had travelled to several villages
in a region and interviewed villagers who were connected to village internet centres in
25 Pithampur, the Special Economic Zone in Dhar district privately manages its own roads, electricity and
other infrastructure. It functions more as a satellite for the city of Indore which is 20 km away rather than as
a part of the district of Dhar (see chapter four).
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some way. I was always introduced by representatives of the local organisation which
had set up those centres and the consent of the local organisation's managers was critical
in obtaining cooperation. Further, most people I interviewed had, usually, already been
interviewed in the past and knew what to expect. In contrast, in my dissertation research,
although I wanted to study the yellow revolution and the eChoupals, I wanted to do it
from the perspective of people living in a single village. I also intended to live in the
village and conduct fieldwork for over a year. Although I was visiting farmers with an
introduction from research scientists in Indore, they found my long term research plans to
be alien to the usual method of research associated with surveys and questionnaires. They
could not understand why I needed to spend one year when they could tell me all I
needed to know in an hour's time. If only I had brought along a questionnaire of
everything I wanted to know, they would help me answer it and I would be on my way.
My unstructured interviews seemed too casual and directionless to them, and I suspect,
they refused follow-up interviews thinking that I was not serious enough about my
research to provide them with a detailed questionnaire.
But more importantly, I was a married woman travelling alone and meeting with
male farmers inside their homes in a region where women could never ever think of
travelling alone anywhere. Both married and unmarried women did not even come to the
front part of the house to serve tea and water to guests, in contrast to what I had seen
happen during my research in other parts of rural India. Here the task was performed by
young boys instead. Even though I had an introduction from the agricultural institutes,
these farmers were always taken aback to see me all alone visiting their village for the
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first time.26 For the first time during my six years of conducting research in rural India,
being a woman researcher (and recently married) had become a liability.
After reaching several dead ends in trying to find a suitable village to study, my
meeting with Karan Singh Pawar turned things around. He found a "suitable" research
assistant for me and also suggested that I live in the town of Dhar rather than in the
village. Although initially I resisted, over time I realised that commuting to the village
everyday provided an independence to me that I would not have had otherwise. In a small
village like Ranipura, there was only one house with enough space for me to stay without
causing discomfort to the occupants and to myself. It was the only pacca house in the
village and belonged to the richest farmer who was also the unofficial headman. By not
staying there I had more flexibility in my movements in the village. Although I did lose
out on intimate details about villagers' lives and the kind of gossip and social interaction
that took place in the few hours after sunset, I think I benefited more in return by
obtaining the trust of marginalised groups within the village, especially adivasis and
lower castes. They treated me as an outsider rather than linking me to the rich farmer or
other upper caste farmers in the village. I believe that this made them more open in
sharing information with me about their relationships with upper caste farmers in the
village.
Karan Singh Pawar helped me find paying guest accommodation in the town of
Dhar and introduced me to my research assistant, Mr. Sunil Bhosle. He was a 40-year-old
26 I was also meeting male traders in local market yards where most women never ventured alone for any
purpose. The only women present there were those who had been hired by traders to work in small groups
to clean the soyabean and wheat of mud particles and other debris. Many traders refused to discuss details
with me in the market yard and show me the auction since it was a crowded place full of men jostling with
each other.
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government clerk from the Water Resources Department of Dhar. According to Pawar he
could do clerical work and was dependable-making him an ideal source of support. His
connection to Pawar was that he was from the same caste [samaj], a Maratha Rajput. His
wife was a school teacher in a private school in Dhar and he had a three-year old
daughter. I was apprehensive about working with him in the beginning. But in the end, if
there is one thing that turned my research around, it was the presence of Bhosleji with
me. With a keen eye and ear for politics in every single interaction, he would never tire to
regale me with stories of the politics of Ranipura village, of Dhar district, of Madhya
Pradesh and even of Delhi! He smoothed over initial interactions with people and
encouraged me to start going to the interiors of the house to talk directly with women,
while he spoke to the men. He guided me on questions of propriety and giving proper
respect to the various people we met. He saved me from embarrassment several times,
especially once when all women in the village would not be eating or drinking anything
all day, and keeping a fast for the long life of their husbands. Before we left for the
village, he said, "Madam you eat everything now but in the village, it will be better if you
don't ask or accept offers of tea. People will judge you badly." Although I was annoyed
initially, since I did not follow such rituals personally, I appreciated later on that his
intentions were always good. His presence finally made me socially respectable!
This research is richer and more animated because of him and my other assistant,
Jafar Khan, who drove us around Dhar district in his run-down jeep. Jafar bhai, as we
called him, was in his late twenties and had just got married a few months before he
joined us. He used to work as a driver for a local travel agency but decided to purchase a
second-hand jeep and become the owner-driver himself. He was finding it difficult to pay
Introduction
Richa Kumar
back the loan for his jeep which he had purchased through the Prime Ministers'
Employment Scheme (PMRY)-his loan account was in the bank where my landlady in
Dhar worked. I needed a mode of transport during the rainy season, which was the season
of soyabean and she arranged for him to work with me. By the end of my fieldwork, Jafar
bhai and Bhosleji had conducted an ethnographic survey in the village, photocopied
reams of paper from the Soyabean Processors' Association in Indore, followed farmers
from Ranipura around the Dhar market yard, and spent countless hours with me writing
field notes and interview discussions. They became a fixture at village events and helped
me to learn a great deal about the underbelly of the village than I could have done myself.
We made a curious trio. A female student from America, whose husband lived in Delhi
but hailed from Orissa, and who professed to be ignorant about her caste; an upper caste
Rajput Maratha who was acutely interested in politics, and a Muslim driver who had
grown up in a locality of Dhar inhabited mostly by Hindu families and who ended up
befriending more people in Ranipura than either of us.
Ranipura and the Yellow Revolution
Ranipura was the first village where Bhosleji and I were taken by Baghelji, a
Rural Agricultural Extension Officer of Jhumki block in Dhar district. I met him in the
Block Development Office where I was sent by Karan Singh Pawar to consult with local
officials to choose a village. Baghelji had been working in Ranipura since 1995 and said
that it was one of those few villages where people were most receptive to government
schemes and to outsiders. You will like this village, madam, he said. And he was right.
Ranipura is located at the edge of the Malwa plateau, about 16 km from the town
of Dhar, off the main highway. It is not one of the prosperous Malwa villages with a
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hundred feet deep black soil where Patidar and Rajput farmers farm tens of hectares with
tractors and harvesters running up and down the countryside. Ranipura is poor. With 565
inhabitants, it is an average sized village for the state of Madhya Pradesh. It comprises of
98 households. It has 21 upper caste Rajput families, 24 backward caste 27 Jat and Maru
families, 49 adivasi families (scheduled tribes) and four balais (dalits or scheduled castes)
who are the lowest in the caste hierarchy. Out of 98 households, small and marginal
cultivators constituted 73 households and they farmed about 90 hectares or 36% percent
of the total cultivable area in the village. 28 The remaining 26 households farmed 74% of
the village land. Amongst the small and marginal cultivators, 10 households had one or
two members holding a government job to supplement the income from agriculture.
According to the official Below Poverty Line (BPL) list, in 1998, 40 families of Ranipura
were listed as BPL whereas in 2003, this was revised to 18. However, if one pegged the
poverty level at 1$ a day per person, then at least 60 households would count as poor.
The lone pacca house in the village belonged to Suraj Jat, the largest landowner
and the village Patel, 29 but it was the Rajput families who held sway in village affairs and
it was Rajput men who dominated the conversation during my first visit sitting at the
Ram temple. I introduced myself as a student from the United States of America who had
come to study the changes that had taken place in Malwa with the introduction of
soyabean cultivation. Immediately, I was asked, how did you come to Ranipura? Bhosleji
27 Backward caste is a category under the Indian constitution to categorize certain sections of society that
are deemed to be economically poorer and with reduced opportunities for social uplift.
28 All households of the Rajputs (except one), fell under the small and marginal farmer category, cultivating
2 hectares or less. All adivasi and balai families also cultivated 2 hectares or less (see chapter four for
details).
29 Patel is a hereditary title from colonial times. The Patel was appointed by the Raja of Dhar and his
responsibility was to represent the village at the court in Dhar and be the tax collector. Although Ranipura
is not a panchayat (it comes under the Rangwasa panchayat) and does not have its own sarpanch
[headman], the Patel can be considered to be the village headman.
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elaborated that madam first came to Indore and from there she was directed to Karan
Singh Pawar in Dhar who then sent her to the Block Development Office in Jhumki, from
where Baghelji brought us to Ranipura. I told them that I wanted to understand their point
of view as opposed to the versions of the scientists and policy makers in Indore and
Bhopal.
The villagers of Ranipura accepted me because of three reasons-the introduction
through Karan Singh Pawar who was well-known to them and who had got a section of
the road built in the village through his MLA funds; the direct meeting arranged by
Baghelji who had been working in the village for more then 10 years and who was in
good terms with the Rajputs in the village who were from his caste; and the presence of
Bhosleji as an intermediary. These links gave me social respectability as well as placed
me as an outsider in the minds of villagers who was here to learn about them and their
lives. At the same time, I am Indian and Hindu and villagers also expected me to behave
according to certain cultural practices that they took to be universally applicable to
Hindus. They learnt that I was a married woman but did not see me wearing any symbols
marking me as such. They also asked me about my caste since my last name, Kumar,
signified no caste at all, and I always answered that I did not know what it was. I told
them that I had grown up in Bombay, did high school in Japan, and then college in the
United States and no one had ever asked me about my caste. I simply did not know. Both
these things created instability in villagers' minds as to how to categorize me within their
social and cultural framework. I was aware of how the markers of marriage and caste
would define me in particular ways in the minds of villagers and create expectations in
their mind about my behaviour. It would also influence their behaviour towards me
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depending upon where they perceived themselves to be in relation to me in the social
hierarchy. But I had not lived in India for nearly 10 out of the 12 years prior to starting
this research and neither of these markers had been significant in my own definition of
my identity. I wanted to be known as a student from the United States, whose parents
lived in China and whose husband lived in Delhi--partly to reduce people's expectations
that I conform to their perceptions of me as married Hindu woman and partly to generate
a productive space of instability where I could talk to them about these issues once we
got to know each other better. Although Bhosleji and Jafar bhai suggested several times
that I simply "make up" a caste and tell people so they can categorize me easily, I
resisted. Finally Bhosleji took to telling everyone we met that my husband was from
Orissa and he was a Patnaik, which is the same last name as the current chief minister of
the state. Hence, I was a Patnaik. Since most people were not aware of that last name and
were unable to quickly place it along a familiar hierarchy,30 such a label prevented
closure to the question while also allowing people to categorize me when introducing me
to others.
As I started my research through unstructured interviews, constructing
genealogies and participant observation, villagers were soon disconcerted by the lack of
questionnaires. They had seen many government schemes pass through their village31 and
had answered innumerable government surveys on health, education, family planning,
population, etc., that they now expected any research to take the form of a survey, with
30 Although caste in India refers to the four main categories of brahmin, kshatriya, vaishya and shudra,
most people understand caste through theirjati, a much smaller social grouping that is usually specific to a
region. Hence, people in Madhya Pradesh would not be able to quickly identify and hierarchically
categorize thejatis of people living in Orissa and vice versa (cf. Bayly 1999).
31 Ranipura's direct link to government schemes started in 1984 when it was selected as one of the earliest
villages to be adopted by the national fertiliser company, IFFCO, to promote the use of fertiliser in
agriculture.
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multiple choice answers. Open ended questions drew a blank look until Bhosleji tried to
reframe them as "survey" questions and people started responding. Usually such surveys
and schemes positioned people as "receivers" and the surveyors and scheme
implementers as "givers"--whether of knowledge or objects. Initially many villagers
would ask me at the end of an interview whether I had any new knowledge about
soyabean that I was here to share with them. Others enquired whether I had brought with
me something to handout to everyone-new seeds, pesticide sachets, or something else.
When Bhosleji and I told them this is "padhai" [study] and I was here to learn from them,
not teach them or give them anything, many refused to come back and talk to me again. I
had been introduced through Baghelji, the RAEO whose job it was to bring new
information and handouts to villagers and it was natural on their part to expect something
from me.
Upon meeting us for the first time, farmers apprehensively asked Bhosleji if I was
working for some multinational company or the government and what I planned to do
with all the information. I told them that this was research for my Ph.D. and that I would
write a book in the end. I was here to ask for their help in this task and unfortunately, did
not have anything to give in return. In effect, this research would help me obtain a degree
and serve my personal ends rather than help anyone directly in Ranipura. It was the most
accurate representation of my project I could give to people because I did not want them
to have expectations that my work would directly or indirectly help (or hurt) them in any
way. Over time, some of the people in Ranipura who had worked in government jobs
understood this as a "tour" that many government employees are sent on to get first-hand
knowledge about a place. They explained to others in the village that I was doing this for
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improving my chances of better employment in the future. People finally started opening
up to me when I began handing out colour photographs of them which I had taken during
my visits. Then the flood gates opened and women, men, children, everyone started
inviting me to their homes to take their picture. When I realized my value had increased
only because of my camera, I felt hurt; until I figured out that it provided an excellent
excuse to get to know new people in Ranipura.
The summer of 2006, when I started fieldwork in Ranipura, saw one of the
severest water shortages in the village. The handpumps were dry and the pond was
empty. Water had to be brought in drums from tubewells more than a kilometre or two
away. The village was without electricity for 12-14 hours a day and most households
used kerosene lamps for light. With about 25 households or one-fourth of the village
having built latrines, a majority of villagers defecated in the open fields. Ranipura had no
cement or tar road to connect it with the main highway or with fields nearby. During the
rainy season that followed, motorcycles and bullock carts could not easily traverse
outside the village. Everything had to be carried on the head-water pots and jerrycans,
fertiliser bags, green fodder for the animals, sickles, and hoes. Fifty percent of the village
residents were adivasis or tribals who have historically been amongst the poorest and
most marginalised groups in India. Leaky roofs, broken charpoys, and mud huts lined
their area of the village and one could get to it only by wading through 6 inches of mud.
Taking notes in the light of a kerosene lamp, I would recall the well-maintained roads and
the brightly lit up India Gate every evening in the city of New Delhi, and wonder, were
we living in the same country?
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People's footsteps created paths through wet muddy fields, and every path was cut
off with overflowing rain water from the fields. After the initial plowing and sowing,
tractors came back to their sheds in the village and sat there until harvest, especially in
2006 when it rained so hard and never stopped. Despite so much rain every summer there
was a severe drinking water shortage in Ranipura-it took me a long time to understand
that the technological complex which constituted the yellow revolution had an integral
role to play in making water excess and scarce at the same time.
But the yellow revolution was supposed to be a story about development. It was
described as the crop that brought double cropping to Malwa, that created rising incomes
by linking farmers to a global cash economy, and that brought monetary prosperity.
Ranipura had 8 tractors, 5 diesel threshers, about 80 working tubewells with motors, 27
motorcycles, 21 mobile phones (two owned by adivasis), 15 cable television dish
antennas and 20 colour televisions in 2006. But this consumerism rested uneasily against
a visual impact of poverty that was overwhelming. Mud houses with thatch or tin roofs,
poorly fed and generally unkempt children, women still washing clothes at the pond and
carrying water to their houses in pots on their heads, a run-down government school,
muddy water flowing around the houses of adivasis and around the village school, and
general low level of education amongst women and adivasis-how could this contrast be
explained?
Initially, I surmised that perhaps Ranipura's soil is not very productive and the
farmers are not able to earn enough. But by 2008, there were 14 tractors in the village,
nearly 60 mobile phones, several new motorcycles and almost 80 new tubewells had been
dug, out of which barely 10 yielded water, at a cost of more than I million rupees or
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$20,000. It is only on hindsight that I understood what was missing from the story of the
yellow revolution. It was not a lack of emphasis on things beyond the economic, i.e.
towards education, health, or infrastructure. It was a failure to recognize the role of power
in distributing the monetary benefits accruing from the yellow revolution. Much of the
"lack" of transformation or the perpetuation of what I saw as poverty was a result of
women and adivasis not having the power to control or appropriate the resources
resulting from growing a cash crop like soyabean.
On the other hand, the introduction of soyabean cultivation has helped poor
farmers stay on the land for a few more years. Soyabean is a rain-fed crop that can
survive across a range of moisture stresses-both excess and scarce. Unlike the green
revolution, the growth of soyabean did not depend on tubewell irrigation. Although
fertilizers improved the yield, the crop was sturdy enough to survive in less fertile soils.
Hence, even poor farmers could grow it and expect some output from the season. As an
integral part of the technological complex that has resulted in severe hardship due to
water scarcity, soyabean brought some financial prosperity to farmers across Malwa
regardless of caste or class.
This research dissects the narratives of development associated with the yellow
revolution and the eChoupals and questions their teleological and transactional views. At
the same time it places alongside them descriptions of alternative arenas of struggle
where rural populations are engaged in their own projects of change which are framed
around the deeper aspirations of their lives.
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Structure of the Dissertation
The first chapter of this dissertation is a historical overview of the yellow
revolution and what kind of development it represented in the minds of various human
actors such as government agricultural scientists, private processing company owners,
government cooperative society managers, and "good farmers." Drawing upon these
various narratives, I argue that the yellow revolution was a result of contingent
circumstances resulting from the coalescing of a wide variety of factors brought together
by the actions of human and non-human actors such as characteristics of the soyabean
crop, the soil of Malwa, and patterns of rainfall, to name a few. Further, I argue that the
yellow revolution was also about making "good farmers" [acche kisan] who were
connected to research institutes and who valued new technologies and higher
productivity. At the same time, these "good farmers," who belonged to the rural social,
economic and political elite of Malwa, used the category to make claims upon the state to
provide them with subsidized inputs, new varieties of seeds, and higher prices for their
output. In doing so, they further marginalised the claims of poor adivasi farmers to have
any right to subsistence from the land.
The second chapter explores the discourse of "information is power" from the
perspective of soyabean farmers in Malwa. I argue that projects like the eChoupals,
which seek to empower farmers by providing them with information on market prices,
create a narrowly transactional view of empowerment. This ignores structural constraints
related to transport and credit as well as larger processes of disempowerment
circumscribing farmers who participate in global soyabean markets. Instead, this research
points towards other arenas of struggle within the marketplace that farmers engage in
Introduction
Richa Kumar
such as disputes over weighing and measurement at the government-owned market yards
and disputes over quality at the eChoupal buying centres. The limited emphasis of
development projects on empowering farmers by providing information alone draws
attention away from these everyday battles that farmers participate in, and which, I argue,
should also be taken seriously.
The third chapter shifts emphasis to one of the most marginalised groups in India,
the adivasis, who form one-fifth of the population of Madhya Pradesh and more than 50%
of the population of Dhar and Ranipura. Most adivasis in Ranipura are farm labourers and
this chapter provides a historical overview of their material condition, which has
remained unchanged despite a plethora of state interventions such as land reforms and
handouts. Further, there has been no sustained political mobilisation by adivasis against
upper castes in Malwa, despite years of discrimination, along the lines of similar
mobilisations undertaken by dalits (scheduled castes) in the neighbouring state of Uttar
Pradesh in the last 20 years. The yellow revolution, I argue, has provided adivasi farm
labourers with an opportunity every year at the soyabean harvest to assert themselves in
economic relationships with upper caste farmers because of the creation of what I call an
"economy of haste." Recently, in conjunction with the introduction of a central
government employment scheme, the annual "economy of haste" has empowered adivasi
labourers to seek higher wages in other economic activity unrelated to the harvest as well.
This research emphasizes the role of political action by marginalised groups in making
claims upon the state to provide for their welfare through measures such as the
employment scheme. Unlike development projects where accountability flows towards
the donors, political representatives are directly accountable to the people of their
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constituency. By disparaging such political activity as corrupt and illegal, the language of
development denies marginalised groups an important arena of struggle that they
participate in to bring about change in their lives.
The fourth chapter brings into focus those in Ranipura who live in a space of
interruptions and who remain invisible in agrarian narratives that focus on farmers and
farm labourers alone. A majority of young people, both upper caste and lower caste,
cannot hope to make a living from the land they will inherit in the next 10 years or so.
Those who are somewhat educated do not want to work as manual labourers, yet they do
not possess the skills to do supervisory or managerial jobs. Their experience in places like
the industrial township of Pithampur, which is a Special Economic Zone with a plethora
of automotive factories, reveals an ambivalence characterised by incapability and
loneliness in the urban environment and a desire to return to the quality of life and
support system in the village. Further, the monetary benefits resulting from the yellow
revolution have bypassed most women in Ranipura, cutting across the caste and class
divide. The contrasting visual impact of poverty against consumerism seen in the villages
of Malwa is a direct result of the shift to growing a cash crop which can only be
converted to value through an intermediary in the market place-an activity that can only
be undertaken by men. Development projects, although targeted at disadvantaged groups
like women, fail to create the conditions to question the lines of exclusion that frame rural
society. This research argues that cultural projects such as Swadhyay provide an
alternative arena of struggle for some upper caste women and semi-educated young
adivasi men to overcome discrimination and exercise agency in bringing to fruition the
desires and aspirations in their lives. Only by recovering and foregrounding the agency of
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rural people in these alternative arenas of engagement with structures of power, can the
language and practice of development be enriched and we can move towards thinking
ethically about the future of rural society.
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Chapter One
Making "Good Farmers":
Development and the Yellow Revolution in Malwa
The "yellow revolution" in Malwa in western Madhya Pradesh (MP), which refers
to the shift to soyabean farming in the region, was proclaimed post-facto as a
development intervention by the state. This chapter explores multiple, often competing,
visions of development that are embodied in the "yellow revolution" from the perspective
of a variety of human actors associated with it. This includes government agricultural
scientists, private processing company owners, oilseed cooperative managers, and well-
to-do farmers. I argue that whereas state and market narratives about the yellow
revolution proclaim development to be a teleological and evolutionary process of change,
narratives of farmers in Malwa do not see change in this way. I recover the role of a
number of other actors, both human and non-human, in bringing about agrarian change,
which has included positive as well as negative effects over the course of the last forty
years.
This research argues that the language of development is inadequate to explain
agrarian change. Instead of using "development," farmers describe positive change as
"prosperity" and "plenty," words that embody within them the recognition that
agricultural change is always contingent upon the coalescing together of various factors,
many of which are not in farmers' hands. Unlike development, which has a moral
connotation of permanently moving away from a perceived backwardness (Pigg 1992),
prosperity denotes a state which may not be everlasting at all. Falling on hard times after
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a time of prosperity does not necessarily have a moral implication about a person or a
region-it invites investigation into multiple causes for such a decline while accepting
that decline is as much a part of change as prosperity (see Ferguson 1999).
By categorizing change in the language of development the postcolonial state is
able to claim a much greater role in social transformation and justify its existence as the
provider of development (Bose 1997, Ludden 1992). It also reinforces the authority of
powerful agents such as state and market actors to appropriate the language of
development and define its parameters either as the health of the poor or the health of the
economy, to the exclusion of all other narratives.
One such narrative defined by the postcolonial state through the yellow revolution
is that of the "good farmer" [acche kisan], through which farmers are evaluated solely on
their ability to produce more and at higher levels of productivity. This is similar to the
triumphant narrative of the green revolution in India, which linked farmers to the
development of the nation by emphasizing their contribution towards making India self-
sufficient in food grains. This legitimized the shifting of resources to farmers through a
package of high-yielding seeds, subsidized electricity, and cheap fertilizer. Likewise,
making "good farmers" through the yellow revolution in Madhya Pradesh meant a
legitimate shifting of resources towards farmers who fulfilled the obligations of higher
production and productivity to bring about development. At the same time, through the
mechanisms of democratic politics, farmers have been able to influence the state to
continue providing them with support such as cheap fertilizer and subsidized electricity
despite growing state budget deficits and losses to state-owned fertilizer and electricity
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companies (Rudolph et al. 1987, Gupta 1998, Frankel 2005).1 In fact, farmers have been
successful in obtaining benefits even during the last 20 years after the shift towards
liberalization from 1991 onwards. During the assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh in
2008, the state government promised farmers, waivers on loans and interest payments,
electricity bill default waivers, and a 100-rupee per quintal bonus in the procurement
price of wheat.
Partha Chatterjee (2004, 2008a) has characterized these claims of farmers as a
legitimate activity of political society that should not be denigrated as illegal or corrupt,
as is done by development agencies like the World Bank which seek to privatize
electricity provision and reduce subsidies to farmers in the name of efficiency. He
considers the influx of capital, especially the growth of agribusiness, as a serious threat to
the viability of farmers in India. In the face of the looming threat of urban corporate
capital, Chatterjee argues that poor farmers have no other option for survival except by
making these claims (2008a: 61). However, Chatterjee's analysis homogenizes farmers
into a single class of people, undivided by caste, landholding, or other axes of
stratification.
The farmers who have benefited from state subsidies in agriculture are the
medium and large farmers who could afford to purchase fertilizer for their fields and who
had legal title to their land to pledge against state-subsidized loans (Rudolph et al. 1987,
Varshney 1995). In Malwa, these were the Patidar, Rajput, Jat, and Maratha farmers who
had immigrated to the region in the last 150-200 years. They had pushed out poor adivasi
farmers into the Vindhya mountains and taken over the fertile lands the latter had farmed
I would add that these claims have been fulfilled by diverting money away from areas such as education
and rural health, which have a direct positive impact on the poorest of the rural population.
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previously. These upper caste farmers have been able to use the language of rights and
make successful claims upon the state by linking the category of "good farmers" with
national development. At the same time, by arguing that only those who can become
"good farmers" have a right to remain on the land, they have used this language to deny
poor, lower caste and adivasi farmers to even have a right to subsistence from the land.
By valorizing their claims upon the state as a legitimate action of political society,
Chatterjee's framework ends up reinforcing the power of those who are already
economically and politically powerful and further marginalizing the poor and the weak.
When agrarian change is normatively defined as making "good farmers" and the
result is labeled as development, it forecloses any opening for alternate imaginings of
change. It becomes a hegemonic language that obscures power relationships and
inequalities that stratify agrarian society and which are constantly at work to create
variations in farm practices and differences amongst farmers. Evaluating farmers on the
basis of narrow definitions of development creates caricatures out of the actual lived
circumstances of people and reinforces stereotypes about the poor and the lower caste. It
also creates conditions whereby those who are deemed as unfit or unable to become
"good farmers" are immediately considered to be unfit to continue farming altogether.
Making "good farmers," thus, becomes a legitimate means to push the poor and
marginalized off the land in the name of development.
Competing Visions of Development
Soyabean was a marginal crop grown in hill tracts in various parts of the country
until its renaissance in the 1960s when Indian government agricultural scientists in
collaboration with scientists from United States' land grant institutions developed
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varieties suited to conditions in the Indian plains. Originally these scientists expected
soyabean to contribute to India's development by providing a cheap source of protein for
the masses as a nutritional supplement to the carbohydrates made available by the green
revolution. However, the subsequent adoption of soyabean cultivation took place only
when private oilseed processors in Malwa recognized the international market demand
for deoiled cake (soyabean meal) as cattle feed. They argued that soyabean was critical
for India's development by providing scarce foreign exchange for industrial expansion.
Subsequently, the cooperative oil federation that was started by the government to
promote self-sufficiency in edible oils, further promoted soyabean cultivation and
ultimately popularized the crop. Over time then, the definition of development shifted
from the health of the poor measured in nutritional terms to the health of the nation
measured in economic terms. Yet, both these definitions characterized development as a
teleological narrative of progress and positive change and enhanced the role of state and
market actors in being the agents of development.
However, I argue that the language of development is inadequate to explain this
kind of agrarian change, which is the unintended result of the imbrication of a variety of
forces stemming from a myriad set of human and non-human actors (Bijker 1992, Latour
1992, Mitchell 2002, Caliskan 2007, Gidwani 2008). I bring out the role of various other
human actors such as farmers and agricultural scientists, as well as that of non-human
actors such as the characteristics of the soil and the geology of Malwa, that play
important roles in shaping the yellow revolution. Further, I show that agrarian change in
Malwa has brought about material prosperity but also resulted in an ecological crisis. The
economic and statistical measures which are typically used to describe the yellow
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revolution as development, fail to capture the multiple actors involved in the story and the
multiple directions of movement that inhabit such transformations.
The value-laden terminology of vikas [development] conveys a sense of linear
movement-a progression from backward to forward, traditional to modern, denigrating
what came before. Once change is defined as development, it is assumed to be a
permanent, one-way, linear shift. In contrast, farmers use words like "khushhali" or
"sampannata", meaning prosperity, plenty, or having resources at one's disposal, to
describe positive aspects of agrarian change that has come about with the introduction of
soyabean cultivation. Unlike the normative sense of devaluation inherent in vikas,
khushhali describes change as a material state which is dependent upon the unstable
coalescing of a variety of factors. In a dryland region like Malwa that depends on the
annual monsoon for sustenance, farmers are deeply aware that a year of failed rains is
always on the horizon. Rather than using development, their expressions of agrarian
change communicate a sense of impermanence, an expectation that prosperity may not
last forever, that decline is as much a part of change as is prosperity.
Protein as Development
Dr. P.S. Bhatnagar gave me my first history lesson on the introduction of
soyabean to India.2 He is the ex-Director and Founder of the National Research Centre
for Soyabean in Indore, and an internationally renowned scientist. Although now retired
from the government, he provides consultancy services to multinational companies
(MNCs) like ITC-IBD (India's largest agribusiness) and is a revered figure in the world
2 The following section is based on interviews with Dr. P.S. Bhatnagar, ex-Director of the National
Research Centre for Soyabean, Indore, on January 31, 2006 and February 28, 2006.
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of soyabean. "Good farmers" constantly call him up for advice and he stays in touch with
colleagues both in the agricultural university system and at the Soyabean Processors
Association. His house, located on the outskirts of Indore near the Agricultural College,
was being renovated when I first went to meet him. One room had been converted to a
small office with a library of soyabean related books and papers. He spent several hours
discussing my project with me.
He described soyabean as an excellent and cheap source of protein and recalled
that initially scientists tried to introduce it in India to help alleviate malnutrition in India.
Although some varieties had been grown in the hill tracts of the country for more than
1000 years and research on soyabean was undertaken in the early part of the 20th century
by colonial and Indian scientists, there was no push towards large scale cultivation of the
crop (Tiwari et al. 1999, Chauhan and Joshi 2005). In the 1960s, the Indian agricultural
university system was established along the lines of the US Land Grant Universities and
there followed a period of intellectual exchange between the two countries.3 In the early
1960s, under USAID funding, Drs. Earl Leng, Ed Bay, W.D. Buddemeier, and Richard
Matsura were sent as advisors to Pant Nagar Agricultural University in the state of Uttar
Pradesh and Jabalpur Agricultural University (JNKVV) in Madhya Pradesh. "Leng,
Matsura and Bay did not come as soyabean experts. They came as a team of agronomists,
entomologists etc. The agreement was that USAID would fund an advising committee to
3 The replication of the land grant system of agricultural and technical universities of the United States in
India started with an agreement signed between the two countries in 1947. The University of Illinois
collaborated with Uttar Pradesh Agricultural University, established in 1960 in the hill town of Pant Nagar
and with the Jawahar Lal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya (JNKVV) established in 1964 in the town of
Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh (Shurtleff and Aoyogi 2007a and Interview with Dr. P.S. Bhatnagar, Feb 28,
2006).
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come to India. The purpose of the team was to develop teaching faculty and help in
research."
But the University of Illinois, from where these scientists came, had been the hub
of soyabean research in the US since the 1920s and the state of Illinois had been
America's leading soyabean producer since 1924 (Shurtleff and Aoyogi 2007b). The
scientists' research was related to soyabean and they were aware of its rich protein
content. At that time, the green revolution was just taking off and awareness of India's
protein gap was increasing. A study estimated that 80% of India's young children suffered
from various degrees of protein malnutrition (Shurtleff and Aoyogi 2007a). "Matsura,"
recalls Prof. Bhatnagar, "was a man of missionary spirit. He was Japanese American. He
felt if soyabean is popularized, it will help overcome malnutrition in society." The UIUC
team brought the first soya material to India in 1965 with the idea of adapting US
varieties to Indian conditions. "They wanted to try something new," said Prof. Bhatnagar.
"They probably didn't know that a black seeded variety of soyabean had been grown for
centuries in hill regions of India." Known as kali tuur or bhatmaas, it was not a
commercial crop but was used to make a healthy black soup.4
In 1965-66 the first trial of yellow seeded soyabean varieties from the US-
Bragg, Clarke, Lee and others-was conducted at Pant Nagar and then at JNKVV. Once
it was realized that agronomically soyabean can be grown,5 the All India Coordinated
4 Almost every government agricultural scientist I interviewed emphasized the long duree of soyabean on
the Indian subcontinent in an effort to resurrect the role of the Indian nation in its own development and to
play down the role of the United States in providing scientists and soyabean strains. Ultimately, none of the
American bred strains worked in Indian conditions and the first popular variety, Punjab-l1, was bred from
kalituur and a Chinese variety (See Tiwari et al. 1999).
5 "Bragg at Pantnagar reached 3,593 kg/ha (53.3 bu/a), much better than the Illinois state average of 1,873
kg/ha (27.8 bu/a). Two other varieties yielded near 3,000 kg/ha (43.5 bu/a). Equally impressive was the fact
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Project on Soyabean was started in 1967.6 In 1969, Prof. Bhatnagar took over as project
coordinator. Much effort was put into researching new varieties, increasing yields, and
most important, trying to popularize soyabean as a food to create a market for the crop.
Compared to other pulses, soyabean has very high percentage of protein and well-
balanced amino acids. 7 Products like soy milk, soy paneer (tofu), soy yogurt, soy nuggets
(texturised vegetable protein), soy baby foods, etc. were all experimented with and
several recipe books were published to inform consumers of possible uses of soy foods in
Indian cooking. But the "Indian man is rigid in his eating habits," lamented Prof.
Bhatnagar.
When marketing efforts failed, questions were, therefore, raised regarding the
economic feasibility of soyabean. Prof. Bhatnagar had a hard time convincing his own
wife to use it-it had a beany flavour and an unpleasant after taste. Farmers grew it but
couldn't dispose of it. They tried to feed it to cattle but the animals suffered from diarrhea
because it cannot be fed to livestock without processing. "The set back was very strong
and farmers burnt their fingers," he continued. "Virtually," then "soyabean was dumped
in manure pits."
In 1971 the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) decided to stop the
All India Coordinated Project on Soyabean. Prof. Bhatnagar went to Dr. O.P. Gautam,
that the soyabeans took only 97 to 111 days to maturity, as compared with 134-149 days in the southern
USA and Brazil" (Shurtleff and Aoyogi 2007a).
6 This was in the Division of Plant Introduction in the Indian Agricultural Research Institute in Delhi whose
Head was Dr. Harbhajan Singh. But he passed away so the project shifted to Pant Nagar under agronomist
Dr. M.C. Saxena in 1968. He too left the country to go to ICARDA in Syria. Then Prof. Bhatnagar took
over.
7 Prof. Bhatnagar explains: Per hectare production of protein is much higher in soyabean than any other
crop. Cost of cultivation compared to other pulses is much less. So cost per unit of protein is much less.
Second, quality of protein is much better because it has lysine which is helpful for growing children. There
is very little lysine in wheat and rice. Sulphur containing amino acids are less in soyabean and more in
cereals (See Chauhan et al. 1988: 43 and Chauhan and Joshi, 2005).
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Director General of ICAR and argued for four hours to allow the scientists one more
chance to create some marketing outlet for the crop. I asked Prof. Bhatnagar how he was
personally affected when the soyabean project failed. He said, "I was confident that the
market will develop. I was not convinced that it won't take off as a food crop. I thought it
would be accepted. But fortunately the first processing plant was started at Indore by
Mahadev Shahara, an oil miller and trader." I asked him, how did that happen? "It was
his foresight." By 1970, farmers had taken up yellow soyabean and although there was no
market, they had started getting it to traders. "Perhaps Shahara came to know about DOC
(deoiled cake). He is a baniya, a trader, so he may have known.... He is a very shrewd
businessman." At this point in our conversation, Prof. Bhatnagar called up Kailash
Shahara, the son of Mahadev Shahara, to ask exactly how and why did he start processing
soyabean.
Dollars as Development
Kailash Shahara is today, head of the largest soyabean processing company in
India-Ruchi Soya. He sits on one of the top floors of Mahakosh House, Ruchi's own
building in the heart of Indore city. I waited almost an hour before I was called in for an
interview with him. Mr. Shahara is more than 70 years old, his white skin sagging
slightly across his face contrasting with his shock of dyed black hair. His hand shook as
he wrote and quivered as he drank coconut water. He is on the Board of numerous
business and government organizations. Apart from running the Ruchi empire, which has
increasingly shifted to refining imported crude palm oil in port-based processing plants
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and selling edible oil in India, he is the Director of the National Board of Trade, the only
open outcry8 soyabean oil futures exchange in the country.
He described how he brought soyabean to Madhya Pradesh:
"Traditionally our firm has been involved in commodities, in agri-processing.
...From the days of my father, we used to have a ginning and oil pressing mill. In the
north [Uttar Pradesh]-Nainital, Bareilly-we had relations so we used to go there.
[Soya] is a Himalayan crop. ... It is known as Bhatt...the black variety was most popular
there. We brought the seed to Madhya Pradesh and did agricultural extension with it.
... After visiting America we realized, we had a vision that it can be a plains crop also.
Initially there was a belief [maanyata] that it is a hill crop only. When we saw it in other
countries of the world, then we felt that this crop can develop in other parts of the country
also. So this is how soyabean came to Madhya Pradesh. This is how we had a pioneering
role in terms of identifying the crop which could be taken as a plains crop and
introducing the crop for developing utilisation of the crop [learning the oil extraction
process and using soy meal as cattle feed] and making it a commercial proposition in the
interest of farmers and all related sectors of society."
In my earlier meeting with Prof. Bhatnagar, he had summarized the phone conversation
with Kailash Shahara regarding this topic. Mr. Shahara had told Dr. Bhatnagar that he
discovered black soyabean at Pantnagar, while visiting his parents-in-law there. He
brought it to Madhya Pradesh. His son studied in the US and so he used to go to USA and
saw deoiled cake (DOC) and its rates in international markets and learnt of its
importance. So he started processing soyabean in his existing oil mill to produce and
export DOC. There was little emphasis in his account on the oil that could be extracted
from the soyabean and none whatsoever on any food uses of the crop.
I remembered the Pantnagar link and I asked Mr. Shahara, "I have interviewed
some scientists who did R&D on this in the 1970s in the universities." He immediately
cut me off. "That all came afterwards. These professors used to come here wondering
what is this thing? They couldn't understand it. ... We gave it the nomenclature of kali
8 Open outcry means a pit trading exchange where traders physically interact and shout out bids as opposed
to an online system where traders interact only through computer screens.
Chapter 1: Development and the Yellow Revolution in Malwa
Richa Kumar
tuur because it looked like tuur (pigeon pea) so that people could easily understand what
it was. So all these scientists used to go about talking of kali tuur, kali tuur. After that like
how you people submit a paper and get a PhD, it was a business conducted later on [woh
baad ka dhandha hai]. They [scientists] are all experts of later on."
Prof. Bhatnagar disagreed when I recounted this to him. He said kali tur or kali
kulti was a native of Madhya Pradesh and had been grown in the local hills for a long
time. In UP it was known as bhatt or bhattmas. Mahadev Shahara, Kailash's father, was a
trader and he bought it at less than 1 rupee per kg. "He would remove the skin and mix it
with tuur dal (pigeon pea) [to adulterate it]. The inside was still yellow. This was in
1971-72."
Ignoring the slight to PhDs, I continued to explore the Pantnagar link in my
interview with Kailash Shahara. "How did you get the original strains?" I asked Mr.
Shahara. He explained it to me: "Actually, see we used to go to Nainital often as my
relatives lived there. My in-laws also lived there. ....My forefathers had farms there. I had
interest in farming and Pantnagar University is very good place to know about various
development and concept going on. We used to go there. We saw there is something
called bhat. We got the information that this was going to Tibet, China and America, too.
The local name, local nomenclature was bhat. So then we thought [humari dhaarna bani]
that why not we try and experiment it out in the plains and we brought it...and developed
its seed....These scientists [yeh scientist log] came much later." Even though he sourced
the seed from Pantnagar University, Kailash Shahara did not seem to give importance to
the role of the All India Coordinated Project on Soyabean or to the American scientists
and their vision for rural development.
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The second person to take full credit for introducing soyabean to MP after
Shahara was someone I met near the end of my fieldwork in Dhar district. Deepak
Suryavanshi owned a palace on the way to Mandu, the historic ruins of the capital of the
Parmar dynasty from the 12th century. He had bought the palace, which was actually built
by the English as a guest house, from the last queen of Dhar, Maharani Mrinaline Raje
Puar. I spotted the palace during one of my trips to a branch of the Oil Federation in
Dhar. It is built in a depression so it is not clearly visible from the road but that ensures
all the water from the surrounding areas flows into the aquifers of the palace, which is
now a heritage hotel. Suryavanshi grows soyabean, wheat, fruits, vegetables, and has a
huge dairy, supplying fresh produce to the kitchens. "I am the pioneer of soyabean in this
country," he stated to me when he learnt about my research. "Don't you know that I
started the first ever soyabean processing plant?!"9
I politely smiled at him and asked him to elaborate since I believed that in 1972, it
was Kailash Shahara who started soyabean processing. I even mentioned that to him. He
started on a tirade against Shahara's company, Ruchi Soya and the government. But
finally he explained that he was the one who first imported the latest equipment in the
1980s to use solvent extraction technology for soyabean processing rather than the
expeller technology, which was being used in the mills till then. The Shaharas were
already processing other oilseeds and they simply switched to soyabean as the new raw
material. Deepak Suryavanshi's factory, Malwa Proteins, was built exclusively to process
soyabean and was located in Dewas district, on the other side of Indore from Dhar.
9 Mr. Suryavanshi had purchased the palace, named Jhira Bagh palace (for the water collecting in the
depression and providing sustenance for agriculture all year round), in 1990, but he only started taking keen
interest in the last few years. He has moved there permanently from Indore and likes to spend his time
experimenting with organic farming.
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It is ironic that Malwa Proteins and Ruchi Soya were created not to provide
nutritious protein-rich food to the population of the country but to facilitate the export of
processed soyabean. Soyabean was accepted on the Indian agricultural scene only as a
commercial crop and not a food crop, despite all efforts made to create a space for protein
enriched foods. Dr. G.S. Kaushal, ex-Director of the Agricultural Department of Madhya
Pradesh state government who retired in 2005, recalled that the earlier [in the 1970s]
agricultural scientists simply did not think of processing. They were all educated in the
United States [through the association with USAID] and there food uses were more
important - soya flour, biscuits, soyamilk were quite popular. But in the Indian context,
"we exported the protein and left our poor still malnourished." Prof. Bhatnagar put it
more bluntly: "it is ironic that we exported our cheapest source of protein to fatten the
cattle of affluent foreign countries."
The meaning of development shifted from a focus on the health of the poor to the
health of the Indian economy. "The Shaharas used to bring dollars and it had a huge
value," stated Prof. Bhatnagar. "Anyone who could bring dollars into the country got
huge concessions." Kailash Shahara quantified the contribution as follows: "With the
export of soyameal India obtains 2500 crore rupees [25 billion rupees] worth of foreign
exchange today and saves another 2500 crore rupees on its edible oil import bill--two
major advantages for India's economy." Earning India precious foreign exchange from
soyameal and reducing the country's edible oil import bill through the production of
soyabean oil became the important contribution of the soyabean to the nation's
development according to market actors in Malwa.
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Self-sufficiency as Development
There was a third narrative of the yellow revolution which included a mandate to
give remunerative prices to farmers at the same time as bringing self-sufficiency in edible
oil production to the country. By 1976, India was importing almost 30% of its edible oil
requirements (Sekhar 2004: 4733). Verghese Kurien, architect of the cooperative milk
revolution in Gujarat'o recalls in his autobiography that he was called to Delhi in 1977 by
India's finance minister, H.M. Patel, who also hailed from Gujarat. Patel asked him if a
similar cooperative movement could make the country self-sufficient in vegetable oils
and reduce the edible oil import bill, which was then a staggering 1000 crores (Kurien
and Salve 2005: 168). Kurien was then Chairman of the National Dairy Development
Board (NDDB). He writes that a cooperative meant "oilseed farmers would have to own
and command the system and in the process eliminate the middlemen - the powerful and
influential telia rajahs (oil kings) who interposed themselves between the producers of
the seeds and the consumers of the oil" (Kurien and Salve 2005: 168). State-owned
farmers' oilseed cooperatives were started in several states in the country and the one in
Madhya Pradesh began in 1979.
S. Lakshminarayan, Managing Director of the MP Oilseed Federation in the
1980s was Registrar of Cooperative Societies in MP in 1981-82. He resurrected a third
narrative of the yellow revolution emphasizing his own role in calling upon Kurien to
increase soyabean cultivation and create a revolution. He recalled that Kurien wanted
assurance from the chief minister that he would be given complete political support. The
to The milk revolution was a result of the cooperative Anand Milk Union Limited (AMUL) started by
Kurien to help milk producers become owners of a processing and marketing unit and to enable profits
from sales of milk and milk products to reach farmers as dividends.
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state government gave free land and a guarantee of support to NDDB. NDDB launched a
700 crore project to start cooperatives amongst oilseed farmers and thus the Madhya
Pradesh State Oilseed Growers' Federation (Tilhan Sangh, or Oilfed) started on 3 rd
October 1979. Dr. M.D. Tedia, Executive Director of the Oilfed in the 1980s, further
explained that the NDDB was importing soyabean oil at concessional rates from the US
under the PL480 law. Kurien sold this American oil to the MP Oilfed at the same
concessional rates while the Oilfed, in turn, sold it to consumers at market rates. The
profit from this was used to establish the MP Oilfed.
Prof. Bhatnagar had remarked that earlier people never thought soyabean should
be processed for oil. Soyabean was never meant as an oilseed and it was "not at all
introduced as an oil crop." When groundnut has 32-35% oil, sesame has 40% oil and
soyabean only has 17-18% oil, why push soyabean as an oil crop, he asked? But in
Madhya Pradesh at that time, soyabean was the only oilseed already under cultivation. So
although the OilFed (Tilhan Sangh) was meant to promote all oil crops, it soon became
the "Soya Sangh" or SoyaFed in MP."
The thrust of the cooperative Oilfed was to "ensure the cultivator gets the right
price, there is an assured buyer, and profit is shared with him."12 For this the Oilfed had
to own the entire supply chain-from production to processing and export. Kurien made
provisions for technical expertise for building a soyabean processing plant, according to
Lakshminarayan. NDDB was funded with a grant of 25% and the rest at 2% interest rate
when actual bank rates were 18%. Like other private soyabean processors, the Oilfed
" Interview with S. Lakshminarayan, Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New
Delhi and ex-Managing Director, Madhya Pradesh Oil Federation, Bhopal. Interview taken in Delhi,
February 23, 2006.
12 Interview with S. Lakshminarayan, February 23, 2006.
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procured, transported, and processed soyabean. Soyabean meal was exported abroad and
oil was sold domestically, fulfilling its mandate to contribute to India's development by
bringing dollars and promoting self-sufficiency. 13 Sadly, even the Oilfed "directed its
whole attention to the export of soyabean meal rather than using it within the country as a
protein product," lamented Mr. J.S. Thakur, who retired from the Oilfed in Bhopal in
1990. "It could have pushed it but this aspect was totally ignored. ...Soyabean would
have been the cheapest protein for a poor country like India."
But there was an important difference between the Oilfed and private processors.
The aim of private processing plants was to buy the cheapest soyabean, but the aim of the
Oilfed was to give farmers a reasonable price-to see "happiness on the face of the
cultivator," according to Mr. Thakur. He added that the market price of soyabean was
always greater than the government minimum support price (MSP) because the Oilfed
was in the market creating huge demand, otherwise private processors would have
colluded to bring down prices. In the 1980s, the Oilfed generated huge demand from its
four large processing plants-nearly 3 lakh14 tons a year in 1990 when total production
was 18 lakh tons. 15 It had control over the entire processing chain, and was a vertically
integrated system. Farmers found an assured buyer in the Oilfed, which also shared its
profits with them through dividends given to members of the cooperative society at the
village level. Even Prof. Bhatnagar agreed with this. "Oilfed popularized soyabean in the
villages. Farmers got a reasonable price because of this. Otherwise private traders and
processors exploited farmers because there was no other market."
13 Interview with S. Lakshminarayan, February 23, 2006.
14 1 lakh = 100,000
15 Calculated from per day capacity of 1200 tons per day and 250 days of operations. "Oilseed Processing
Facilities," Madhya Pradesh Oil Federation, 2005. Available at www.mp.nic.in/mpoilfed/leasing.htm
Accessed January 2, 2007 and (SOPA 2008).
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But at the same time, there was always excess processing capacity in the soyabean
industry compared to the availability of crop for crushing. In 1984, when Krishna Oil
Extraction Ltd. was started by O.P. Goel, the crop size was 5 lakh tons and the processing
capacity was already 8 lakh tons. The crop size kept on increasing because the Oilfed did
a lot of work for it but processing capacity increased even faster, he said. "Farmers
benefited from the excess capacity-there was always a scramble to buy on part of the
processors, first at market price and then at a premium. Even if prices fluctuated, farmers
would still get a fair price and be able to sell at anytime."' 16 In 2006, processing capacity
was 19 million tons while production was just 7 million tons. 17
The growth of soyabean in MP has been attributed to the grassroots efforts of the
Oilfed staff by both insiders and outsiders in the soyabean industry. Here was a solution
for farmers that provided them good quality inputs (through a seed program), technical
advice (through local extension) and a guaranteed market (through buying at the
cooperative level) right at their village. Many people, including scientists, farmers, Oilfed
employees, and even private processors claimed that because of the existence of the
Tilhan Sangh, farmers received a better price. OP Goel, ex-Chairman of the Soyabean
Processors Association in Indore said that "the Oilfed transformed soyabean-it gave
farmers an assured buyer, assured price, did not cheat them in weight or quality. It
supplied seeds, fertilizers and pesticides."18
Further, it provided an opportunity for the government to intervene in the market
when the market price fell below the minimum support price. The Oilfed, the Marketing
16 Interview with O.P. Goel, ex-Chairman, Soyabean Processors Association, Indore, Feb 28, 2006.17 Interview with Dr. P.S. Bhatnagar, February 28, 2006.
18 Interview with O.P. Goel, January 31, 2006.
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Cooperative Federation, and Civil Supplies Corporation were asked by the Government
of India to buy on its behalf at Minimum Support Price in such instances. The loss
incurred was paid by the Government of India. The Oilfed received 2 crore 19 rupees for
this. This "guarantee" of a defined price was one of the main contributions of the Oilfed
according to Mr. Thakur.20
Thus, the Oilfed fulfilled its role not only as bringing about the development of
the nation by promoting self-sufficiency in edible oil, but it also became part of the state-
driven model of agrarian development which created the conditions for farmers to
become "acche kisan" [good farmers] and model citizens. According to Dhar district
secretary of the Oilfed, Malviyaji, "by becoming members, farmers became part of the
'soyabean project' [Sadasya banke soyabean project se jud gaye]." 21 The Oilfed provided
credit for fertilizers and pesticides along with new seeds to farmers who were members of
village level cooperative societies. 22 But only those farmers who had land registered in
their name were eligible to become members and thus benefits resulting from
membership were restricted to the already better off rural elite.
These narratives of bringing development to Malwa through the yellow revolution
focus only on the role of state and market actors as agents. They do not talk about the
complexities of ecology and science and the role of farmers that are equally crucial to
how the yellow revolution played out in Malwa. It is to this story that we now turn.
19 1 crore = 10 million
20 Interview with J.S. Thakur, Manager (Retd), Madhya Pradesh Oil Federation, Bhopal. Interview taken in
Indore, March 9, 2006.
21 Interview with S.C. Malviya, ex-Manager, Madhya Pradesh Oil Federation, Dhar branch, November 2,
2006.
22 Interview with Hanuman Das Gupta, ex-Executive Director, Madhya Pradesh Oil Federation, Bhopal,
February 10, 2006.
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Non-Human Actors and Agrarian Change
Notwithstanding the various claims by state and market actors to appropriate
credit for bringing about the yellow revolution, this section explores the role of non-
human actors such as varieties of soyabean, texture of the soil, and properties of stored
water alongside human actors such as agricultural scientists and "good farmers" to
broaden the story of agrarian change. Doing so challenges the linear story of a revolution.
In the 1970s, with increasing international demand for deoiled cake and the take off of
soyabean processing in the country, scientists and government officials expected that
soyabean would become popular all over India. Yet, soyabean was only picked up by
farmers in Madhya Pradesh and the revolution did not happen even in neighbouring Uttar
Pradesh (UP), where the original research on soyabean took place. Even today MP is the
largest soyabean growing state in the country.
Soil scientist Dr. G. S. Kaushal, ex-Director of the Department of Agriculture,
Madhya Pradesh, argued that, "The soil is the important factor. The medium black soil of
the state is best suited for soyabean and that is why even though...soyabean was
introduced into Pantnagar, and they developed a large number of varieties, but the
expansion could not take place in those areas." 23 But Prof. Bhatnagar emphatically stated
to me several times that there was nothing unique about MP's ecological endowments
and that soyabean was versatile enough to take root in a range of places.
So why did soyabean not pick up in UP? Dr. B. B. Singh, Head of the Genetics
Research Department at Indian Agricultural Research Institute in Delhi, which has
23 Interview with Dr. G.S. Kaushal, ex-Director, Department of Agriculture, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal,
February 7, 2006.
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produced several soyabean varieties, ventured a more complex explanation. He said that
the "decision to grow depends upon two things: surety of production and surety of
return." In Pantnagar, soyabean did not give surety of production because it suffered from
the yellow mosaic virus. It compared poorly to rice and sugarcane, which fit well into the
'very high rainfall' profile of the region. Farmers were also sure of the returns from
paddy (rice) and sugarcane as there was an existing industry of sugar mills and rice mills
in Uttar Pradesh. In MP the soya processing industry came up and farmers found an
assured market for the crop close to home so they took to soyabean. Moreover, there was
no other crop during the rainy season that provided competition to soyabean-and this
was because of 'khariffallows' as described below.
Dr. O.P. Singh, an entomologist at Sehore Agricultural University in Madhya
Pradesh explained that during the rainy season, known as kharif, farmers did not plant a
crop on much of the land in MP i.e., it was left fallow. "MP has deep black cotton soil.
The average rainfall in Malwa is 1000 mm, which is very high. If it starts raining, one
won't see the sun for 7-10 days and intercultural operation (ploughing, sowing, weeding)
is not possible in waterlogged fields." 24
The original crop cycle in Malwa was one single crop in winter, known as rabi.
The soil retained water after the rains and wheat and chickpeas grew with the moisture
available in the soil itself [aal mein pak jati thi].2 5 I asked an old farmer, Ratanlalji of
Amla village in Ujjain district, about kharif fallows. He said when he was younger it
rained so much and there was so much water logging that they couldn't grow anything.
24 Interview with Dr. O.P. Singh, Vice President, Research and Development, Dhanuka Group of
Companies, new Delhi and ex-Senior Scientist, Sehore Agricultural College, Sehore, Madhya Pradesh.
Interview taken in New Delhi, Feb 23, 2006.
25 Interview with Vijay Mehta, soyabean trader in Badnagar, Ujjain district, March 1, 2006.
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Crops were grown in the rainy season only on higher (well drained) land, which was
limited. Jowar (sorghum) was one option during kharifbut it was of long duration, about
150 days, and could not be harvested in time for planting wheat and gram in rabi. Jowar
was grown only in a limited area where the main rabi crops would not be planted. Other
crops like sesamum collapsed while corn and jowar grew poorly in heavy rain in this
heavy soil. Pulses like lal tuvar (red gram) were also of long duration of six months like
jowar and could not occupy much area in kharif. Dr. O.P. Singh, thus, concluded that
"there was no other suitable crop for this heavy soil and heavy rain." Vakilsahab and
Patidarji, rich farmers from Badnagar near Ujjain added another dimension. "Earlier there
were not many wells, no tubewells at all, no facilities [saadhan], only bullocks. There
was only one crop which was unirrigated. ...Farming was dependent on bullocks. So
there was no large scale sowing." 26
But with soyabean, farmers found a crop that was of just the right duration for the
rainy season and which gave an output [utpadan hota hai] under all negative
circumstances [vipreet paristhithi]. "Whether there is less rain or more rain, something
will come in soyabean," according to Omkar Singh Chauhan, 27 a well-known farmer
from Dhar district who farmed 60 hectares.28 Dr. O.P. Singh described the technical
characteristics of the plant as follows: "Soyabean has a tap root system which goes 1-1.5
feet below from where it can take water. Temporarily it can develop aerial roots in water
logged conditions. Most soyabean varieties can tolerate heavy rain, water logging and
26 Interview with Nasir Jagirdar and Laxminarayan Patidar, Proprietor of Krishi Darshan Farm
Implements, Maulana village, Badnagar, Ujjain district, March 2, 2006.27 The names of all farmers have been changed according to anthropological custom. The names of private
entrepreneurs, traders, government officials, and scientists have not been changed.28 Interview with Omkar Singh Chauhan, Baggad village, Dhar district. Interview taken in Indore, March 3,
2006.
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drought." His colleague, Dr. K.K. Nema, of Sehore Agricultural University agreed. "With
three days of water logged fields urad [black gram] is finished. Soyabean leaves will turn
yellow but it will recover with application of urea. Soyabean is a hardy crop and it is a
cash crop." 29 Farmer Omkar Singh Chauhan emphasized the ability to withstand
drought-crops like corn and lentils like urad and moong will die if there is no rain for
20-25 days but soyabean will survive, he noted.
Soyabean, thus, provided a good replacement or filler for the fallow season of
kharif in Malwa. The amount of rainfall was ideal for its growth without the need for
irrigation and it matured just in time for the planting of rabi. The biggest advantage of
soyabean varieties that were created to suit Indian conditions was that they grew in 100-
120 days instead of 134-139 days as in the United States. They fit into the time of
kharif.3 0 Since it did not affect the winter crop, the commodity balance was not
disturbed.31 Moreover, said Dr. Kaushal, "because it was a new crop...it was free from
pest, insect, diseases and the soil was...rich in nutrients and they [farmers] got good
production and good return also." Farmer Madho Singh Patel of Hatod village called it a
"free crop because farmers didn't do anything in the rainy season anyway." 32
Still, by 1980 the total soyabean acreage in the country was less than 3 lakh
hectares and total production just 96,000 tons.33 The yellow varieties developed from US
strains had a problem with seed viability-they had very poor germination and they were
29 Interview with Dr. K.K. Nema, Scientist, Sehore Agricultural University, Sehore, Madhya Pradesh,
January 25, 2006.
30 Interview with Prof P.S. Bhatnagar, January 31, 2006.
31 Interview with Dr. B.B. Singh, Head, Division of Genetics, Indian Agricultural Research Institute, New
Delhi, February 17, 2006.
32 Interview with Madho Singh Patel, Hatod village, Indore district, March 24, 2006.
33 Interview with Dr. G.P. Saxena, ex-Joint Director of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture, Madhya
Pradesh, and Director of Extension, Soyabean Processors Association, Indore, March 3, 2006.
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susceptible to the yellow mosaic virus according to Dr. Bhatnagar. The local black
variety gave very poor yields compared to the yellow varieties. Only in 1975, the first
successful black Indian variety known as Punjab-1 was released by JNKVV. It was
created using genetic strains from China. But it faced problems such as excessive
vegetative growth and pod shattering. Dr. G.P. Saxena, Joint Director in the MP
Agriculture Department earlier and now Head of Extension Activities in SOPA
(Soyabean Processors Association) explained: "The stem would branch and spread
[phailna] in the field like a climber. The seed would shatter and fall to the ground when
the pod burst and reduce the yield. Leguminous crops like soyabean disperse seed in this
way and are known as aerophilic."
In 1981, a locally developed variety scientifically known as JS-72-44 was
officially released. It was the first seed which created a sensation [jisne tehelka macha
diya] according to farmer Omkar Singh Chauhan. It had already become popular by its
local name Gaurav. Its germination rate was lower but the yield was higher compared to
Punjab-1. According to Dr. Saxena, this increased acreage very fast-from 3 lakh
hectares in 1981 to 26 lakh hectares in 1991. But Chauhan said it had its own share of
problems. It was a long duration variety [samay adhik] of almost 115 to 120 days causing
a delay for the sowing in rabi. Also, it had more vegetative growth, its stalk would grow
higher and so it would fall and cause damage to the seeds.
Finally in 1994, a new variety JS-335 brought the most change in terms of yield.
Its popularity changed the picture all over India according to Dr. Saxena. More than 90%
of the coverage in India is with JS-335 today. Chauhan explained its characteristics: "It
had better germination, the best actually. The duration was less, just 95-100 days. The
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stem was strong and it needed less seeds. The production was also 5-7 quintal more per
hectare compared to JS 72-44 and Punjab 1." From 1994 to 2006, the total soyabean
production in the country almost doubled from 39 lakh tons to 73 lakh tons (SOPA 2008).
Birendra Singh Pawar, a 100-hectare, mechanized farmer from Bhatoni village in Dewas
district said that JS-335 brought about the biggest revolution in soyabean. "If it had not
been there, there would be no soyabean left today."
Farmers like Omkar Singh Chauhan, Birendra Singh Pawar and Madho Singh
Patel are seed breeders. They sow "Fl" foundation seeds in their farm obtained from
government institutes like the National Research Centre for Soyabean or the Seed
Corporation and from private companies like Manikya Agrotech. Some of their output is
sold back to the government or to the same private companies who package it and sell it
to farmers as good quality "certified seeds." The seed left over is bought by other "good
farmers" in the area who have contacts with each other and are always on the lookout for
new, good quality seeds. These farmers pride themselves on developing new hybrid
varieties through breeding on their own farms. Vignesh Singh Rathod, although a tiny
farmer compared to Omkar Singh or Birendra Singh, is the main source of new seeds in
Ranipura. He, too, buys foundation seeds from the Seed Corporation or private pesticide
and seed shops in Dhar, multiplies them on his 13 hectares and sells them to villagers
after cleaning and grading them using family labour. Omkar Singh and Hukum Singh
Rathod had obtained a new variety, Brazil-i directly from a South American group of
farmers visiting the Soyabean Processors Association in Indore and had planted it in
2006. Agricultural scientists were not aware of this variety and were quick to point out
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the illegal nature of such direct exchange, especially since India does not allow the import
of genetically-modified soyabean. 34
Yet, soyabean would not have become popular but for the massive informal
sharing of new varieties and seeds with friends and extended family members in the
farming community. Many farmers in Ranipura obtained the seeds of a new variety such
as NRC-7 from relatives in far off villages near Ujjain and Neemuch-places where their
daughters and sisters were married and where social obligations mandated several visits
during the year. Those who were not directly connected to government institutes and
private corporations obtained seeds from "good farmers" who were. Such practices are
not new. In fact, they form the backbone of any agrarian transformation. But they are
ignored in narratives that locate the agency of agrarian change within institutions
inhabited by state or market actors.
The Soyabean Technological Complex
The teleological narrative of the yellow revolution focuses primarily on the
introduction and popularization of soyabean cultivation in the 1970s and 1980s and
culminates with a triumphant discussion of the monetary benefits it has brought to
Malwa. However, since the 1990s, serious ecological problems have arisen in Malwa that
can be traced to the introduction of soyabean in the region. I call the set of circumstances,
which have resulted in monetary benefits at the same time as ecological decline, the
soyabean-technological complex. The soyabean-technological complex today is
epitomized by a farmer draining out water from the fields in the monsoons to grow
34 Indian soyabean processors have lobbied the government to maintain this ban because India's non-
genetically modified (non-GM) soyabean gives them a niche market for GM-free deoiled cake in countries
like Japan. Interview with Rajesh Agrawal, Chairman, Soyabean Processors Association, Indore, March 4,
2006.
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soyabean35 and using the handsome profits earned from selling soyabean to dig more
tubewells on his land to get water to irrigate winter wheat. The wheat is a water intensive,
high yielding variety that is grown for part self-consumption and part market sale, even
though the farmer is aware that extracting more water in winter from the soil heralds still
more trying times in the summer when even drinking water will have to be brought in
large plastic drums from far away sources on bullock carts or cycles or tractors.
Farmers recognize the ecological fragility of sustaining this cropping pattern year
after year, especially in the face of a failed year of rain when the soil aquifers do not get
recharged. Their understanding of agrarian change is not limited to the introduction of
soyabean cultivation alone. Rather, they include the introduction of new technologies for
water extraction and for mechanizing agricultural work within the ambit of what has
brought about change. Further, they do not refer to agrarian change in evolutionary,
teleological terms of "development" or "revolution" but as an impermanent state of
prosperity within which is inherent the seed of decline.
Ujjain district is one of the most prosperous in Malwa with more than 100-feet
deep fertile black soils. Badnagar, a small town 40 kilometers from the city of Ujjain, has
historically been a trading post, initially of opium in the 19t" century and cotton in the
20th.The village of Maulana is 3 km from Badnagar on the highway to Ujjain and has one
of the most famous agro-implements workshops in the region making and sell threshers,
plows, seed drills, sprayers and other equipment. I spent an afternoon with Laxminarayan
Patidarji, the owner of the workshop and his lawyer friend, Nasir Jagirdar (Vakilsahab),
discussing the coming of soyabean and the transformation of the area. "Lot of farmers
35 Although soyabean grows in waterlogged conditions, the yield is two to three times higher in well-
drained soils.
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bought land through money made from soyabean," he started out. "From 20 bigha to 100
bigha-soyabean was the base. My father has two more brothers. All three had 60 bigha
each. Now I have 200 bigha because I bought land through soyabean money. Fifteen
years have been very good with soyabean, ever since the 1980s."
The financial remuneration resulting from soyabean cultivation was expressed in
superlative terms by many. Farmer Omkar Singh Chauhan said it was most beneficial for
poor farmers with no source of irrigation: "what a farmer got with maize and wheat he
got with soyabean alone. ...In our area [Malwa] farmers will do soyabean even if no rabi
crop is taken because it is more remunerative." Vijay Mehta, a soyabean trader and
market yard representative from Badnagar said, "For farmers soyabean brought economic
prosperity [aarthik samriddhi]-it led to a construction boom in the village, people
bought two wheelers, four wheelers." 36 Subhashji, the proprietor of Mahendra Bros, an
old trading firm in Dhar district said, "Malwa has become a prosperous garden. Soyabean
is a boon for this area [Malwa chaman ban gaya hai. Soyabean vardaan hai is area ke
liye.]." Narendra Mehta, another soyabean trader in Dhar mandi said, "With new
soyabean varieties the output increased and farmers bought many tractors. Prosperity
[sampannata] came because of soyabean. It is the gold of Malwa [Malwa ka sona]." Dr.
M.D. Tedia, an agricultural scientist and Executive Director of the Oilfed in Bhopal, who
had received his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1972, proclaimed that soyabean
was the "wonder crop of the 20h century" and the "meat of the fields". The Soyabean
Processors' Association's (SOPA) magazine called it "the miracle bean." Prof. P. S.
Bhatnagar concurred: "Earlier farmers sold wheat and made their children eat jowar
36 Interview with Vijay Mehta, March 1, 2006.
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[sorghum] and bajra [millet]. Now it has all changed. ...Women and children were the
worst sufferers earlier and didn't get enough food. Now there is enough food for
everyone. Farmers are sending their children to school, colleges because their income has
increased. ...There are so many more televisions, tractors, cooking gas, two-wheelers,
four-wheelers, fridge, etc. in the villages." Nevertheless, he wryly stated, "the cream of
soyabean was eaten by the processors and the farmers got only the leftovers [soyabean ki
malai processors kha gaye, kisan ko sirf khurchan mili]." The massive bungalows on MG
Road (the posh thoroughfare of Indore) all came up because of the rise of soyabean
according to him.
Yet, Patidarji of Maulana village pointed out that "prosperity [khushali] [wa]s
only partly a result of soyabean. There has been a lot of development in farming. We got
good electricity at the same time as soyabean came. So we drilled tubewells and were
able to grow an irrigated second crop. Those who had enough water were able to do short
duration potato, peas, and onions before planting irrigated wheat.""37 Both soyabean and
irrigated wheat brought about a double cropping system in Malwa and the increased
income encouraged farmers to bring more and more grassland under cultivation. They
had the purchasing power to buy newly available technologies such as electricity,
tubewells, and power pumps for water extraction and tractors for ploughing and
cultivation. "Once there was double cropping, farmer got more money to buy things. It
especially impacted the bazaar outside the mandi. The trade of the entire Malwa region
37 Farmers in Ranipura village also explained the change in the last 40 years as being a cumulative result of
many different things and not soyabean alone.
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improved. Most importantly, farmer's financial condition [maali haalath] improved
without much extra hard work," according to trader Narendra Mehta of the Dhar mandi.3 8
Albeit with some ups and downs in its market price, soyabean has remained
financially remunerative. The rate of soyabean at harvest in October 2007 was Rs. 1500 a
quintal rising to more than Rs. 2000 in January 2008. The minimum support price is Rs.
1010 and usual rates at harvest hover between Rs. 1100-1200. The reason for this
phenomenal increase in price was related to changes taking place in the US. Technologies
for making biodiesel from corn became affordable with the huge rise in crude oil prices in
the last few years. With the rush to build biodiesel plants, corn became a sought after
commodity in 2007 with its prices increasing by several fold. Farmers in the US, the
largest producer of corn and soyabean in the world, shifted acreage to corn and away
from soyabean. This led to a shortage in total production of soyabean in the world and
Indian soyabean farmers benefited from the resulting rise in prices (Chandrashekhar
2007, Dale 2007, Wynn and Boselli 2007). The financial remuneration from soyabean
was truly phenomenal.
The sowing of soyabean in July 2007 had been delayed due to late and erratic
rains. By the time it was harvested in October, the monsoons were over. Farmers, who
usually relied on the last vestiges of the monsoon to sow wheat in the residual moisture,
could not do so without watering the fields first. In November-December of 2007, the
Highland machine to dig a borewell did not leave Ranipura for a month and a half.
Almost 80 tubewells costing about Rs. 1 million were dug in Ranipura. The extra income
accruing from the sale of soyabean fed the rush to drill more borewells. Out of the 80
38 Interview with Narendra Mehta, soyabean trader in Dhar mandi, Dhar, February 27, 2007.
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tubewells, not more than ten, in fact, resulted in water and even in them, farmers
reported, the water level and intensity of flow had gone down by February 2008.
According to conventional wisdom tubewells should be drilled in the summer, when
ground water is at its lowest point, so that one bores deep enough to ensure that water is
available all throughout the growing season in winter. Although they understand this
logic, farmers in Ranipura say that they need the water most to irrigate winter wheat,
especially when their existing tubewells stop functioning in November. This is the time
when the water requirement is so high that it is worthwhile to dig a borewell-farmers
may be able to irrigate their standing crop and reap the benefits in that season itself. The
extra income from wheat would possibly cover the cost of the tubewell. Moreover, they
will not have to drill as deep as in the summer because water levels will be higher with
the monsoon having just ended. But then, farmers also know that such a bore may not last
for the entire rabi season-it certainly won't have any water for the summer-and may
not work at all the following year.
What exactly is at work here?
The soyabean-wheat technology complex worked in Malwa by inverting the cycle
of water-a critical shift in a dryland region where the only source of irrigation is
groundwater. Malwa is a plateau from where many rivers originate-Maahi, Chambal,
Shipra-but they are all small in size until they leave Madhya Pradesh. There are only
two main dams that provide irrigation through canals-Gandhisagar in the north and
Tawa in the south (the Halali dam has a small canal network near Bhopal). But in the
heart of Malwa-Ujjain, Dhar, Dewas, Indore and Shajapur, the only source of irrigation
is rainwater that has either been stored in ponds or in the ground. According to a report
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by Samaj Pragati Sahyog, an NGO and academic research organization in Bagli tehsil of
Dewas district:
[Malwa] is covered with deep black soils, traditionally considered as best suited
for cotton cultivation. These soils are formed by the weathering of Deccan Trap basalts.
...With low percentage of irrigated area, jowar [sorghum] was the main kharif crop.
During rabi season, unirrigated wheat varieties such as Jalalia, Tigria and Pissi were
grown primarily on residual soil moisture in deeper and water retentive black soils (Vijay
Shankar 2006a).
During the time of kharif fallows, prior to soyabean, farmers created bunds 39
along the fields to allow water to soak into the soil during monsoons. All throughout the
rains farmers would plough the land using bullocks to ensure that weeds did not grow and
take away the fertility and moisture of the soil. Substantial area was left untilled as grass
for fodder. Thus, large tracts of land were uncultivated-almost 60%. Only some lentils,
maize, and jowar (sorghum) were grown, mostly for home consumption and fodder, on
high, well-drained ground. "Land on which wheat was grown during the rabi season was
kept uncultivated during the preceding kharif season. This was also necessitated by the
tendency of deep black soils in topographically low-lying regions to get water-logged
during kharif' (Vijay Shankar 2006a). Un-irrigated wheat was expected to grow in the
moisture retained by the soil in the winter. A good crop of "unirrigated wheat gave 3-4
quintal per bigha (half an acre) while unirrigated chana (gram) gave only 2 quintal per
bigha. But we used to have a lot of rain earlier and could grow wheat and chickpeas
without irrigation," according to Patidarji of Maulana village. In effect, the system of
khariffallows was followed because the water availability for irrigation was low.
39 A bund is a boundary made out of mud demarcating fields of different farmers. It can also be used to
block certain sections of the field to allow water to accumulate and irrigate the soil.
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Soyabean, on the other hand, requires well-drained fields so its introduction
during the monsoon season shifted the main aim of farmers from storing/saving water to
draining out all the water from the field. Since soyabean was so remunerative, farmers
started bringing in more and more area under cultivation, leaving less land for grazing
and lesser for ground water recharge. In Ranipura, farmers were draining out overflowing
wells by channeling the water away from the fields. In places where they had not done so,
they faced waterlogging of fields that were below the overflow level of the well, which
substantially reduced soyabean yields. The water which was considered to be a
'requirement' for un-irrigated wheat became 'excess' for soyabean. After taking a crop of
soyabean the residual soil moisture was inadequate to support the wheat crop. If it rained
during or after the soyabean harvest [pichala pani], farmers could still plant un-irrigated
winter wheat. But if it did not, then irrigation would be required (Vijay Shankar 2006a).
In the month of October, especially, when day temperatures became very high, wheat
could not be sown without watering the fields first.40
At the same time as the arrival of soyabean in the 1970s came electricity, pipes,
diesel-run motors, and technology for digging tubewells known as cutter machines. The
first tubewell was dug in Ranipura in 1986 and surface wells stopped working in 1992.
Tubewells replaced wells and ponds as a source of water. Further, new varieties of water-
intensive wheat also became available in the 1970s, which increased wheat output by four
times. Using water from newly drilled tubewells, farmers "increasingly substituted
unirrigated wheat varieties by high yielding varieties of wheat (such as WH-147) which
needed large scale irrigation. While only 13% of wheat area was under irrigation in 1970-
40 Interview with Karan Singh Pawar, ex-Member of Legislative Assembly, Dhar, August 24, 2006.
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71, nearly 90% of the wheat area was under irrigation by 1993-94" (Vijay Shankar
2006a). The increased income from soyabean gave farmers the resources to invest in
technologies to extract ground water in winter and consequently encouraged the planting
of high yielding varieties of wheat and water-intensive chick peas over a larger and
expanding area of cultivation.
In the 1970s, out of a total of 900 bigha in Ranipura village, more than one third
was grassland. By the turn of the century all the common land, government land, grazing
land, and fallow land in the village was progressively occupied by soyabean in kharif.
Even during rabi, there were very few empty fields. If a farmer did not have his own
source of irrigation, he leased out the field to someone else who did, in an agreement
known as paanti, and shared fifty percent of the output. "As access to irrigation facilities
increased, the thrust of the agricultural strategy came to be the maximisation of
productivity per unit of land by intensive cultivation of every bit of available agricultural
land" (Vijay Shankar 2006a). Agricultural intensification in Malwa led to the complete
abandonment of the system of khariffallow followed earlier.
Karan Singh Pawar, ex-MLA from Dhar, has been managing his agricultural
fields for the last 20 years. He has been conducting experiments with all kinds of crop
varieties. He explained that traditionally, Malwa has never had much sowing in kharif
season. But after the coming of soyabean there was complete sowing during kharifon his
fields in Pipalkheda, about five kilometres from Dhar. "There was enough ground water
available to exploit and double crop the area until 1984-85. That was the best year when
water in the tubewell was available at 50 feet and the output was 1000 quintals of
soyabean and 1000 quintals of wheat."
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But progressively, the water table began to fall and the entire cycle became
unsustainable. As more and more farmers planted these winter water-intensive crops, the
water table started declining. Soon water was available only after 100 feet, then after 200
feet, and in 10-15 years, 600 feet tubewells also did not yield water. This is because after
the shallow ground water was completely extracted within a few years (wells dried up by
the 1990s), what was being extracted was ancient water embedded in volcanic rock
making up the Malwa plateau. The black soil is between 5-100 feet deep. Below that is
hard impervious basalt formed millions of years ago and known as the Deccan trap. The
black cotton soil has been formed through the weathering of this basalt. Water was
trapped in crevices or fracture zones of igneous rocks as various lava flows cooled and
hardened one on top of the other. P.S. Vijay Shankar of Samaj Pragati Sahyog has
conducted research on the geology of Malwa and explains:
Much of the land area in Western MP is underlain by basaltic lava flows of the
Deccan Trap formation, which are rocks of igneous origin, formed by the cooling of
molten material. ...the natural rate of replenishment of groundwater is usually very low
in these rocks. Hence, while there can be often be fairly large reservoirs of stored water in
hard rock aquifers (accumulated over several thousand years), the renewability of this
resource in flow terms is likely to be limited (Vijay Shankar 2005: 5020).
Tubewell technology has enabled farmers to tap into this very old groundwater,
known as 'primary water', which is not rechargeable through surface water or rain water
because the rock is impervious. The pace of extraction has been very high, leading
farmers to dig deeper and deeper tubewells as the shallow aquifers within these rocks are
emptied. The low rate of success is mainly because water is only available in unexploited
aquifers, which are now scarce or at least deeper than before. Moreover, explains Vijay
Shankar, "because the extent of weathering and structural deformations is never uniform,
[there is] high variability of groundwater availability within a drainage basin. ...[There
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is] very little connectivity and transmissivity between the aquifers ...making it very
difficult for water to replenish the discharge zone from the recharge zone" (Vijay Shankar
2005: 5020).
Surface aquifers, which are within the soil strata and pervious rock, fill up within
the first two weeks of strong monsoon rains and rest of the water has to be drained out of
the fields to save the soyabean. Karan Singh Pawar says that "we are not giving [the
water] sufficient time to percolate to the ground water level in the planted fields." Rather
than recharging the surface aquifers as happened in the past prior to soyabean cultivation,
90% of the water today is wasted as runoff. Double cropping is almost universal in the
region, although the increasing lack of availability of water has reduced yields of wheat
as reducing amounts of water have to be spread across the same number of fields. The
consequence has been reduced water availability throughout the year and unbearable
floods during the monsoons.
Today the ground water crisis has come to a head. No amount of surface recharge
is going to bring back the ancient ground water that has been tapped by the farmers
already. Although the state government has banned boring of new tubewells in most
districts of Malwa, farmers argue that they do not have any other choice. They do not
want to shift from water intensive varieties of wheat because even with less irrigation,
they yield more than unirrigated varieties. Leaving land fallow during the soyabean
season to promote recharge of surface aquifers again causes immediate economic loss.
Those without sources of irrigation grow unirrigated chickpeas in rabi but continue their
efforts every year to dig tubewells in different locations on their land in the hope of
striking water.
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Describing the agrarian transformation of Malwa as a "yellow revolution"
spearheaded by powerful state and market actors that has brought about development is,
of course, inadequate. It removes from the story various human and non-human actors
who play as much a role as these other powerful actors in bringing about change
(Mitchell 2002, Latour 1992, Caliskan 2007, Gidwani 2008). More importantly, the
linear, progressive, value-laden language of development obscures the underlying shifts
in practices that are in effect taking place. Rather than filling up the empty space of the
kharif fallows and being a free crop for farmers, soyabean farming replaced important
farm practices related to water management in an agrarian system that took into account
low water availability. By draining water instead of replenishing it and by financing farm
investment in water-extraction technologies, soyabean played a crucial role in
transforming Malwa ecologically.
The vital distinction farmers make in describing agrarian change is by using
words like "prosperity" and "plenty" [samriddhi, sampannata, khushali] rather than
"development" [vikas]. Farmers in dryland Malwa face uncertainties every year, every
cropping season-if it is not the terrible timing and frequency of the rain, or even excess
rain, it is the drought. If it is not the sudden pest attack, or the weeds, it is the failed
electricity or a dried tubewell, or even a combination of them all. As farmers in Ranipura
often said, one can never know how much will ripen until it [soyabean, wheat, maize,
etc.] is safely [threshed and stored] inside the house. 2001 was a year of massive drought
in Malwa and most of Ranipura had nothing to eat. After some well-off villagers led by
Suraj Jat, the village head, started a food for work program digging a pond in the village,
the government responded by providing monetary support. Farmers remember the
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drought as much as they remember the extremely high soyabean prices they received for
their crop in 2004.
Prosperity and plenty embody within them the recognition that agricultural
change is always contingent upon the coalescing together of various factors, many of
which are not in farmers' hands. Unlike development, which has a moral connotation of
permanently moving away from a perceived backwardness (Pigg 1992), prosperity
denotes a state which may not be everlasting at all. Falling on hard times after a time of
prosperity does not necessarily have a moral implication about a person or a region-it
invites investigation into multiple causes for such a decline while accepting that decline is
as much a part of change as prosperity (see Ferguson 1999).
Managing the Water Crisis: Alternatives to Soyabean
In the last 5 years, a re-evaluation of the 'gift of soyabean' [soyabean ki daen] is
already taking place in Malwa. Farmer Madho Singh Patel said in March 2006 that
soyabean cultivation has become very expensive although it really helped farmers. 41
"Farmers are now looking for a replacement of soyabean, which can give the same
amount of income especially with rising costs. ...Recently expenses have increased
because herbicides have come on the market. ...Also pests are attacking more-girdle
beetle and stem borer require medicines to be sprayed twice. 25% of the revenue goes
into this."4 2 Mr. A. Khan, extension officer in the Agricultural Department in Bhopal also
mentioned that weeds had become a big problem requiring the application of expensive
41 These doubts were raised before the harvest of 2007 when prices skyrocketed to Rs. 1600 and then to Rs.
2000. In 2008, the prices hovered between 1500-1600 rupees a quintal. The economics of soyabean has
regained profitability, at least temporarily.
42 Interview with Madho Singh Patel, March 24, 2006.
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herbicides.43 But more importantly, he stressed that inputs like fertilizers and chemicals
were not available to farmers on time, causing immense losses in the yield. 44
Dr. K.K. Nema from Sehore Agricultural University also agreed that the cost of
production had gone up and productivity had gone down. He explained, "Productivity of
soyabean is very low today because for 20-25 years soyabean has been grown in the same
field. Diseases, pests have now multiplied. ...Earlier one could get 15-16 quintals per
hectare in production. The cost was Rs. 9555 per hectare. So at the rate of 1000 Rs per
quintal, farmers got a profit. Today there is no profit. Production for a good farmer is 10-
12 quintals per hectare and the rest only produce 4-5 quintals per hectare. So farmers
want to leave soyabean." 45 My own experience in Ranipura showed that monocropping
created the fear of the spread of an epidemic of intensive pest attacks and created a cycle
of relying on more potent and ever more expensive pesticides. Pesticide dealers and
private companies have reaped a fortune, while growing soyabean has become less and
less remunerative. Vijay Mehta, the trader from Badnagar summarized it succinctly:
"Farmers are hung in the middle; there is no future seen in soyabean so they are
wondering what to do."4 6
But, unfortunately, even with its reducing productivity or increasing cost,
soyabean is still a better crop compared to other possible substitutes. Farmer Omkar
Singh Chauhan explained that farmers were turning to other things as a replacement for
soyabean. But the returns were not the same. With makka [corn], a 2-5% increase in the
43 According to Karan Singh Pawar, by using weedicides, traditional weeds that could be eaten by cattle
and were suitable for the climate of Malwa died. However, this gave rise to new weeds like dudhi, which
are not consumed by cattle and grow to unmanageable proportions. Interview, Dhar, July 14, 2006.
" Interview with A. Khan, Extension Officer, Agricultural Department, Bhopal, January 23, 2006.
45 Interview with Dr. K.K. Nema, January 25, 2006.
46 Interview with Vijay Mehta, March 1, 2006.
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erstwhile steady cropping area had lowered the prices. Similarly with jowar [sorghum]
the price fell because buyers are poultry farms and liquor factories, whose demand is
fixed and is not a lot. Moreover, although desi [country] jowar gives a good rate, it take
5-6 months to grow while hybrid Shankar jowar grows in 100-120 days but the rate is
less and it is not very tasty. He further elaborates:
"If you sow full kharif with makka or jowar, one can't handle all of it. Saadhan
kam hain [facilities are not there]. Jowar and makka need more handling. ... You have to
peel the cob and dry it in the sun to be able to thresh it. There is a problem of how to dry
it in the godown. 5 quintals of soyabean is equal to 10 quintals of corn in weight and
price of corn is much less, but you need more space. Soyabean is easier to handle, there is
less effort [mehanat]-it can be harvested and threshed in one day and one can sow rabi
crops sooner. With corn one can't do sowing immediately because you have to clean the
field, remove the [long tap root] from the soil, etc."
Prof. Bhatnagar concurred: "Corn and sorghum were replacing soyabean when
productivity of the latter became low. But because there was a lot of production, the price
fell down and many farmers didn't even harvest it. But with soyabean prices can never
precipitously fall because demand is 19 lakh tons and production is 6 lakh tons. There is
so much excess capacity so it is a safe crop." 47 O.P. Goel, ex-Chairman of the Soyabean
Processors Association says "It is very difficult to uproot soyabean because farmers have
less hassles and are making good money. It is the only such crop to be so." 48
But replacing soyabean with something else during the rainy season does not
affect practices related to water management. As long as anything is grown in the
monsoons and water is drained out of the fields, preventing the recharge of shallow
aquifers, and as long as water-intensive varieties of wheat are grown in the winter using
tubewell water from deep aquifers, the crisis will continue to grow.
47 Interview with Prof P.S. Bhatnagar, January 31, 2006.
4 Interview with O.P. Goel, January 29, 2006.
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Managing the Water Crisis: Conservation and Recharge
The seriousness of water scarcity cropped up in my very first conversations with
farmers in Dhar, even before I had chosen Ranipura village for extended fieldwork.
Karan Singh Pawar and I traveled together to Jhumki block headquarters and he
introduced me to some local farmers who had also helped him campaign for the elections.
It was March 2006 and the wheat was being harvested. The conversation quickly veered
towards the scarcity of water and poor availability of electricity reducing the production
of wheat. The main discussion focused around water and how best to increase its
availability. Pawar then helped the farmers recount all the good work he had done for
water works in the area during his tenure (1998-2003)-construction of a few canals, two
stop dams, and obtaining sanction for an electricity grid. Many of Pawar's supporters had
voted against him in the last election, "despite all the good development work I did," he
said. Currently, the MLA was from the opposite party, the BJP.
A farmer in the group initiated a discussion on the recharging of tubewell aquifers
by letting the rain water from the entire surrounding area drain into the tubewell hole in
the ground. Pawar tried to reason with the farmer and explain the severe health
consequences that could result from such a long term strategy. He said, "I have tried it in
my own fields and it works for a short while. But then it fails." Despite putting a strainer
on the mouth of the tubewell, some garbage and mud always goes in. Most important, the
pesticides, weedicides, and other chemicals from the soyabean field go in directly. "You
can't play with nature. The tubewell water is [usable] only after the filtration process of
the soil. ... So many people have had severe health problems like paralysis [lakhua] by
drinking water from such recharged tubewells." The farmer, a staunch BJP supporter,
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insisted that he had tried it and it worked. "There should be a [government] scheme that
forces everyone to fill their holes. Then only we can solve the water problem."
Mr. Vijay Shankar of Samaj Pragati Sahyog (SPS) has been working for several
years with farmers in Dewas district to promote a more holistic and long term
understanding of the ecological crisis. SPS's research suggests that "replenishment of
highly depleted groundwater aquifers [is possible] through strategically located surface
water storage structures and sub-surface dams" (Vijay Shankar 2006b). 4 9 Several large
farmers in Malwa have tried to recharge rock aquifers by directing surface run-off into
existing tubewell holes. Dr. Najmi, senior hydrologist in Dhar, explained that such
recharge will be limited by the size of the confined aquifer from which the water has been
extracted. If the tubewell cuts through many aquifers, the lowest one will fill first and
then the ones above it. Dr. Najmi felt it was a good idea to try and recharge tubewell
aquifers but did not expect much success over the long term.50
In contrast, Pawar advocates that in kharif, 75% of the area should be planted with
soyabean along with other crops while 25% should be left fallow for collecting rain water
and percolating it into the ground. Another strategy could be planting that 25% area with
an early spice crop such as coriander [dhaniya] or carom [ajwain], which would give at
least a few weeks of recharge time before the planting of rabi. The government has been
promoting and subsidizing surface aquifer recharge schemes such as farm ponds and
49 Samaj Pragati Sahyog has been promoting trials of less water intensive wheat varieties with farmers in
Dewas district. Vijay Shankar writes that, "A return to the earlier low yield regime is both unfeasible and
undesirable. Our objective of conducting rabi season trials in wheat has been to identify varieties which can
give yields comparable to the varieties currently in vogue, even in a regime which is less water-intensive"
(Vijay Shankar 2006a). But at the same time, they stress the need for the "regulation of end-uses of water
through community management of groundwater, low cost drip irrigation and diversification of the crop
production systems using drought-resistant varieties and crops that require less water" (Vijay Shankar
2006b).
50 Interview with Mr. Najmi, Senior Hydrologist, Water Resources Department, Dhar, April 23, 2007.
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village ponds. But taking away land from cultivation to recharge water has not been the
most popular item on the agenda of farmers in Ranipura and elsewhere. Instead, they are
experimenting with tubewell aquifer recharge, regardless of its uncertain consequences,
and they are focused on drilling more tubewells in clear defiance of government laws
banning any new tubewells in Jhumki block.
Since the 1990s, there has been a spurt in bringing grassland, grazing land, and
other common land under cultivation by farmers, at the expense of keeping areas aside
for their animals to graze. Farmers suggest that because of the remuneration offered by
soyabean and subsequently by wheat or unirrigated gram, as well as the technologies that
make cultivation easier, they are keen to farm as much area as possible. But why would
they continue to participate in this spiraling journey downwards when the very water and
soil upon which their entire existence is premised, may no longer be able to support
them?
I would like to suggest that there is one factor that much analysis of the green and
the yellow revolutions misses out. This is the creation, partly during colonial times and
much more strongly after independence, of a metaphor that reframes a particular
narrowly defined vision of farming as a vital contribution to the development of the
nation. I argue that this vision fundamentally shapes the relationship between the state
and farmers such that it legitimizes a shifting of scarce resources to a set of already
powerful rural interests while at the same time giving a metaphor to those rural interests
to continue to successfully make demands upon the state to ensure their well-being. As a
result, not only are powerful rural interests supported at the expense of the poor and the
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weak, but also the practices which cause ecological decline continue to foster in the name
of national development.
Making "Good Farmers"
When I started my research on the introduction of soyabean in MP, I was directed
to meet "acche kisan" by agricultural scientists and private processors in Indore. "Acche
kisan" or "good farmers" were connected to these state and market actors through the
seed breeding networks described earlier. "Good farmers" were interested in new seeds
and new technologies; they implemented new techniques on their farms, and were
progressive, modernizing farmers. They interacted with scientists at the National
Research Centre for Soyabean and at the Indore Agricultural College as well as directly
with retired scientists such as Prof. Bhatnagar seeking technical-know how and advice as
the soyabean and wheat season progressed every year.
"Good farmers" reflected a vision of agriculture that can be traced to colonial
times (Ludden 1992) and to the recent past during the green revolution, which took root
in the 1960s in India, when increasing productivity and pushing for higher production
became defined as agricultural development. Farmers were enrolled in the process of
making India self-sufficient in food grains, which became the sole aim of agricultural
policy. Ironically, Nick Cullather (2008) has shown how the economic policies of the
planning commission during the 1950s, including imports of PL480 wheat from the
United States, in effect, led to decreased domestic wheat production-a fact expected by
planners who were focused more on promoting industrialization. He thus reframes the
situation of India in the early 1960s as one of induced lower agricultural production
rather than as one where the country was inherently unable to produce enough to feed
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itself. Moreover, historians have shown that the green revolution took off more as result
of the coming together of various forces including the availability of hybrid seed
technologies, populist measures of the state to ensure its own survival, and a growing
demand for state support of rural interests through subsidies (Frankel 2005, Varshney
1995). However, the vision of agricultural development as higher production and greater
productivity continued to inform agrarian policy and became the dominant frame within
which relationships between farmers and the state played out in India.
On the one hand, the state was obliged to provide farmers with support so that
they could produce more and be more efficient, and thus bring about development. At the
same time, farmers appropriated the language of development as entitlement and
articulated their demand to become developed through the mechanisms of democratic
politics. In Madhya Pradesh, in the context of the yellow revolution, the metaphor used
by farmers to make claims upon the state, is that of the "good farmer."
Omkar Singh Chauhan and Birendra Singh Pawar were "good farmers"
introduced to me by Dr. Bhatnagar. Chauhan was one of the most famous and well-
respected farmers in Malwa, well known in soyabean circles, and was often invited to
represent the views of farmers in conferences in Indore. He was middle-aged and despite
wearing a shirt and pant, had a rustic, village-look. He farmed 250 bigha (about 60
hectares or one-fourth of the village land) in his village in Dhar district, and mostly
planted breeder or foundation seeds obtained from private companies or the government.
His house in the village was equivalent to a posh bungalow in an upper middle class
locality in Delhi with a beautiful garden in front and a long driveway. He had built huge
sheds to house his tractors and other farm implements. However, most of the time he
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lived with his family in a small flat in a middle class locality in Indore. His daughter was
studying to become a doctor in a medical college. Chauhan had completed a law degree
himself and only went back to farming in the village because there was no one else to
manage the lands. I was told that almost everyone in the village of about 300 people
worked for him in some capacity or other.
Birendra Singh Pawar was a young farmer in his twenties who idolized Omkar
Singh Chauhan and wanted to become like him. When I met him for the first time, he
looked well-groomed, dressed in a shirt and pants, with neatly combed hair. His family
farmed 500 bigha (about 100 hectares) out of 1200 bigha and owned 6 out of the 14
tractors in their village in Dewas district. His father had completed a Bachelor of Science
degree and returned to the village in 1971. Birendra Singh started farming in the mid-
1990s. He constantly communicated with scientists and always sought to learn new
techniques about farming. He was keen to mechanize farm operations to the maximum
extent possible yet he criticized scientists like Prof. Bhatnagar for pushing certain
scientific methods of agriculture and denying the value of farmers' traditional methods
such as 'dora.'51 He was building a two-storey bungalow in his village in 2006 but lived
in the town of Dewas with his wife and two young children in a small single-storey
house. His cousin was the secretary of the village Oilfed society.
Madho Singh Patel was also well-known in soyabean circles. He was an old
farmer, possibly in his seventies and had been the sarpanch [headman] of his village in
51 A dora is a wooden or iron-made piece of equipment that is used for weeding. It usually has a small
wheel with a long handle to roll it in between rows of soyabean while a sharp edge uproots weeds as it is
pushed. A cycle-dora replaces the small wooden or iron wheel with a bicycle wheel and is much easier to
use. A bullock-dora replaces the wheel with a long rope attached to a bullock and held by a person-the
dora moves as the bullock moves forward (See Vinaygam et al. 2006).
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Indore district. He was secretary of his village Oilfed society from 1986 to 1998 and in
2006 he was the Chairman of Malwa Seed Growing Organisation [Beej Utpadan Samiti]
which is a cooperative society and runs a seed shop in the mandi. He had visited Chicago
in 1995 as part of a three-member farmer group sponsored by the Soyabean Processors
Association. He showed me pictures from his visit and I especially recall one where he is
standing in front of a tractor with a wheel taller than his height.
Chauhan, Pawar and Patel are representative of the immigrant farming castes who
settled down in western Madhya Pradesh between 150-200 years ago-the Rajputs from
Rajasthan, the Marathas from Maharashtra, and the Patidars from Gujarat respectively.
They are outstanding examples of "acche kisan" and were introduced to me as such by
scientists and private processors. Laxminarayan Patidarji of Ujjain district, himself a
"good farmer," described the typical progressive evolution of such a farmer through the
soyabean revolution:
"With soyabean's money first of all farming was improved and second lifestyle standard
went up because farmers bought tractors, vehicles, motor bikes etc. Sales of tractor
increased the most....With soyabean money a farmer was able to dig tubewells, build a
pacca house... The attraction [rujhan] towards implements led to more sowing. And
implements came because of soyabean. ...Profit led to more dedication [lagan] on part of
the farmer, his family got involved, and they tried their best to grow a good crop [acchi
phasal ka prayas kara]."
Enacting the role of a good farmer meant growing a good crop. A good crop was
consistently defined by state and market actors as one that gave the highest yield. The
language of yield bound these farmers to agricultural scientists and seed companies.
These farmers prided themselves on making all efforts to increase the yield of their crop
but lamented the lack of support from government institutions in enabling higher
increases that could potentially be possible. For instance, at a SOPA conference in
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Indore's most-expensive Sayaji Hotel, Omkar Singh Chauhan questioned the Agricultural
Production Commissioner and other government officials as to why there been a lull in
creating new, higher-yielding soyabean varieties for the last decade or so, after the
popular JS-335. Recounting the incident to me he said, as farmers we are creating new
local varieties, I have made 3-4 myself, but these scientists are not able to come up with
anything. Similarly, farmers blamed electricity department officials and agricultural
department officials for not supplying electricity and fertilizers in sufficient quantities
when required, especially during the sowing of wheat. How could they be expected to be
"good farmers" if the government did not support them?
The farmers described above, who seek to become "good farmers," are powerful
rural actors in their own right. They belong to the most economically well-off families in
the village and may even hold some political office, whether it be in the village panchayat
or the cooperative society. When development is narrowly framed as increasing
production and productivity of agriculture, these economically and politically powerful
rural actors are better able to fulfill the criteria of being "good farmers" because they
have the resources to dig tubewells and irrigate their lands, buy good quality seeds,
fertilizers and pesticides to improve the yield, and enough land to produce a large crop.
Consequently, those who were already powerful within rural society have been able to
ensure that the state continues to provide them with free electricity, enables timely
provision of fertilizer, innovates and gives them new seed varieties, procures their crop at
higher minimum support prices, helps them maintain their level of prosperity and protects
them during times of distress (Varshney 1995, Gupta 1998). They have also made
successful claims upon the state to continue to support them in the name of agrarian
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development even after liberalization in 1991 (Varshney 1999). In Madhya Pradesh,
under pressure from farmer lobbyists the state government pledged to waive all electricity
bills of defaulters as well as increased the procurement price of wheat by an extra 100
rupees per quintal prior to the assembly elections in November 2008. However, in the
name of helping all farmers, both these actions encouraged greater extraction of ground
water and growing of more water-intensive wheat by farmers who were already
economically better off. In effect, state policy subsidized richer farmers and supported
their extractive practices related to soil and water management-a policy which can lead
to a more severe ecological crisis than what Malwa is seeing already.
More problematically, the metaphor of "good farmers" has become a means for
upper caste farmers to denigrate the rights of poor, lower caste, adivasi farmers to be
farmers at all. In Madhya Pradesh, farmers who do not fulfill the criteria of being "good
farmers" are usually small and marginal producers, mostly adivasi and lower caste. For
state extension agents, such farmers are too poor and ignorant to be helped or reformed,
while for neoliberal agribusinesses they produce too little and are incapable of improving
their low levels of productivity to count much in the larger scheme of things. State
planners in the past and market actors after liberalization have insisted upon enacting the
narrative of transition on small and marginal farmers (and the landless agricultural
workers) converting them into industrial or urban labourers.
During my visits with "acche kisan," I asked them to introduce me to poor
farmers who farmed small plots of land in their village. Repeatedly, they tried to dissuade
me from meeting such farmers. "What will you learn from them," they asked? "We have
told you everything there is to know about soyabean. Those farmers don't know about
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new varieties and new techniques, they don't do farming correctly. They won't be able to
tell you anything correctly for your research." I tried to get around this by suggesting that
I wanted to learn about bullock farming and tractor farming-surely those farmers would
be able to tell me more about bullock farming. But these farmers dismissed bullock
farming as outdated and on the wane.
"Good farmers" often criticize the state for giving resources to such farmers
through mechanisms of land redistribution or by providing subsidized farming
equipment. Ramakant Patidar of Gopalkhedi village went to the extent of suggesting that
these farmers should not be farmers. "The government wastes resources on them. Look at
their land, madam," he said, as we were going through his village. I saw a patchy piece of
land with short soyabean stalks looking weak and dried out next to the road. The patch
had been given to an adivasi farmer during land redistribution 30 years ago. "They have
spoilt the average [yield] from 5-6 quintal per bigha to 2-3 quintal per bigha," he
lamented. Along with scientists, "acche kisan" displayed anxiety over the decline in
average yields because poor adivasi farmers' low yields were also counted in the overall
average calculation. In the context of constant evaluation on the basis of yields, they felt
that the real productivity of agriculture would be revealed if we did not count such poor
farmers. 52
The following incident at the field of Champalal Singh Makwana of Ranipura
village epitomizes this sentiment. At the soyabean harvest in 2007, almost a year and a
52 The land was originally government-owned wasteland and had been given to the adivasi farmer in a
process of land redistribution during the 1970s. A new road was built a few months ago next to the land and
the topsoil and mud from that field had been used in making the road. It was no surprise then that the
soyabean looked like it was 10-15 days old even after two months. A nearby field of an upper caste farmer
had been extended onto land owned by the government. He had allowed only a little portion to be denuded
of mud. The adivasi had to make the sacrifice for the greater public good, whereas the upper caste farmer
could get away without doing so.
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half after I began fieldwork, I was at Champalal Singh's field when a Rajput farmer from
the nearby village and who owned the field across the road from Champalal came up to
us. I had never met him before and he asked about the purpose of my visit. I explained
my interest in farming and soyabean. He said, "You compare my field and his. I have got
5 quintals per bigha and in another field it may even be 6 q/ bigha. He has 2 q/ bigha. 6 q
in 3 bighas." The Rajput did not realize that Champalal farmed only one out of the three
bighas he was seeing. Anyway, he continued, "He could have got 15 quintals in 3 bigha.
He has lost 9 quintals or Rs 9000 at least [calculated using the minimum support price of
soyabean at Rs. 1000 per quintal]. And his pesticide and fertilizer would not have cost so
much." Even if we calculate for one bigha, Champalal Singh lost Rs. 3000 and a bottle of
pesticide costs Rs. 450. I added that I had seen Baghelji, the gram sevak (village
agricultural extension officer), giving the bottle at a subsidized rate of Rs. 250. Looking
at Champalal I asked why couldn't you get it? Champalal's son Anil responded that
"Motibai [Champalal's mother] had got some seeds and culture [plant vitamins] this
year." When I mentioned Baghelji's name, the Rajput said, "He needs to go and meet
Baghelji to get things. The well will not come to you. You have to go to the well to
drink."
All this while Champalal Singh sat on the ground and didn't say anything much.
The Rajput and I stood about 10 feet apart making him our topic of discussion. I asked
generally, "Why not even get it [pesticide] from Dhar?" Before Champalal Singh could
reply, the Rajput chimed in. "You need enough mental capacity to plan ahead. If you
want to go to Dhar tomorrow you need to plan from today. Tomorrow if you get up and
think you want to go, by then it is already 10 am and you wonder would it be available or
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not in the shop. So you decide I will go tomorrow. Then something happens the next
day and so they don't end up going. They do not do anything on time, whether it is
sowing within the required three days, or it is giving pesticide and fertilizer on time. And
by the time they cut the soyabean it has already shattered [khir gai he]. Luck/fate and
deliberation both are needed [Taqdeer aur tadbeer dono chahiye]. Luck is god gifted and
even if you wish to increase it you cannot. But where is the application of his mind
[Dimaag pata nahi kahan raheta hail? If he would have given the land on lease [munafa]
it would have turned out better." Then the Rajput left.
Champalal Singh Makwana, his daughter, son, and three nephews sowing soyabean and maize by hand in
Ranipura, June 2006. Photo by Richa Kumar
This analysis is typical of what most upper caste farmers and traders in places like
Ranipura and Dhar believe about lower caste, adivasi farmers. The problem, they
eloquently argue, is with the adivasis' mental inability to think, to make decisions, to act
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upon them in a responsible manner. But such an evaluation creates a caricature out of the
actual lived circumstances of people like Champalal Singh and obscures the unequal
power relationships that circumscribe his life. Champalal Singh was around 36 years old
in 2006 when I met him first. He was at his field on the main road coming from Ranipura
to the highway. Five children between 7 and 12 years of age were with him planting
maize and soyabean by hand. The children, I later learnt, were Champalal's two children
and three nephews. They were poking a hole in the ground with their little fingers and
dropping seeds into them. Using a little stick they were trying to draw a 10 feet straight
line from the last hole where they planted a seed. Champalal said that the tractor fellow
missed out about 5 feet of rows at the end of his field so he was taking the help of these
kids to finish the sowing by hand. But the holes made by the children ended up all over
the place, definitely not in a straight line and only 6-8 inches apart rather than the 2 feet
norm. Moreover, the kids were doing a pretty lousy job of sowing, dropping too many
seeds into one hole! They didn't seem to know about the techniques but they were
enjoying themselves thoroughly. Champalal Singh wasn't paying much attention to them
either. I had spent the past three days observing farmers sowing by bullock cart and by
tractor and had discussed the seed rate and spacing of plants with many of them. So I
instinctively interrupted the kids saying you are putting too much seed, how will the plant
sprout well? So then Champalal Singh became slightly more alert and started showing
them how to plant.
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Left: Champalal Singh's field showing the hand-sown portion. Right: The field on the opposite side of the
road (referred to by the Rajput). Photos taken in July 2006 by Richa Kumar
Champalal Singh and his brothers, the sons of Savitri bai, are amongst the poorest
families in Ranipura village. Each of them has one quarter to one half hectare of land,
obtained when their father's 2-3 hectares was divided at his death. Savitri bai had seven
sons and three daughters. Her nieces joked that she did not get the benefit of birth control
methods during her time. One son disappeared as a teenager and one daughter died
leaving behind a two-year old boy. All remaining six sons were yearly labourers at the
houses of Jat farmers in the past, although two of them (Champalal and Raju) quit
because of medical problems. A third expired due to some illness leaving behind his wife
and three young children. None of the brothers have a tubewell in their fields (the one
field with a tubewell has been leased out to the priest of Ranipura), but they grow
unirrigated wheat in rabi and soyabean in kharif.
Champalal said he had studied till the 3" standard but could not remember
anything. He had been a yearly servant [hali] at the houses of two Jat brothers in
Ranipura for nearly 10 years but left the job a few years ago. He recalled that he was
spraying pesticide for them and fell sick some 6-7 years ago. I asked whether he took any
Chapter 1: Development and the Yellow Revolution in Malwa 118
Richa Kumar
precautions or safety measures. He replied, "They gave soap to wash. But by mistake I
think I may have taken water or food with unwashed hands. But mostly it is the gas that
comes into your mouth when you spray." Every month or two months, Champalal would
stop getting any sensation in his entire body, almost like paralysis. I asked him whether
he went to a doctor or what medicines he took. He said "I have a slip [parchi] from the
doctor; you see it and tell me. The medicines are very expensive, five rupees a tablet. I
only have them when I become very sick." On my next visit to his house, he showed me a
worn slip of paper. Below a scrawled date of 2002, the doctor had written "schizophrenic
psychosis." I don't think Champalal quite understood the import of his disease nor the
possible implications that he could be sick for life. He had never visited the doctor after
that date. It was also unclear whether his diagnoses was accurate or not.
Two months later in September 2006, Champalal's five feet of hand planted
soyabean and maize was definitely a sight to see. Because it had rained a lot, he told me,
he wasn't able to pull out the extra maize stalks which had sprouted up. There were too
many plants, he had not put fertilizer in the hand sown maize and the plants were short
and stunted with yellowing leaves and no potential corn cob mustaches [mooch]
whatsoever! The soyabean didn't look much better. The stalks were short and thin, the
leaves were small and limp, and even the tractor-sown area was sparsely populated. It
was an odd lot along the main road to Ranipura. Left, right, behind, and opposite this
field, lush green stems swayed in the breeze every time I passed by.
Champalal told me that he did not have enough money to put fertilizer in the
maize nor to buy pesticide for the soyabean. The field sloped away from the road but the
water never drained out completely. It would simply accumulate in the low lying areas of
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the field for days together, rotting whatever little crop that was standing. Soyabean,
despite being able to withstand water logging for extended periods of time, did not do
well in Champalal's field, one important reason being the soil had very low fertility
[urvarak shakti]. In comparison, the Jat families for whom Champalal and his four
brothers worked, all had between 5 and 20 hectares of land, and each had ensured that
every year the soil fertility in select fields would be replenished with several trolleys of
mud. The mud mostly came from the dry bed of the village pond during the summer
months. Other farmers, such as the Rajputs, who did not have tractors or the ability to add
mud, instead used their bullock carts to add cow dung fertilizer. Farmers like Champalal
and his brothers did not have enough animals to generate sufficient cow dung for their
fields. Champalal owned a cow and a calf and most of the cowdung was used up as
cooking fuel.
At the soyabean harvest, the few pods on Champalal's field were small and
withered. I counted not more than 10-15 pods on each stem where the usual would be at
least 30-35 and a good crop would have 60-70 pods. He obtained just about 2 quintals in
one bigha, when most other farmers in Ranipura got between 3-4 quintals, the best
turning out to be 5 quintals in a couple of fields. Champalal and his family left for his in-
law's place for Diwali, just after harvest and they left the unthreshed pile of soyabean at
their field itself. Unfortunately, when they came back after six days, they saw someone
had stolen all their soyabean, threshed it 100 metres away behind a tree and camped off
[chor koot ke le gaye].
Based on this extended context, it is clear that Champalal Singh has inherited a
tiny plot of land from his father. He does not own enough animals to provide animal
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fertilizer to improve the soil quality of his fields. He does not have a bullock cart or
farming implements and has to borrow them from others once their own farming
operations are over, delaying his work. He is unable to add mud to the field to level the
slope and reduce the extent of water logging. Further, he suffers from a serious illness,
possibly caused by pesticide poisoning, and has no money to pay for medication and
doctors' visits. Consequently, he is sick much of the time. Yet none of these
circumstances are visible when we see the soyabean on his field. What is worse, he has
no recourse to any support or compensation upon the loss of his entire crop to theft.
Back to the 2007 harvest: After the Rajput left, I asked Champalal whether the
Rajput was correct in his statements. While he was there Champalal had turned his head
away and generally agreed with a laugh and "hmph" with the Rajput. But when I asked
he said, "These persons talk this way only. They suppress poor people this way only.
They do not know the helplessness of the poor [Yeh log aise hi bolte hain, aise hi gareeb
ko dabate hain. Inko kya maloom garib ki majboori kya hai]. I asked why the situation
was helpless. He said,
"We go work as labourers. We do not come to know when Baghelji is coming.
Sometimes we are on this field, sometime another field. These persons [Rajputs] take
everything from Baghelji. It does not reach us at all. They [Rajputs] also must be giving
[some inducement] to the village agricultural extension officer [Baghelji]. We do not
have anything to give. Everything happens with arrangements under the table. [Hum
mazdoori jate hain. Pata nahi chalta kab Baghelji aa rahe hain. Hum kabhi is khet pe
kabhi us pe. Yeh log Baghelji se sab le lete hain. Humare tak pahunchta hi nahin. Yeh bhi
dete honge kuch gram sevak ko. Humare paas kuch dene ke liye hai hi nahi. Sab upar
upar hi ho jata hai.]"
Then I responded, "But last July I met Manguji and Rama bai [adivasis] and others at the
nursery going to Jhumki to get seeds and some other agricultural equipment. They had
got information from Baghelji." So then Champalal replied, "They must have a pauti
(land record in their name). I have heard that one needs a pauti for this and our land is all
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in the name of our mother. So Ram Prasad [his brother who takes care of their mother]
may know about it." Anil, Champalal's son again reminded us that, "Motibai
[Champalal's mother] had got some seeds and culture this year."
So, not only does Champalal Singh find it difficult to pay for subsidized
pesticides and fertilizers, he is not eligible to receive government benefits because he
does not have land in his own name, yet.53 He is structurally excluded from even aspiring
to join the category of "acche kisan" by his low caste, by his economic endowment, by
his (il)legal status, and by his physical (in)ability amongst other things. By suggesting
that farmers like Champalal Singh should not farm anymore because they can never
become productive, modern farmers, their right to grow food such as vegetables in kharif
and unirrigated wheat in rabi to feed themselves is also denied as a result. It legitimizes
their forced transition into the growing numbers of landless, migrant workers and the
subsequent pauperization that such a life entails (Breman 2007).
Conclusion
The metaphor of a "good farmer," which articulates an imagined scientific and
technologically progressive farmer bringing about development through higher
productivity, has been used effectively by rich farmers and state policy makers to frame
agrarian change narrowly as a technical question. In doing so, they have obscured
unequal power relationships that circumscribe farm practices and enforce differences
amongst farmers. This has reinforced the power of the rural economic and political elite
to seek support from both state and market actors and disempowered those who are weak
53 The relationship between the village agricultural extension officer and marginal adivasi farmers is
discussed in greater detail in chapter three.
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and powerless. Those who are already powerful are able to utilize the metaphor of "good
farmers" to make claims upon the state to develop them through the provision of new
agricultural technologies. The state is obligated to fulfill these claims because "good
farmers" are the ones who are ostensibly making agriculture (and the nation) developed.
But in the process, poor rural dwellers are further disenfranchised and denied access to
the language of entitlements-for land, livelihoods, and subsistence-altogether. Partha
Chatterjee's framework of political society must be mapped onto this rural milieu with
utmost care and concern, lest it glorify the actions of the rural elite at the expense of the
poor and the weak.
Soyabean's story is the story of a crop that brought double cropping to Malwa,
that creating rising incomes and brought monetary prosperity. The pacca houses,
televisions, motorcycles, agricultural implements, tubewells and motors, tractors, and
harvesters, are all testaments to this transformation, which has been labeled as the yellow
revolution and the credit for which has been appropriated by the state. However,
soyabean did not come as a filler for empty space in the crop cycle of Malwa but replaced
crucial water management practices that were central to this dryland plateau region of
western Madhya Pradesh. The ensuing acute water scarcity and regular uncertainties in
agrarian production puncture the progressive, linear narrative of the yellow revolution.
In this chapter I have argued for rethinking agrarian change as a result of the
contingent imbrication of various human and non-human actors rather than a triumphant
teleological narrative of state-led development. I also suggest that we foreground
farmers' narratives which treat change as non-linear and inclusive of the possibility of
prosperity as much as decline. Further, the dominant vision of agrarian development as
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higher production and greater productivity has reframed agrarian change into making
"good farmers" and bringing about the development of the nation. Using metaphors such
as "good farmers," which embody a trajectory of making farmer into citizens, rural elites
have been able to appropriate a greater share of the state's resources for their own well-
being and reinforce their power. At the same time, they have used it as a means to
legitimize the exit of poor, low caste, marginal farmers from agriculture altogether,
consequently denying the latter even the right to subsistence from the land.
Chapter 1: Development and the Yellow Revolution in Malwa 124
Richa Kumar
Chapter Two
"Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace:
Misleading Expectations from Information Technology
In June 2008, the New York Times published an article which began as follows:
"Whether it's for an Armani-suited Wall Street trader or a farmer in rural India, the right
information at the right time is the baseline for success." The article was describing a
project to provide market price information to farmers in rural India using mobile phones
via a text-messaging service. Anecdotal evidence suggested that a soyabean farmer from
Maharashtra in central India, made 400 rupees more per quintal by waiting to sell his
crop based on information received from this service. The project was hailed as an
example of how information can empower farmers in agrarian markets (Arango 2008).
Dr. Ashok Jhunjhunwala, Professor of Electrical Engineering at the Indian Institute of
Technology, Chennai would have agreed with this assessment. He had proclaimed during
a presentation at the e-Development conference at the MIT Media Lab in Cambridge,
USA, in October 2000, "Information is power." I was a final year undergraduate in the
US at the time and had conducted fieldwork at TARAhaat that summer, one of the
earliest development projects setting up computer and internet centres in rural India. Prof.
Jhunjhunwala's talk was inspiring enough to convince me to go and work with his
company n-Logue Communications, to "empower" villagers in India with information on
government schemes, agricultural best practices, and education, using latest information
technology.
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In the late 1990s, the dotcom bubble had not yet burst, India was slowly growing
into an information technology (IT) hub, and there was a sudden interest in using
information and communication technologies (ICTs), especially computers and the
internet in promoting rural development. The World Bank's World Development Report
for 1998-99 was entitled "Knowledge for Development" and started out by saying, "Poor
countries-and poor people--differ from rich ones not only because they have less
capital but because they have less knowledge" (Dahlman 1998:1). If only the poor knew
how to farm better, they would become more productive farmers. If only the poor knew
how to save their children from diarrhoea using oral rehydration therapy, there would be
less infant mortality. Sweeping aside the complexity of disease, sanitation, affordability
and access to nutritive food and medical aid, the problem of development looked
deceptively simple-let experts in the west and in urban areas provide access to
information and the rural poor would be able to save themselves from their own
ignorance.
The first assumption underlying the statements of both Dr. Jhunjhunwala and the
World Bank is that the poor lack information or have less knowledge. The second
assumption is that providing the poor with a certain kind of information or knowledge
will empower them and bring about development. The emphasis upon knowledge or
information as the primary constraint in enabling development reformatted the problems
facing the poor into issues of access to technology. In an environment where the
information technology industry in India grew phenomenally over the last decade, such
an approach found solutions to the problem of access by the dime a dozen. Projects like
Mission 2007 which purported to establish internet kiosks in 100,000 Indian villages or
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the 100$ laptop of Nicholas Negroponte of the MIT Media Lab or Drishtee, TARAhaat,
Akshaya, and many others, became institutional mechanisms supported by public and
private funding for promoting access to technology. 1
ITC-IBD, India's largest agribusiness and a division of the India Tobacco
Company (ITC) adapted this notion in its analysis of the problems plaguing the
agricultural marketing system of soyabean in Madhya Pradesh towards the end of the
1990s. It argued that farmers did not have adequate and reliable information on the price
of their produce. Because of poor rural infrastructure in transportation and
communications, farmers were dependent upon intermediaries for information and for
transporting their produce to market yards and processing factories. Such intermediaries,
argued ITC-IBD, were able to make a higher profit by denying farmers accurate
information on prices and paying them a lower price. After careful analysis, the company
came up with a project known as eChoupal, whereby information technology through
internet kiosks in villages would be used to provide farmers with accurate price
information collected from market yards and the company's own price quotes. This,
argued ITC-IBD, would empower farmers to make an informed choice on where to sell
their produce and improve their incomes. The company was expected to benefit through
increased procurement and reduced transaction costs, thus, increasing shareholder value
at the same time as benefiting the farming community (Deveshwar 2002, Annamalai and
Rao 2003).
1 For descriptions of services provided using ICTs by these projects and an analysis of usage by villagers of
such services, see Kumar 2001, Singh 2004, Kumar 2005a, Kiran 2005, Mission 2007 Secretariat 2005,
Hamm and Smith 2008.
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The eChoupal instantly became popular amongst development agencies in India
and abroad, winning several ICT for development awards in the corporate social
responsibility category. 2 Even though by 2005, most ICT projects were floundering, the
eChoupal was consistently hailed as the lone success story in using information
technology to bring about rural development. Failure of a majority of ICT for
development projects did not prompt questioning of the assumption that information is
empowering. Rather, critics argued that projects failed because relevant information had
not been provided through the available technology (Balaji 2005). The eChoupal
succeeded, critics claimed, because price information was critically important to the
marketing of agricultural produce and brought direct benefits to farmers (Banerjee 2005,
Panigrahy 2006).
In contrast, this research points towards several conceptual problems inherent in
this discourse of empowering farmers through technology-promoted disintermediation
and provision of market information. First, by reducing the frame of analysis to the
moment of decision-making when farmers decide to sell their produce, the notion of
empowerment is reduced solely to the act of being able to obtain a higher price. This
narrow frame of analysis assumes that obtaining information automatically enables a
farmer to receive the monetary benefits associated with that information. Agrarian
markets are structured such that the price of any produce finally realised by each
individual farmer is critically dependent upon the quality of the produce and who has the
power to make the decision regarding quality. Further, simply providing price
2 The eChoupals project have won the following development related awards, among many others:
Development Gateway Award 2005, TERI Award for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 2004, the
Stockholm Challenge Award 2006, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) Award
at the international conference on Sharing Innovative Agribusiness Solutions 2008. See
http://www.itcportal.com/sets/echoupal framneset.htm for more details.
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information of far away markets is unhelpful unless a farmer has the ability to realise that
price. For that, a farmer needs to be able to afford to transport his or her produce to that
place and find a buyer willing to buy at that price, activities that cost both time and
money. Additionally, this discourse does not differentiate between farmers and their own
ability to obtain market information. Those who live closer to market yards have multiple
sources of obtaining price information compared to those who live further away,
regardless of whether they are rich or poor, literate or illiterate. Those who are poor,
however, have comparatively less financial ability to be able to take advantage of such
market information even if they live close enough to a market yard and almost no ability
at all if they live farther away.
Second, focusing on the notion of disintermediation, or removing middlemen
from the supply chain between farmers and consumers, through information technology
draws attention away from the fact that disintermediation in a commodity like soyabean,
which is a cash crop, is not possible. Without intermediaries to buy the soyabean from
them and processing companies to process it and export it, farmers will be stuck with a
product they cannot consume nor sell locally. I argue that rather than disintermediating or
reducing the number of intermediaries in the supply chain, the eChoupals are, in effect,
creating a system of private intermediaries beholden to a single company to compete with
independent intermediaries who purchase soyabean for all processing companies in
general. ITC-IBD argues that disintermediation is taking place because its private
intermediaries do not have the power to make judgements on the quality of a farmers'
crop and settle the final price for farmers. However, this obscures the fact that the power
to settle the final price, in the new arrangement, shifts from a fairly competitive auction
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between many traders in a market yard to a single employee of the company at the
company's hub. Ironically, despite all the emphasis on prices, the difference between
these two marketplaces is not on the price of soyabean offered to farmers but rather on
non-price elements of competition, such as accurate weighing, on-time payment in cash,
and respectful treatment of farmers.
Third, this discourse of technology-promoted empowerment diverts attention
away from larger processes of disempowerment that are functioning in agrarian markets
of cash crops like soyabean. Soyabean is a global commodity whose price in India is, in
fact, driven not by ITC-IBD or the market yards, but by the Chicago Board of Trade and
the Kuala Lumpur Commodities Exchange. All soyabean-related entities in India,
whether processing companies, traders, or exporters are price-receivers with no ability to
influence its price. Unlike a commodity like wheat, where farmers in India have
consistently been able to lobby the government for increasing the minimum support price
each year, and have obtained direct benefits through higher procurement prices in some
areas, in soyabean, farmers have no power whatsoever in influencing the price.
Fourth, it is a myth to consider the eChoupal as an ICT intervention bringing
about rural development. The computers and internet established by ITC-IBD do not play
any role in enabling farmers to sell their soyabean to the company. In most cases, they are
not even the primary source of information on soyabean prices, especially when the
telephone is a convenient alternative. These computers have instead been installed in the
homes of relatively better off farmers from the dominant caste in most villages and have
become means of personal entertainment or communication for these families, in the
select places where they are actually being used. While this promotes access to computers
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for the families of the 6000 sanchalaks [computer operators] of ITC-IBD, it is not clear
whether the village in general is benefiting at all, either from access to the machine itself
for learning how to use computers or the internet, or from getting any benefits from the
information beamed to these places by ITC-IBD, a fact which the company has itself
acknowledged (Sivakumar 2007).
Finally, this discourse mistakenly equates the actions of traders in the marketplace
whose aim is to maximize profits over the course of a season of buying and selling
produce with the actions of farmers who are, in fact, motivated by concerns other than
maximizing the price they obtain for their cash crops every season. Farmers are expected
to make informed choices about when to sell their soyabean in an effort to maximize the
price. In contrast, I argue that rather than maximizing the price of their crop over the
entire season or year, as traders would naturally be expected to do, farmers, instead, try to
maximize their savings in the form of stored commodities such as soyabean. Farmers
would rather have stored goods than cash because cash is more easily alienated to others
within the family or in kinship networks through claims of dependents and requests for
loans. In places like Ranipura, farmers, whether rich or poor, large or small, sold their
soyabean only when they required cash to conduct transactions. 3
Although I also started out seduced by the ephemeral vision of empowerment
through information technology, this research challenged these assumptions. In depth
fieldwork, instead, suggested the need to explore alternative ways in which soyabean
farmers in Malwa attempt to exercise power in the marketplace. Farmers engage with
3 James Ferguson (1994) makes a similar observation about cattle in Lesotho but he also analyzes their
value in cultural terms, such as being a stand-in for the wealth and status of migrant young men. My
argument here is restricted to the value of commodities such as soyabean as a means of saving.
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intermediaries both at the market yard and at the eChoupal in battles over deciding the
quality of their produce, in negotiations over the weight of their soyabean, and in playing
off one marketplace against another. The misguided focus exclusively on technology
detracts from understanding these alternative arenas of power struggles and prevents
moving of resources to genuinely support farmers in these contestations over power in the
marketplace.
Establishment of the eChoupals
The choupal is a public meeting place in a village, usually underneath a large,
shady banyan tree. eChoupal is the name of an internet centre established by ITC-IBD in
the house of a farmer in a village. Nearly 1700 villages in Madhya Pradesh and 6000
villages across India had such eChoupals as of 2007 (Fairless 2007). The name eChoupal
reflects an attempt to make the centre an alternative place for meeting and sharing
information using modem information and communication technologies (ICTs). In
Madhya Pradesh, these eChoupals are known as soyachoupals because ITC-IBD first
established them to buy soyabean from farmers.4 ITC-IBD installed computers and
internet access with battery backup in every eChoupal, selecting a room with a pacca
[concrete] roof and strong walls in the house of a farmer who was called the sanchalak
(information provider).5 ITC-IBD selected only those persons owning a telephone as
sanchalaks to enable communication of price information when the internet was not
4 This research refers to the soyachoupals only, although it uses choupal, soyachoupal and eChoupal
interchangeably.
5 Most eChoupals faced long power cuts and electricity was available only for a few hours everyday. Along
with the computer and a satellite dish (VSAT) the company provided two uninterrupted power supply units
(UPS) with two solar panels and battery backup so that the computer and VSAT could be utilized even
when there was no electricity. Peripherals such as a printer, mouse, keyboard, and monitor were also
installed.
Chapter 2: "Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace 132
Richa Kumar
available or the computer had a technical breakdown. 6 The sanchalak was trained by the
engineers who installed the system and taught how to access the soyachoupal website of
ITC-IBD. Through the eChoupal in the village, ITC-IBD provided farmers with their
company's purchase price for the produce. The sanchalak gave information to farmers
and helped them take their soyabean directly to ITC-IBD's warehouse, bypassing
intermediaries in the market yard altogether. At the warehouse, which came to be called
the choupal by farmers, a company official would judge the quality and settle the price
for each farmer. At the same warehouse, ITC-IBD built rural retail malls, known as
Choupal Sagars,7 to sell agricultural inputs and consumer goods to farmers, converting it
into a private market yard in competition with the government-owned market yard known
as the mandi.
Madhya Pradesh is the largest producer of soyabean in India. There are a few big
processing companies such as Ruchi Soya, ITC-IBD, Malwa Vanaspati, Prestige
Industries, and Gujarat Ambuja (in neighbouring Gujarat), along with several hundreds of
smaller soyabean processors in the state. ITC-IBD is one of the largest buyers of
6 ITC-IBD sought to identify a male farmer with a medium-size landholding, who lived in a pacca house,
owned a telephone, and was from the dominant caste of the village. He was expected to be influential in the
village so he could convince farmers to sell to ITC-IBD. At the same time, he was required to be neutral
(i.e. apolitical) so he would not get embroiled in local conflicts. The most obvious restrictive element of
this list was the pacca house and telephone. Most phones in Malwa were in houses of the wealthiest
families in the village in 2003 when I first conducted my field research, and the mobile phone revolution
did not occur until 2006-07, when all the eChoupals in Madhya Pradesh had long been established. Further,
most adivasis were typically poor and were usually not the "dominant" caste in the village (See Srinivas
(1987) for a discussion of the "dominant" caste). So even though they formed a majority in many villages,
no one from their community could fulfil the criteria to become a sanchalak. The choices for a sanchalak
would remain between leaders of powerful political or social groups within the village.
7 The company proposed a two-way, rural transportation/distribution network (independent of the mandis
and the existing retail network) where it would directly buy agricultural produce from farmers as well as
sell agricultural inputs, consumer goods, and services to farmers through the same network. As part of the
retail distribution network ITC-IBD supplied fast moving consumer goods such as tea, biscuits, matches,
salt, bulbs etc., to the sanchalak in the village who further sold them to local shops and other customers. In
Sehore district where the mall started in 2005, the retail network in villages was just picking up. In Dhar
district, the Choupal Sagar only started in October 2007 and the retail network was not very well developed
yet.
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soyabean in MP, although Ruchi Soya has had the highest market share. There are about
60 major (A- and B-class) government-owned market yards8 in the state and ITC-IBD
setup 44 warehouses to compete with them by 2005. 9
The government-owned market yards were created through the Agricultural
Produce Marketing Committee (APMC) Act of 1972. From pre-colonial times till nearly
the 1960s, when road infrastructure was non-existent and the only affordable mode of
transportation was horse carriages or bullock carts, only a handful of farmers were able to
take their produce outside the village to buyers in town. Most of them relied on traders
who picked up produce from their door step and at the same time supported their
production activities through loans-the classical interlinked markets described by
economists (Harriss-White 1999). Activities of such moneylenders-cum-traders were
opaque, often cryptic to illiterate farmers, and the relationship between them was one of
power and control over farmers. David Hardiman (1996) has documented the
relationships between farmers and intermediaries in colonial Gujarat and the power they
held over farmers.
The institution of the mandi by the government in the post-independence period
was created to reign in the power of intermediaries and bring transparency in the settling
of prices for farm produce. All marketing transactions were to take place only within the
premises of the mandi, which was established in a place officially designated by the
8 There are A, B, and C class mandis with A-class mandis being most competitive and having 15-20 traders
participate in the auction each day. B and C class mandis are not very competitive and farmers far away
from an A class mandi prefer not to sell their produce at these smaller mandis. These smaller mandis are
usually the sites for corruption and traders have licenses in these mandis but are buying directly in the
villages, illegally. Further research is required in this area to understand the functioning of smaller mandis
and suggest methods to make them more accountable to the farmer.
9 See the Madhya Pradesh Mandi Board website at http://www.mpmandiboard.com/imajorcommE.asp
Accessed December 20, 2008 and http://finance.indiamart.com/markets/commodity/soyabean.html
Accessed November 21, 2007.
Chapter 2: "Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace 134
Richa Kumar
government. Farmers had to bring their produce to the mandi where it would be
auctioned, weighed and moved to the traders' shops by government-licensed weighers
[tulaavatis] and labourers. Traders and erstwhile brokers had to pay a fee to the
government to obtain a license to bid in the auction and buy produce from farmers. No
weighing or transactions could be concluded at the traders' shop outside the mandi.10
The implementation of the mandi system in the 1970s led to the transformation of
the role of the middleman according to Arvind Sardanha (2005), who conducted research
on the historical role of the mandi system for Eklavya, an NGO working on education in
Madhya Pradesh. The important distinction was that produce was sold in an open auction
where traders would shout out bids for a given farmer's produce and it would be sold to
the highest bidder. Further, legally payment was guaranteed by an external body, the
Mandi Board at the state level and the Mandi Committee at the level of each mandi. The
Mandi committee consisted of elected officials from the trading and farming communities
who resolved disputes. Government officials also monitored the practices of traders
within the mandi and supervised the weighing and the payment of mandi tax. According
to Sardanha, "Earlier middlemen came to the village and picked up produce at a very big
margin. They would tell farmers 'you don't know what will happen in the mandi,
someone may cheat you, your maal [produce] may be stolen, sell it here only' [loot lega,
chori ho jayega, yahin bech doh]. But the mandi was much more fair. It changed the
entire system. Going to the mandi became much more common."
1o Maniramji Kankaria, an erstwhile munim (accountant) of a trader in Dhar mandi and now a proprietor of
his own trading firm, thanks to soyabean, recounted the history of the mandi. The mandi was earlier in
Dushera Maidan, an area on the outskirts of Dhar. In 1979 it shifted out of there to the Moti Bagh Chowk,
its present location. The chowk was part of the palatial gardens of the Dhar Maharaj, Anand Rao Pawar. "It
was a huge bagicha [garden] with more than 100 chikoo and sandalwood trees and a library." Interview,
February 25, 2007. According to mandi records, it was bought from the Maharaj for Rs. 200,000 in
September 1978.
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After liberalisation of the Indian economy in 1991, several government
committees were instituted to study agricultural markets and give recommendations to
improve their efficiency." In 2000, an Expert Committee on Strengthening and
Developing Agricultural Marketing System in the Country (Shankarlal Guru Committee)
was instituted by the Ministry of Agriculture. This committee suggested the promotion of
privately organised market yards (such as the eChoupals) in competition with existing
government-owned market yards (mandis) where farmers sold their produce (Acharya
2005). In May 2002, Madhya Pradesh amended the Agricultural Produce Marketing Act
of 1972 to allow farmers to sell their produce outside the mandi at pre-approved private
hubs. This allowed companies to set up a buying hub at their processing factory or any
leased warehouse to buy from farmers directly, thus eliminating traders from the supply
chain, and creating a network parallel to the mandi system.
ITC-IBD is the agribusiness division of the India Tobacco Company (ITC), and
started purchasing, processing and exporting soyabean apart from many other agricultural
commodities in 1990. The company explained the introduction of the eChoupal in 2000
as a post-liberalisation, post-WTO induced response of the company to inefficient
agrarian markets controlled by corrupt intermediaries, and an over-regulating, licensing
regime of the state.' 2 One of the main export products of the company was soyabean meal
and the eChoupal was an attempt to regain competitiveness in the export market of
soyabean. The Chairman of ITC, in a speech to shareholders in 2002 said, "This model
" These included the Expert Group on Agricultural Marketing (Acharya Committee) constituted by the
Union Ministry of Rural Development in 1998 which recommended transferring the agricultural marketing
division of the central government from the Ministry of Rural Development to the Ministry of Agriculture
(MoA). This was followed by the Guru Committee and then the Inter-Ministerial Task Force in July 2001
(Jain Committee). See Acharya 2005.
12 Interview with S. Sivakumar, CEO, ITC-IBD, Hyderabad, December 20, 2002.
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[eChoupal]...is in conformity with the reforms recommended by the Shankarlal Guru
Committee ...[for] inducing efficiency in the mandi [market yard] channel through
competition" (Deveshwar 2002). ITC-IBD also expected to benefit through reduced
procurement costs and by increasing its market share in the soyabean processing industry.
The reforms in agricultural marketing and the importance of the role of
information technology can be traced to a shift in the last two decades towards neoliberal
models of development whose stated primary purpose has been to make markets efficient,
although they have had other effects.' 3 David Harvey argues that the shift to
neoliberalism is predicated upon the use of information technology to enable greater
accumulation and dissemination of information and, consequently, enable efficient
transactions in markets (2005). The World Bank considers enabling "flow of
information" through ICTs to be "essential for effective markets" (Dahlman 1998: 2).
Proponents of the eChoupal emphasized the role of intermediaries in blocking the flow of
price information to farmers and argued that information technology could effectively
overcome this inefficiency. According to ITC-IBD's CEO Mr. S. Sivakumar,
intermediaries added little by way of productive value but because they compensated for
infrastructural constraints, they were entitled to some monetary share (Sivakumar 2002).
Information technology was expected to reduce this share to the minimum possible by
empowering farmers with price information and reducing the power of intermediaries to
exploit their ignorance.
13 Shifts towards neoliberal models of development in parts of Latin America and southeast Asia had
devastating effects on poor people in countries like Chile and Indonesia during the 1990s when real
incomes reduced and poverty increased (Paley 2001, Harvey 2005).
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Is Information Empowering?
This research argues that information alone is not enough to "empower" farmers
to automatically obtain the benefits that are supposed to be associated with it. Simply
knowing average market yard price or ITC-IBD's quoted price is unhelpful for an Indian
soyabean farmer because these prices are for a given level of quality known as FAQ
(Fair, Average Quality). A farmer can never know the exact price of his or her soyabean
until it is physically evaluated and its quality determined in relation to the FAQ. The
power to decide the quality is vested in the person buying the produce-either a group of
market yard traders in the mandi auction, or ITC-IBD's rate-setter at the warehouse, or a
trader who comes to buy directly in the village. The determination of quality "inevitably
depend[s] to a considerable degree on subjective judgement," as William Cronon argued
for grain in Chicago in the 1860s (Cronon 1991: 118).
With larger landholdings, standardized inputs, mechanized processes, and large
marketing contracts, such as those in the United States, one can expect certain
standardization in the quality of a large volume of output. 14 Unlike this industrialised
form of agriculture, the nature of agricultural production in India, however, is not
amenable to standardization of quality. Not only are farms small in size in comparison to
the US and south America, they are further subdivided into multiple plots located far
away from each other and, thus, having different soil fertilities and slopes. A farmer
rarely farms contiguous plots of land and thus, soyabean from the same farmer would
14 Steven Stoll in his book, The Fruits of Natural Advantage describes the process of standardization of
quality in the fruit industry in California and argues that it was a mutual shaping of the process by
marketing requirements and technological choices. Unfortunately, standardization was only based on size
and colour; it did not reflect qualities of juicyness and nutrition. Moreover, the problems with
monocropping, pest attacks, and huge seasonal labour requirements led to unsustainable practices.
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have some variation. The soyabean of an entire village would consist of a range of
qualities and each farmer's amalgamated lot would be priced very differently depending
upon its grade.
In Jharkheda village in Sehore district, for instance, rain had fallen in one part of
the village and the soyabean there was growing well in July 2005, but in the other part
where the sanchalak also had land, his crop was still waiting for water. He might
amalgamate all his produce together and sell (to obtain a medium level of quality and
generally recover his costs) or he may sell his good quality at a premium and forego the
costs on his bad quality. Micro-level rainfall differences and variations in soil quality
contributed significantly to soyabean quality even if the seed was the same, the same
variety of fertilizers and pesticides were used, and the timing of weeding and harvesting
was the same. Farmers in Ranipura village in Dhar district obtained different quality of
soyabean from different parts of the same field, especially when part of the field
remained waterlogged for extended periods of time, reducing the size and shine of the
seed. For instance, the Panditji [priest] of Ranipura explained that every year he was
always in a hurry and would sell as fast as possible. He would usually use the tractor of
Sameer Singh Rathod to bring his soyabean to the Dhar mandi. "One year Panditji had
got bags with grain of different quality and the trader yelled at us," said Sameer Singh.
Traders expect farmers to mix their grain and bring one single quality so that it can be
graded and priced accordingly. Panditji had simply bagged everything as it was from his
different field plots and taken it to a trader outside the mandi. "I then begged the Seth
[trader] and said please do it, this is our Panditji [village priest]," said Sameer Singh, and
the trader finally relented.
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Further, advertising market yard prices of far away places is not helpful unless
farmers can afford the transportation to that place and find a willing buyer at that price-
activities that cost time and money and require some contacts in the far away place. It is
precisely these costs and efforts that intermediaries are supposed to help with.
Information about any price, whether it is the minimum support price (MSP) instituted by
the government, or the average market yard price in a distant mandi, or ITC-IBD's price
at its warehouse does not automatically empower a farmer unless he or she has the ability
to realise that price. Information about a potential price can give farmers a comparative
frame within which to evaluate the price being offered by a local village trader or a trader
at a market yard. But it can empower them only if they have the ability to obtain that
price. For that, transportation costs should not be prohibitive to take away the entire
expected profit and those costs should be affordable to the farmer. A farmer then needs to
find a buyer willing to buy at that price, given the quality of the farmer's crop.' 5
Additionally, the discourse celebrating the need for new information technologies
assumes that all farmers do not have any price information whatsoever. Farmers from
villages situated in close proximity to a large A-class mandi, within 30 kilometres or so,
find it easier to get information on mandi prices. Many farmers from such a village, like
Ranipura in Dhar, would sell their produce at the mandi and many villagers would travel
to the mandi town for work or education almost on a daily basis. They brought back news
about the mandi prices of the day. Farmers who live in villages that are farther away from
15 The Minimum Support Price (MSP) instituted by the government also helps farmers only where the Food
Corporation of India (FCI), NAFED or some other government agency is physically purchasing at that
price and farmers are able to sell to them. In response, traders in the vicinity are forced to also increase their
price of procurement to approximate the MSP, to remain in business. Simply advertising an MSP is of no
use to farmers who cannot find a buyer at the price. Traders will undercut the MSP unless the FCI is a
buyer in the same marketplace.
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large, competitive mandis do not travel to the mandi town often. But they are still able to
obtain information on prices through the telephone during the day or at the end of the
day. 16 Several television channels now provide the day's mandi prices in tickers at the
bottom of the screen and those who obtain newspapers are able to see the prices for the
previous day. The local mandi price has become ubiquitous.
The eChoupal intervention was different from other ICT projects because it went
beyond just providing price information to farmers. ITC-IBD established warehouses in
the vicinity of every major mandi buying soyabean in Madhya Pradesh. Farmers who
could afford to pay the transportation costs to the mandi could refuse to sell to a trader in
their village and feasibly make a trip to ITC-IBD's warehouse to sell their soyabean.17
Thus, ITC-IBD's quoted price had a definite transactional opportunity embodied within
it, which could be realized by some farmers.
However, according to research conducted by Dr. Jaya Mehta, an independent
academic based in Indore, of the 30-40 small farmers interviewed around Indore district,
none had ever been to ITC's warehouse or the mandi although they were aware of the
latter. With transport on a tractor being costly, small farmers with 2-5 bags to sell did so
in the village itself. They found it prohibitively expensive to sell outside the village
(Mehta 2005).18 Thus, those farmers who could not afford to take their soyabean even to
16 The mobile phone has become immensely popular in the Madhya Pradesh since 2006 with several
companies establishing networks and promoting cheap and popular schemes for buying handsets and SIM
cards.
17 In the past, ITC-IBD had paid farmers transportation costs (at the rate of 3-5 Rs. per quintal per
kilometer) to bring their produce to the warehouse; but once warehouses were established in most soyabean
growing districts, this practice was discontinued.
18 Interview with Jaya Mehta, Indore, March 28, 2006.
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the mandi and were forced to sell to traders at the village, itself, were unable to take any
advantage of knowing ITC-IBD's price. 19
Mehta further argued that even if these small farmers, who produced less than 5-6
quintals each, pooled together their soyabean on one tractor trolley, each farmer's grain
would warrant a different price depending on the quality. All the soyabean could not be
mixed together. The farmer with better quality than others would not want his rate to be
reduced by mixing his soyabean with others. In the large Choupal Sagars there was no
provision to weigh a single bag. Hence, the trolley would have to be weighed five times,
according to Mehta, which would be impractical for ITC-IBD's employees who would
prefer to weigh it all at once. For this reason, small farmers could not sell their soyabean
at ITC-IBD's warehouse according to Mehta.
Finally, the eChoupal also followed strict norms of quality.20 ITC-IBD refused to
buy soyabean that deviated significantly from the FAQ level of 2% foreign matter, 2%
bad seed and 10% moisture. The worst level of quality that it accepted was 13% moisture,
7% foreign matter [mitti], 5% discoloured seed [daagi], and 10% green seed. 21 The
sanchalak of Bhaunkhedi in Sehore district estimated during an interview in 2005 that out
19 According to Mehta's research, small farmers were unaware of the eChoupals if there was no sanchalak
(or choupal agent as they were also known locally) in their village. Even if there was an eChoupal located 2
km away they, did not know about it. Interview in Indore, March 28, 2006.
20 One of the explicit aims of ITC-IBD in establishing the eChoupals was to purchase better quality
soyabean. Prior to the eChoupals, ITC-IBD would procure soyabean through traders in the mandis who
would, according to ITC-IBD managers in Bhopal, traditionally buy batches of both very good and very
bad quality produce, then mix them up before selling to companies like ITC-IBD for a higher overall
margin. ITC-IBD would get lower level quality of soyabean, which upon processing yielded less oil and
more contaminated de-oiled cake. According to traders in Dhar mandi, they would mix several qualities of
soyabean to come up with a homogenous lot filling one truck load to make it easier to estimate the price of
the entire lot and give some quality assurance to companies purchasing from them. Both sides agreed that
this would generally provide companies with a lower average quality of soyabean. Through the eChoupals,
however, soyabean comes loose in trolleys (usually belonging to a single farmer) without being mixed and
bagged at the mandi. ITC-IBD managers claimed that soyabean purchased through the eChoupals had
consistently been better in quality compared to the mandi-procured soyabean during interviews in 2003.
21 Interview with Deepak Pathak, Manager of the ITC-IBD choupal in Dhar, October 28, 2006.
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of 20 tractor trolleys that he directed to the ITC-IBD warehouse each day, at least 5
trolleys were rejected. Other sanchalaks corroborated that about 15-20% of trolleys were
rejected by ITC-IBD each day. Thus, not every farmer could sell at the eChoupal even if
he or she could afford the transportation costs-one had to ensure a certain minimum
level of quality. Despite obtaining information about a potential price of soyabean,
farmers were not automatically able to act upon the information to realise the potential
benefits linked to it. Rather than fetishizing information, this research argues that the
power relationships underlying market exchange need to be foregrounded in any analysis
studying the presumed empowerment of farmers.
Disintermediation: A Misleading Expectation
Disintermediation, or removing middlemen between producers and consumers, in
a commodity like soyabean, which is a cash crop, is not possible. Soyabean farmers
require intermediaries to connect them to processing companies and finally to consumers
of their produce. Without intermediaries to buy the soyabean from them and processing
companies to process it and export it, farmers will be stuck with a product they cannot
consume nor sell locally. Intermediaries are an integral part of market exchange,
precisely because information on potential buyers and sellers is not easily available in the
physical domain.
The problem with intermediaries, according to ITC-IBD, was that they were
taking away a greater share as profits than the actual value they added by transportation
and other logistical support. They were necessary in the past to compensate for poor
infrastructure and low connectivity and communications. With fragmented farms and
small lot sizes of farm produce (less than 100 quintals or one truck size for a majority of
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farmers) intermediaries played an important role in amalgamating and transporting a
reasonable lot size to factories and ensuring homogeneous quality within that lot. But
with the growth of rural infrastructure, ITC-IBD felt that the company could use
information technology to directly connect with farmers and bypass as many
intermediaries as possible.
However, ITC-IBD recognized that they could not do away with intermediaries
entirely. Human intermediaries were still needed to fill infrastructural gaps related to
transportation, especially to convince farmers in villages far away from market yards to
transport their soyabean to ITC-IBD's warehouse. Hence, the model called for selecting
an alternative set of intermediaries known as sanchalaks and sanyojaks to enable the
transportation of farmers' produce to ITC-IBD's warehouses in various parts of Madhya
Pradesh. The sanchalak, as described earlier, was chosen from the dominant caste of the
village but was expected to serve all people in the village without prejudice. ITC-IBD
made him (it was always a male farmer) take an oath in public which said that the
computer infrastructure was a social good provided to the entire village by ITC-IBD and
was not the personal property of the sanchalak. The sanyojak was a trader from the
mandi who entered into a commission-based partnership with ITC-IBD to manage the
warehouses and make payments to farmers.
These new intermediaries were expected to be less interested in profiteering from
the system because of the better economic opportunities provided by ITC-IBD through a
fixed commission on transactions undertaken through them and through various social
constraints such as the public oath. The company argued that in their new position as
sanchalaks and sanyojaks, these intermediaries would not have the power to decide the
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quality of a farmers' soyabean and would not have the authority to settle the final price at
the warehouse. That task would be conducted by an employee hired by ITC-IBD. Both
sanchalaks and sanyojaks obtain their income through commissions paid by ITC-IBD to
them for every ton of soyabean that is sold to the company through their village and
warehouse.
According to ITC-IBD the sanchalak was expected to replace the village trader
and enable farmers in bringing their soyabean to ITC-IBD's warehouse in tractor trolleys,
where it would be finally graded and priced. When the smaller warehouse system was in
operation, it became more accessible and affordable for farmers in distant villages to
bring their soyabean to ITC-IBD with the help of the sanchalak as opposed to selling it to
a village trader. Although the sanchalak did not have the authority to finalise the price for
the villager, in practice, many sanchalaks were amalgamating soyabean in their village
and bringing it to ITC-IBD's warehouse themselves. Despite knowing ITC-IBD's
advertised price, the final price obtained by the farmer depended upon the desire of the
sanchalak to communicate accurately the actual price given to the soyabean by the rate-
setter at the warehouse.2 2 The ability to do so would depend upon the power of the
sanchalak in the village and the social relationship of the said farmer to the sanchalak.
My research from 2003 shows that ITC-IBD's criteria for selecting sanchalaks is
inherently biased towards selecting farmers who are already socially, economically, or
politically powerful in the village. In some cases, sanchalaks are from the same caste,
class, and families as erstwhile traders whom ITC-IBD aimed to disempower (Kumar
2005b).
22 Even though ITC-IBD and traders in the mandi, both gave receipts, the receipt can always "get" lost and
illiterate farmers would, in any case, have to rely on the word of the sanchalak.
Chapter 2: "Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace 145
Richa Kumar
This research argues that the discourse of disintermediation by reducing the
number of intermediaries draws attention away from the fact that ITC-IBD is, in effect,
creating a system of private intermediaries beholden to a single company to compete with
independent intermediaries in the mandi who purchase soyabean for all processing
companies in general. In every A-class mandi such as Dhar mandi, 10-15 medium and
large traders who are the top purchasers of soyabean conduct their business as
commission agents (CAGs). CAGs already work on a commission basis with local
processing companies just like the sanyojaks, and not on margins based on the difference
between the price paid to farmers and that obtained from the company. In fact, ITC-
IBD's local sanyojak in Dhar was the erstwhile CAG for the company in the local mandi
and continued his business of purchasing soyabean and other produce in the mandi
auction, even while working for ITC-IBD. The CAG system works competitively in
Malwa because it is home to a large number of small and large soyabean processing
plants, much of it excess and idle capacity created in the 1980s and 1990s. These plants
are eager to purchase soyabean to keep the unit functioning for as many days in the year
as possible and ensuring a steady supply of soyabean is the primary objective.
Despite claims of competing with intermediaries between the village and the
market yard (i.e. village traders), ITC-IBD's eChoupals are essentially competing with
intermediaries who participate in the A-class mandis. ITC-IBD's warehouses started out
in locations with A- and B-class mandis in Madhya Pradesh and for a brief period from
2003-2006, they were established in smaller towns with C-class mandis.23 The trend since
23 Some of these smaller warehouses, such as the one in Icchawar in Sehore district impacted the
procurement of traders in the C-class Icchawar mandi quite significantly. However, ITC-IBD closed down
the warehouse in 2005 when it opened the Choupal Sagar on the outskirts of Sehore town.
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2006 has been to close down these smaller warehouses and expect all farmers to visit the
Choupal Sagars, which are all established in competition with A-class mandis and also
provide a channel for selling agricultural inputs, and other consumer goods and services
to farmers.
Further, in contrast to assumptions that government-owned mandis are not
competitive, this research argues that intermediaries participating in the large A-class
mandis in Malwa such as in Dhar, Dewas, Indore, Sehore, and Ashta, for instance, are
functioning in a competitive price environment organised through open cry auctions. In
spite of several infrastructural problems plaguing the mandi system (Acharya 2005), it
has created a competitive environment for marketing of agricultural produce. The A-class
mandis do not function in the way characterised by neoliberal analysts who seek to set
aside government regulation altogether (Panagariya 2008: 314-317, World Bank 2005).
For instance, in October 2006 a new trading firm was launched in Dhar mandi-
Mahageeta Traders, and Vignesh Rathod, one of the upper caste Rajput elders from
Ranipura, was the main buyer. It turned out that the proprietor of the cloth shop where
Vigneshji was an accountant for nearly 20 years in Dhar, had taken a mandi license. His
aim was to buy the soyabean of farmers indebted to the cloth shop and thus recover the
money.24 The proprietor had asked Vigneshji to check out the mandi everyday to identify
indebted farmers who had come to sell. He would bid only on trolleys where recovery
was to be made, at times, even communicating to the mandi employee shouting out the
bids that he was interested in the trolley. Nevertheless, even if Vigneshji was able to
24 The system of buying household goods and farm inputs, including fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides, etc.,
at shops in Dhar on credit and paying back at harvest has always been present. Seeds are usually obtained
on credit (1.5 or 2 quintal to be returned for every quintal borrowed) from other farmers in the village or
from relatives, usually wife's parents, in other villages.
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subtly communicate to the auctioneer, the auction could not be influenced so easily.
Small traders like Mahageeta had to contend with large buyers like Modiji, who were
commission agents for companies and bought soyabean at whatever was the prevailing
rate. They received their commission regardless of the price. In other words, even if
Mahageeta traders wanted to recover debts, there was enough competition in the mandi to
prevent them from getting away by bidding at below the prevailing market rate.
Left: Farmers from Ranipura sitting on a soyabean trolley in the mandi in October 2006.
Right: Traders checking the quality of the soyabean in the trolley and participating in the auction.
Photos by Richa Kumar
The eChoupal intervention is, in effect, replacing the competitive system of open
cry auction between many intermediaries at the mandi who are buying for many
processing companies with a single person who decides the quality and price for farmers
and buys for ITC-IBD alone. Ironically, however, the competition between ITC-IBD and
the market yard was not on the price of soyabean offered to farmers because ITC-IBD
always set its price for the next day based upon the previous day's modal mandi price.
25
25 The modal rate in each market yard was decided based on the average price that soyabean sold for per
quintal on a given day and comparing it to the modal price for that day. A rate reflecting both the average
and the modal price was picked as the final modal rate for the day. Only the price of lots greater than 10
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The unique selling point (USP) of the eChoupal, according to ITC-IBD, was that the
FAQ price for the farmer would remain constant all day despite any fluctuations in the
mandi. Thus, any variation between the two prices occurred when the mandi price fell or
rose during the course of the day while ITC-IBD's price remained constant. On days
when the mandi price rose above ITC-IBD's quoted price, the company increased its
price by 11 am and possibly again by 3 pm to match up to the rising prices in the mandi,
ultimately offering farmers a similar price bracket. But on days when the mandi price fell
below the eChoupal price, farmers flocked to the choupal, and caused losses to ITC-IBD.
On such days the price for ITC-IBD's soyabean meal would fall too, but the company
would have to honour the higher fixed all-day price it had pledged to farmers for their
soyabean meal.26 From the perspective of farmers, the competition between the mandi
and the eChoupal was focused generally not on gaining higher prices, but instead, on
non-price elements of competition, such as accurate weighing, on-time payment in cash,
and respectful treatment of farmers. These are discussed later on in this chapter.
Global Networks of Disempowerment
The focus of the discussion on empowerment thus far has been on the actual
"transaction" of farmers at the mandi or the eChoupal. This transaction needs to be
contextualised in the broader setting of the global commodity chain of soyabean markets.
This research argues that such a narrow frame removes from view larger processes of
quintal was considered. The mandi secretary certified each day's rate and it was published on a board
outside the mandi office as well as provided through online websites.
26 The mandi price rose or fell because processing plants had increased or decreased their procurement
price advertised to CAGs. Processing plants responded to various factors, especially the price of deoiled
cake (soyabean meal) in the international market (where they exported it) and the price of edible oil. Since
ITC-IBD was also a processor and exporter, it faced the same ups and downs of the market. When mandi
prices fell, as a processor, ITC-IBD would ideally reduce its own procurement price, which it did in
purchases outside the eChoupal network. But within the eChoupal system, the company was required to
maintain the earlier, higher prices, and thus, incurred losses that day.
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disempowerment that are functioning in agrarian markets. In the case of soyabean, these
new market structures seek to empower farmers within a global commodity system that
has already fundamentally disempowered them. Other than as a cash crop, soyabean is of
no use to Indian farmers who do not eat it nor feed it to their animals, but instead grow it
for meat-eating populations in other countries. The very act of choosing to grow
soyabean means Indian farmers are inserting themselves into global networks of
commodity flows and becoming part of a global chain linking them to soyabean
producers in the United States and South America, to processors of soyabean around the
world, and to consumers of beef in the countries of the Middle East and Japan. Each link
in this global chain has a differentiated ability to influence the price but power is
primarily centred on the commodity markets based in Chicago and Malaysia--the
Chicago Board of Trade and the Kuala Lumpur Commodities Exchange. India's total
soyabean production has never been more than 5% of global production. Hence domestic
production shortfalls or increases do not have a significant influence on the global price
of soyabean.
Ever since its introduction in Madhya Pradesh in the 1970s, most of India's
soyabean was primarily exported for cattle feed after being processed into de-oiled cake
(DOC or soyabean meal), whereas the oil resulting from the process was refined and sold
domestically as cooking oil. 27 In the 1980s, a system evolved whereby processing
companies would contract with traders in the mandi to buy soyabean on their behalf.
27 In the early 1970s only two factories in Malwa, General Foods (Ruchi Soya) and Malwa Vanaspati used
to buy soyabean. According to an old trader in Dhar mandi (Rameshji Jain) in 1986-87 most of the
soyabean from Madhya Pradesh was sent to Gujarat. Solvent extraction plants (using hexane to extract the
oil and process the leftover deoiled cake) meant for groundnut shifted to processing soyabean. Initially the
capacity of the plants was 200-250 tons per day (TPD) whereas now plants are of 1500 TPD. In the 1990s,
five processing plants were established exclusively for processing soyabean in Dhar district, in the areas of
Ghatabillod and Pithampur (the Special Economic Zone discussed in chapter four).
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These traders were called commission agents (CAGs) and were responsible for
transporting the goods to the company's warehouse or factory, and would receive a fixed
commission in return. Plant managers provided traders in the mandi with the daily price
for the delivery of one ton of soyabean to the factory premises. Traders bid in the mandi
auction accordingly. They would invest their own money and pay farmers the same day
and the company would reimburse all their costs within 7 to 10 days.
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) prices, which reflected international production
trends, were the baseline against which local prices were calculated by managers of
processing plants. Factors such as existing inventory and unfulfilled orders, port delays,
possible changes in import export duties, etc. would also influence the sale price of DOC
for processing companies and exporters, and hence impact their procurement price for
soyabean. During the domestic harvest in October excessive arrival of soyabean in the
mandis would drive down procurement prices relative to international prices and in the
lean season, prices would reign higher.
In the mid-1990s two new influences upon the price of soyabean emerged. First,
India became a net importer of edible oil (today it imports between 50-60% of its
requirements), 28 especially of large quantities of crude palm oil from Malaysia and
Indonesia. Despite 300% import duty initially, palm oil became a cheap substitute for
other edible oils, especially in the manufacture of vanaspati (hydrogenated oil), a very
popular substitute for more expensive ghee (clarified butter). It exerted a major influence
on the domestic price of edible oil. As import duty on palm oil changed, prices of
28 Import dependence of edible oils was 2-5% from 1961-75 and 36-47% from 1976-87. With the tightening
of import restrictions it came down to 4 per cent in 1993. After liberalization in 1994, it rose steadily to
over 50 per cent in 1999 and 2000. See Sekhar, C.S.C., "Agricultural Price Volatility in International and
Indian Markets," Economic and Political Weekly, October 23, 2004, p. 4733.
Chapter 2: "Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace 151
Richa Kumar
domestic edible oil would react. Any changes in the domestic price of oil would affect the
price of soyabean, since soyabean oil was entirely sold in the domestic market.29
Second, the government allowed futures trade in oilseeds and the SOPA30 Board
of Trade (SBOT) was started in 1999 as an open cry soyabean oil futures exchange in
Indore. Soya oil futures on SBOT took into account fluctuations in the price of palm oil,
which was traded on the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange (KLSE). SBOT prices
started affecting mandi prices of soyabean during the course of the day, which in the past
had been known to remain mostly steady throughout the day. Initially through landline
telephones, information would be relayed to traders' shops in the mandi by processing
plants who had revised their daily price by afternoon. A helper would run from the shop
to the auction platform and inform the trader about price changes and the latter would
change the bid accordingly. As mobile phones became more affordable in the mid-2000s,
this impact became almost instantaneous. 31
In this global commodity chain, traders in the market yard and the company
officials of ITC-IBD are price receivers. They decide prices for farmers based upon a
price they obtain from domestic processing plants, who in turn base their price upon the
price of soyabean meal on the CBOT and the price of palm oil on the KLCE. When the
global price of soyabean on CBOT goes up, farmers in Malwa get higher prices, as
happened in 2007 thanks to the shift in soyabean acreage towards corn in the United
29 Interview with Ravindra Mall, Manager, National Board of Trade, Indore, April 23, 2007.
30 Soyabean Processors Association of India (SOPA) Board of Trade was renamed National Board of Trade
(NBOT) in 2001-2002.
31 According to Maniram Kakaria, a very old trader in Dhar mandi, there was a time when telegrams would
be sent from Indore to Dhar everyday informing the brokers at what rate their produce was sold to the
plants. A two-rupee change in price from the previous day was considered to be a big deal. Sanjay Jain
Chajjer, Ruchi Soya's commission agent added that with the onset of telephones a lightening call (for long
distance calling) used to be booked to Indore to obtain rates. One person had to sit at the phone all the time
because the call could come through anytime (Interview, Dhar mandi, Feb 24, 2007).
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States. When soyabean prices on CBOT go down or the price of palm oil on the KLCE
goes down, farmers in Malwa get lower returns regardless of how much it may have cost
them to produce the crop.
In contrast to soyabean, farmers in India have the ability to directly influence the
price of wheat. India is the second largest wheat producer in the world.32 Almost all the
wheat produced in India is consumed domestically and a small portion of it is purchased
by the government at a minimum support price (MSP). This MSP is suggested by the
Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices, a body of experts in agricultural
economics (Varshney 1995). But it is finally determined by the political party in power-
which is open to influence by farmers' lobbies from the main wheat producing states of
Punjab and Haryana, to increase the price every year. In 2005 the price was Rs. 650 a
quintal, which increased to Rs. 850 in 2007 and Rs. 1000 in 2008. Farmers in Madhya
Pradesh, too, benefited from the increased prices. Because wheat is sold domestically and
because the government is an important buyer, farmers' organisations have been able to
successfully lobby the increase in the minimum support price each year. But soyabean
farmers have absolutely no influence at all on the price they receive. Participating in the
global system means subordinating oneself to transnational forces of capital-and giving
up the ability to influence price outcomes altogether.
Over-Hyped Potential of the Internet
The eChoupal has been popularly regarded in development circles as an
information technology project bringing about rural development. ITC-IBD undertook a
32 India produces about 11.5% of the world's wheat, next to China. See
http://nue.okstate.edu/Crop Information/World Wheat Production.htm for data from 2003 sourced from
the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.
Chapter 2: "Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace 153
Richa Kumar
very large investment in information technology infrastructure in rural India. As
previously mentioned, there are computers and satellite dishes in 1700 villages in
Madhya Pradesh and in 6000 villages in India (Fairless 2007). ITC-IBD developed a
website known as soyachoupal.com which gave information on ITC-IBD's price for the
next day, along with district level weather, 33 common pests and diseases, and a query
section for questions related to agriculture sent to the local government agricultural
college. The information was available in Hindi. Over a period of time, sanchalaks were
taught how to use email as well as browse other websites such as the Madhya Pradesh
Mandi Board and other government sites that gave information on historical market yard
prices. ITC-IBD even experimented with different technologies for connectivity and
various designs to make the soyachoupal website more user-friendly. It has developed a
strong technical team to troubleshoot computers in the villages and even created a call-
centre helpline for hardware, software, and connectivity issues.
But not only did the computer and internet have no integral transactional role in
the agricultural trading system, in most cases, the internet was not even the primary
means for obtaining price information from ITC-IBD's warehouse. Sanchalaks preferred
to use the telephone to enquire about prices and obtain transaction numbers from the
warehouse during the course of the day. In fact, ITC-IBD's price soon became a public
commodity freely available in the region. Villagers obtained it from farmers returning
from town in the evening, or by calling the hub themselves, or even from public
loudspeakers and blackboards outside the sanchalak's house; some got it from the
33 The source of the weather information is the meteorological department of the government. The extent of
the weather information is still, unfortunately, only until the district level. Usually the generic forecast
obtained on television is enough to generate discussion in the village on when to start planting. Newspapers
also give suggested dates from agricultural scientists. However, the actual impact of the weather is
extremely local--one part of a village can get rain and the other part may not.
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neighbouring village when there was no eChoupal in their village or when they were not
on good terms with the sanchalak. Initial expectations of the company that the computer
would generate greater trust in the price information since farmers would be able to see it
on the screen, as opposed to the sanchalak simply informing them orally after obtaining it
over the telephone, did not play out. The telephone, and since 2007 the mobile phone, has
remained the medium of choice for obtaining the price.
The eChoupal is essentially a set of private marketplaces established in
competition with government-owned market yards to enable ITC-IBD to procure larger
volumes and better quality of soyabean and other crops. With the establishment of
Choupal Sagars, ITC-IBD has shifted focus to rural retail by providing a wide array of
goods and services to farmers. In fact, the payment for their soyabean is given to farmers
inside the Choupal Sagar premises, presenting farmers with the opportunity to browse
around the rural mall and buy items they may need.
About the computers in the villages, in 2005, sanchalaks in Sehore district were
using them for email, internet browsing (newspapers and entertainment websites) and
playing video CDs and games.34 A few sanchalaks in Dewas district accessed real-time
fluctuations on the Chicago Board of Trade and the Indian online commodity futures
website NCDEX (National Commodity Exchange) in 2006. Others sometimes checked
historical market yard prices on government websites. Some of them had provided free
access to academic test results for students in their villages and a few were also sending
34 Top websites accessed through the 1100 eChoupals in MP in June 2005: www.sovachoupal.com
(3.95%), www.webdunia.com (4.18%), www.epatra.com (1.41%), and www.mpresults.nic.in. Data
obtained from Mr. T.K. Radhakrishnan, Manager-IT, ITC-IBD, Bhopal, July 2005.
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queries through the soyachoupal website (See Appendix 1 for anecdotes on computer
usage). 35
In villages where the sanchalak was using the computer, it was only accessible to
family members such as young children or elder male relatives of the sanchalak.
Interviews with sanchalaks in Sehore district in 2005 revealed that they were afraid of the
computer breaking down if people in the village were allowed to touch it. Also, there
seemed to be no push from ITC-IBD's side to encourage more sanchalaks to use the
computer using systematic training programs and the only way sanchalaks obtained
training on the machine was when engineers came over for repairs. As of July 2005, there
was no program to encourage villagers to access the machine, even for educational
purposes (such as computer training for children).
It is ironic then that the concept of the eChoupal embodies within it public
interaction and involvement. A choupal is the public meeting place in a village and the
eChoupal reflects an attempt to make the internet center an alternative place for sharing
information and meeting people using ICTs. ITC-IBD's process of creating an eChoupal
involves the sanchalak taking a public oath that he will keep the eChoupal open for
everyone in the village; it is explained to the villagers present that the eChoupal is a
public benefit because it is paid for by ITC-IBD: it is not the personal property of the
sanchalak. In fact, the very meaning of sanchalak is 'information provider' and in local
usage, most people drop the 'e' and refer to the kiosk as only the 'choupal'. The
35 ITC-IBD restricted access to almost all internet sites in 2005 due to excessive pornographic usage, and
the only information available on these machines was a few news websites, email, and static agricultural
information on pests and district level weather.
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underlying assumption is that anyone in the village can access the machine, whether on
their own or through an intermediary.
However, in the villages I visited in Bhopal and Vidisha districts in 2002-2003, in
Sehore district in 2005, and in Dewas, Indore and Dhar districts in 2006, it did not seem
that anyone else other than the sanchalak shared a sense of ownership or understanding
of the computer; the sanchalak was called the "choupal agent" (a focus reflecting the
commissions that he would earn as opposed to the service he would provide as a
sanchalak); most villagers did not know about the computer, and some villagers who did
know, expressed discomfort that no one else was allowed to use the computer.
As a result, ITC-IBD's investment in computers may be promoting access to
information technology for the families of the 6000 sanchalaks of ITC-IBD, but it is not
clear whether the village in general is benefiting at all. Since the selection criteria for
sanchalaks is inherently biased towards selecting relatively better off farmers from the
dominant caste in most villages, these computers have been installed in the homes of
relatively better-off families and have become means of personal entertainment or
communication for them.
Thus, it is a misnomer to consider the eChoupal as an "ICT for development"
intervention bringing about rural development. It is paradoxical that the eChoupals
received several "IT for rural development" awards from international development
agencies such as the Development Gateway of the World Bank. This reflects less the
stated intentions of ITC-IBD and more the needs of the development community to find
positive stories about the use of ICTs for rural development in an environment where
failure has been the norm. Since the eChoupal project started at the same time as the hype
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about using ICTs overtook development agencies, it was to the benefit of both ITC-IBD
and development experts to view the project as a successful example of using ICTs for
rural development.
During interviews with me in December 2002-January 2003, and July 2005,
company officials were positive and enthusiastic about using the computer infrastructure
in innovative ways to bring about rural development for the village in general. However,
over time, they too realized that information and computers were one part of a much
more complex set of interventions that were needed, both for transforming agrarian
markets as well as for initiating larger processes of rural change. Mr. S. Sivakumar, ITC-
IBD's CEO, in a speech at the eIndia conference in New Delhi in July 2007, emphasized
that "information technology is possibly a necessary but not a sufficient condition" for
transforming agricultural markets. "Non-ICT components are equally important. ...
Simply broadcasting prices, or making them available online, through SMS, on radio,
etc., is not good enough." There is a need to provide "complementary infrastructure such
as buying so that transaction is possible. Information alone is not good enough. ...Human
infrastructure and physical infrastructure are required" (Sivakumar 2007).
Yet, projects intervening in agrarian markets continue to fetishize technology. As
I described in the beginning of this chapter, in June 2008, the New York Times reported
about a Reuters-funded project that provides price information to farmers through text-
messages on mobile phones in the state of Maharashtra. The article suggests that
inefficiencies in agrarian markets arise because farmers are unable to compare market
prices in different markets. "The farmer would decide which market to travel to, then
would just sell to that market. So there was no competition between markets." It further
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goes on to say, "Reuters has collected anecdotal evidence from farmers about how the
service has influenced their decisions about crop sales. One farmer, according to Reuters,
held back the sale of 30 quintals of soyabeans for 15 days after noticing that prices had
been rising for several days. He was able to get 400 extra rupees per quintal" (Arango
2008).
Interventions such as these, while adding one more means for farmers to obtain
price information, quickly make the leap from information to monetary benefits for
farmers without recognizing the various power relationships and socioeconomic
structures that make up and intervene in agrarian markets. Any intervention expecting to
transform agrarian markets requires sensitivity to such structures of power starting with
understanding the specific manifestations of particular crops in particular geographies.
Regarding the specific example of the soyabean farmer, soyabean prices have risen from
an average of 1200 rupees per quintal to nearly 1800 rupees per quintal since November
2007 due to the reduction in soyabean acreage in the United States as farmers shifted to
more lucrative corn production for biofuels. The last time such a spike took place was in
2004. Almost all farmers in Ranipura, large and small, rich and poor, obtained much
higher prices for their soyabean after the 2007 harvest and after the 2008 harvest since the
global price of soyabean continued to remain high. Viewing the Reuters' farmer's 400
rupee extra income per quintal in this larger context makes it seem less extraordinary and
perhaps not necessarily a result of the information obtained through Reuters' service.
Price Maximizing versus Savings Maximization
The prevailing discourse on the use of price information by farmers, such as that
underlying the Reuters' project, expects farmers to be price maximizers. However, this
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research argues that such a rationale makes assumptions about the behaviour of farmers
without attempting to understand the environment within which they conduct transactions
of their produce. Farmers are expected to behave like rational, utility-maximizing
individuals who make informed choices if they are provided with more information. Such
behaviour forms the core of self-disciplining citizens under ideas of neoliberal
governmentality (Barry et al. 1996) who are expected to empower themselves. They are
expected to desire more information and make efforts to obtain information on prices, to
calculate their costs of holding on to the crop, and make informed choices about when to
sell to ensure as far as possible that they will get a higher price. The utility that is to be
maximized is the price. Such behaviour fits very well with the profile of traders in the
mandi or with companies like ITC-IBD who hold on to stocks of soyabean and sell them
when prices are higher.
In contrast, this research suggests that although soyabean farmers make
calculations about when to sell their crop-such calculations are not based on extensive
analysis of mandi prices over the course of the entire season or year, even though, today,
mandi price information is ubiquitously available to a large majority of soyabean farmers.
Rather, farmers sell soyabean when they need cash to conduct transactions. Instead of
maximizing price, relatively better-off farmers in Ranipura made efforts to maximize
their savings in the form of stored commodities (cf. Ferguson 1994). Such farmers tried
their best to ensure they did not have cash in hand or in the bank for an extended period
of time. This was because it was easier for family members and relatives to make claims
upon cash-claims which the farmer, who was usually male, may not be too keen to
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fulfil. 36 Instead, they waited until the need for cash arose and gave themselves a week or
10 days to take their produce to the market or organise for it to be sold by a trader coming
to the village. The need for cash could be for illness, marriage or funeral expenses,
buying a new tractor or implements, digging a tube well, making a latrine or building
parts of the house, settling the payment for a loan, loaning money to someone else,
buying new stock of alcohol, paying electricity expenses, buying fertilizer, or any other
such requirement that can only be fulfilled through cash. Once others in the village learnt
about a cash influx without a corresponding expenditure associated with it, claims were
often made on that cash. Hence, relatively better-off farmers preferred to stock their
soyabean (and wheat) for as long as possible until it was absolutely necessary to sell it.
Poor farmers sold right at harvest because they had to repay consumption and
production loans, a practice known as distress sales. Those who farmed winter wheat also
had to buy inputs for the next crop. Prices at harvest are the lowest and preventing
distress sales has been an important aim of policymaking for agrarian markets. The
Indian government, on the recommendation of the Guru Committee, created a specific
intervention known as negotiable warehouse receipts to help such farmers. Farmers could
deposit their soyabean in bags at a select warehouse, pay a monthly rent and obtain a
warehouse receipt which is similar to a mortgage note. They could take it to a bank or a
36 Chapter four traces the implication of the shift to growing a cash crop like soyabean for the relationship
between women and men. It discusses the inability of women to make claims upon cash for their personal
needs and household requirements, in a patrilineal society like in Malwa.
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private financier who would give them a loan for 70-90% of the value of the produce. 37
They would in effect get money for their produce without having actually sold it.38
However, farmers who ended up making distress sales were those who owned less
than 2-2.5 hectares of land and their total production was not more than 30-40 quintals of
soyabean at the maximum. 39 Warehouses require a minimum deposit of 100 bags (at
times relaxing it to 50 bags). So a majority of farmers who are targeted for the scheme
don't qualify for obtaining space in a warehouse. Small farmers store their 30-40 bags in
and around their own kaccha houses. According to Alok Sharma, the manager of a
warehouse in Anaradh village, about 10 km from Dhar, a farmer needs to farm at least 6
hectares with a production of 16 quintal per hectare to be able to keep his bags in the
warehouse. 40 76% of farmers in Dhar district own less than 4 hectares of land, putting this
scheme beyond their reach. 4 1 Larger farmers who qualify for warehouse space usually
have their own godowns or pacca rooms in their house for storage and are not in
immediate need of money for planting the next crop. They have the finances to hold onto
to their crop for several months to a year until they have to sell.
So whom does this policy benefit? Traders need space for storing the produce
they purchase inside and outside the mandi. Since most of them live in the crowded
37 The interest rate from banks was 0.8% per month (9.6% per annum), much lower than the private
moneylending rate of 1-1.2% per month (12-14.4% per annum). The common rate in Ranipura and Dhar
was between 2-3% per month (24-36% per annum).
38 According to Alok Sharma, the manager of a warehouse in Anaradh village, about 10 km from Dhar, a
farmer could take a loan from someone else to pay back the warehouse and take the bags to sell in the
mandi once prices rose. That person could be a trader who would finalise the deal at the warehouse itself
and pick up the bags directly, concluding a transaction outside the mandi (an illegal transaction). Or it could
be a relative or friend whom one can repay after selling the produce in the mandi. Interview, September 13,
2006.
39 The most productive farmers obtained 20-24 quintals per hectare in Dhar.
4 Interview, Anaradh warehouse. September 13, 2006.
41 It was 70% in 1993. All India figure is even lower at 95%. (See District Statistics Handbook: 2000, 2000
and NSSO 2006.
Chapter 2: "Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace 162
Richa Kumar
bazaar areas of the city and space is at a premium in the mandi, they need to rent
warehouse space. It was suggested many times to me that traders had stored their stocks
in warehouses around Dhar under the name of farmers. Through the loans offered under
the warehouse scheme in exchange for keeping produce, traders are able to access
finances to enhance their monthly turnover-to the extent of enabling them to participate
even without using their own money. The scheme also subsidized farmers, cooperatives,
individuals, and corporations to establish warehouses of a minimum 100 tons (1000
quintals) to maximum 10,000 tons. Private companies like ITC-IBD have been able to
subsidize the construction of their Choupal Sagars, the rural malls associated with the
soyachoupal warehouse. Corporations are given a 15% subsidy on capital cost with a
maximum amount of 2.8 million rupees. Thus, government policy inspired by neoliberal
models which emphasize the role of credit in supporting farmers in agrarian markets has
supported traders and corporations instead.
Farmers' Battles in the Marketplace
As opposed to the ephemeral vision of empowerment through information
technology, this research explores alternative ways in which soyabean farmers in Malwa
attempt to exercise power in the marketplace. One of the major impacts of ITC-IBD's
eChoupal was the realization by its competitors such as Ruchi Soya, the oldest and
largest soyabean processor in India, and other smaller processing companies that they
could also set up private marketplaces in leased warehouses in Madhya Pradesh to attract
farmers away from the government-owned mandi. Dropping the 'e', the word choupal
soon become synonymous with a private hub started in competition against the mandi and
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two companies in the Malwa region, Ruchi Soya and Bajrang Soya, started their own
choupals in 2004-05.42
To build a choupal, private companies had to obtain licenses from the
government, report their functioning to, and allow themselves to be monitored by
officials in the mandi nearest to the location of the choupal. Every year licenses have to
be renewed. The mandi office monitors daily transactions of farmers at each choupal as
well as at the mandi. A mandi office staff member brings over new receipt books to ITC-
IBD's choupal in Dhar everyday and takes back copies of completed farmer transaction
receipts to be entered into the mandi's information recording system, both manual and
electronic. Further, the mandi office collects taxes at 2.2% on every transaction whether
inside the mandi or at a choupal. Every 10 days, companies also report how much
soyabean they have purchased at their factory, how much has been processed, and how
much inventory is left.
From 2004 onwards, the choupals catalyzed a change in the marketing of
agricultural produce because the increased competition resulting from a parallel buying
infrastructure brought uncertainty in the minds of traders and challenged their hegemony
in the mandi. Because of the competition from the choupal "there is more decency,
42 In 2003 the ITC-IBD choupal was started in a warehouse about 2 km before the Dhar mandi when
coming to town from Ranipura. The capacity was 100 tons per day. In November 2006 an electronic
weighbridge was installed and the capacity doubled. In 2003, the Ruchi choupal started in Lebad, situated
20 km from Dhar, in an empty lot inside the premises of another factory of the Ruchi group, the Ruchi
Strips and Alloys. Mr. Arvind Gupta of Ruchi Soya was posted here to purchase soyabean. An electronic
weighbridge increased their capacity and helped them purchase 100-200 tons per day during the soyabean
harvest and in 2005 they had bought 7800 tons in all. They factored in transportation costs to the soyabean
processing plant in Manglia in Indore district and labour costs and then decided the farmer's rate. In
November 2006 Ruchi started another choupal in the town of Dhar itself, right opposite the existing ITC-
IBD choupal. This one was managed by an ex-Dhar mandi trader, Ashish Jain Gangwal. He informed us
that they manually weighed individual bags of soyabean and bought between 15-20 tons a day. The storage
capacity was 500 tons. The Bajrang choupal was situated at the Bajrang processing plant in Lebad. In
September 2007, ITC-IBD opened a Choupal Sagar (rural mall) in Dhar, about 4 km outside the city
towards the town of Lebad.
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modesty, and less rudeness [shaleenta, namrata, and less rookhapan]," on the part of
traders, according to the sanchalak from Bhaunkhedi in Sehore district near Bhopal. He
added that the behaviour of traders towards farmers has changed, regardless of the crop
that the farmer is selling: "The trader wants farmers to shift to him." 43 Farmers engaged
with intermediaries at the market yard in battles over the weight of their soyabean, with
the rate-setter at the choupals in negotiations over deciding the quality of their produce,
and in playing off one marketplace against another to get the highest price for their
particular transaction. The misguided focus exclusively on technology detracts from
understanding these alternative arenas of power struggles and prevents moving of
resources to genuinely support farmers in these contestations over power in the
marketplace.
"Choupar'l" Board (on the left in Hindi) outside Bajrang Extraction Pvt. Ltd., a small soyabean processing
plant in Dhar district. October 2006. Photo by Richa Kumar.
43 ITC-IBD only buys soyabean and wheat. Traders buy all crops grown in the region.
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Accurate Weight at the Mandi
The first important struggle waged by farmers in Malwa was against inaccurate
weighing by traders at the mandi. At both the mandi and the choupals government-
licensed weighers (tulaavatis) were supposed to weigh the farmers' produce in a
transparent and accountable manner, regardless of which trader or firm had bought it.
Weighers were paid a fixed amount per quintal for the total bags they weighed each day.
This charge was recovered from farmers as weigher's fees. Farmers also paid for
labourers to bag their produce at the traders' shops in the mandi. A licensed weigher was
stationed at every trader's shop inside the mandi as well as at ITC-IBD's weigh-bridge
and Ruchi Soya's manual weighing scale in Dhar.44 At the choupals, farmers did not have
to pay the weigher's fees or the bagging labour costs. Instead, ITC-IBD and Ruchi Soya
paid these costs to the mandi. The weigher gave daily reports to the mandi on how much
soyabean had been bought by the trader or the firm. The weighers rotated on a daily basis
from one trader to the next. According to a weigher [tulaavati] union post holder,
Mangilal Shiromani, they were supposed to authenticate [satyapan] the exact weight.
"The entire responsibility is ours," said Tarachand, another weigher. "Mandi tax is
calculated based on the data we give. ... If there is a dispute, then the tulaavati is
responsible." 45
At the mandi, most traders weighed using manual weighing scales capable of
holding one bag (one quintal). Weigher Govardhan Sharma, also a post holder in the
union, explained that at least 400 grams per quintal is automatically reduced in the total
44 There is no government licensed weigher at Ruchi's choupal in Lebad and at the Bajrang choupal, also in
Lebad.
45 Interview, November 28, 2006.
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weight when weighing using the manual scales. Soyabean falls to the ground while
bagging it and putting the bag onto the scales, and the straight arrow which should be
vertical when the scale is balanced, is normally always tilted to one side. So one cannot
make out whether the weighing is accurate or not.46 Farmers often complained of
inaccurate weighing by the government-licensed weighers on these single-bag weighing
scales.
I went with six villagers from Ranipura to the Dhar mandi in July 2006--all of
them had piled soyabean that was leftover after the sowing on Ajit Singh's tractor. After
the auction, we went to the shop of Puja traders in the mandi, where Ajit Singh's
soyabean was being weighed on old style one-quintal scales. The weigher was making
the side with the soyabean bag heavier (lower) than the side with the weight [baat]. I
commented about it to another farmer from Ranipura, Gautam Singh Rathod (who was
Ajit's first cousin) and took a couple of photos. The weigher became perturbed and then
tried to balance the sides a bit more. Two or three kilograms of soyabean fell to the
ground when it was being emptied from the tractor into bags. The plastic sheet on the
bottom [paal] was too small to cover the entire breadth of the tractor's backside from
where soyabean was falling onto the cement floor. Gautam said that the trader
[purposely] won't keep a bigger paal. Ajit Singh seemed completely lost, unlike the
farmer before him who was anxiously picking up the scattered soyabean and observing
what the weigher was doing. A group of farmers in Janpur Bavadiya village in Sehore
district in July 2005 expressed to me the desperation on the part of many farmers to
gather the scattered grain, so that they are not penalized in the total weight. "We cannot
Chapter 2: "Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace
46 Interview, February 27, 2007.
167
Richa Kumar
remove the grain from the cracks in the floor," they said. "And as a farmer is trying to
gather the scattered grain the trader yells at him to rush out because there are so many
farmers waiting in line."
Although initially at many choupals in Madhya Pradesh these single-bag
weighing scales were being used, by 2005-2006, electronic weighbridges became more
common. Here, the entire tractor-trolley filled with soyabean is weighed, then the
soyabean is emptied into bags or in a heap on the ground using the hydraulic mechanism
of the tractor, and finally the empty trolley is weighed again to determine the weight of
the soyabean. In ITC-IBD's choupal in Dhar, the electronic weighbridge was installed in
November 2006, doubling the daily purchase capacity to 200 tons (2000 quintals). At the
Ruchi choupal in Dhar, the manual weighing scale was still in use in 2007. In response to
the use of large electronic weighbridges at some of the choupals, many A-class mandis in
Madhya Pradesh installed these weighbridges, too.
However, it became a common practice for traders to reduce the weight of the
total produce by 300 grams per quintal if it had been weighed on the electronic
weighbridge. According to the mandi office, the electronic weighbridge has a margin of
error of 5 kilograms on 300 quintals or approximately one large truck. Traders use this to
cut 300 grams. Mr. Mittal, a mandi official, suggested that some farmers who are in a
hurry ask traders to use the weighbridge and agree to the cut in return. They don't
complain so the system [pratha] continues although it is not sanctioned. But at the margin
of error suggested, the cut per quintal should not be more than 17 grams! Ramesh Lal
Jain, an old trader in the mandi explained this informal rule to Suraj Jat from Ranipura
and to me. "Traders send produce to buyers outside by packing it in individual bags of
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100 kg each. We cannot store it without stacking it in bags. Loose grain takes up a lot of
space." Thus, even if farmers weigh it on the weighbridge and dump it in front of the
traders' godown, traders have to fill it in bags. "In filling bags the quantity becomes less.
...At the factory when they weigh it the weight is always less. We cut 300 grams because
we need to ensure the full weight," he concluded. 47
But, farmers did not accept this practice without opposition. Ajit Singh of
Ranipura got another tractor of soyabean four months later-this time the harvested crop
in early November 2006. After the auction, Kriti traders agreed to let his tractor be
weighed on the electronic weighbridge. That morning, Ajit Singh and his son chanced to
meet the President of the mandi committee, Jam Singh Davar, a tribal farmer, who was a
friend of Ajit's eldest brother in Ranipura. My research assistant was with them. Ajit
Singh asked the President if there was a rule to reduce 300 grams per quintal from the
total weight. The President replied that there was no such rule and nothing of this sort had
been discussed by the committee. "If you want to get it reduced of your own free will
[swechha se] then you can. Otherwise you bring it in writing from a trader or weigher that
they will deduct 300 grams and we will initiate proceedings [karyavahi] against them."
Ajit Singh turned to my assistant and said we will tell Davar if the trader deducts
anything, we won't be afraid.
At Kriti traders' shop in the afternoon, the weigher made a slip with 7 kg less than
the amount written on the electronic slip received at the electronic weighbridge. 48 Ajit
47 Interview, February 24, 2007.
48 Farmers ended up having to pay twice for weighing if they used the weighbridge. Not only did they 10
rupees for the electronic receipt at the weighbridge, they also had to pay 1-2 rupees per quintal for weighing
and bagging at the traders' shop. These charges were waived off at the choupals with ITC-IBD and Ruchi
paying the weigher's fees to the mandi.
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Singh went to the accountant of Kriti traders and started fighting-I will not accept the
deduction. How can your weigher do this? The accountant replied, "I cannot do anything
about it. You get it in writing from the trader [seth] or the weigher [that the deduction is
invalid. Only then I will give you the extra money]." The group with Ajit Singh trooped
back to the weigher and challenged him to write on a piece of paper that he will deduct
300 grams, which they planned to give to the mandi President. The labourers stopped the
work and asked the weigher to sort out the matter before they would continue. The
weigher was an old man and his hands trembled as he finally asked Ajit Singh for his
slip, changed the weight from 2463 kg to 2470 kg (24.7 quintals) and gave it back--best
to avoid hassle [kaun jhanjhat mein pade], he must have thought.
My assistant had informally met another trader, a friend of his, to ask for his
opinion on the issue. The trader replied, "...The weighing scales have differences [kaante
mein phark rehata hai]. ... This margin has to be given to us. We send grain all over the
place. Economic arrangements [vyavastha] are in our hands. ... The government is
functioning because of traders [baniye logon se chal rahi hai]. If we do not buy produce
then what will the farmer do?" My assistant then responded saying that the mandi
President has asked farmers to bring such cases to his attention. The trader dismissed this
by saying,
"The President is illiterate. He doesn't know anything. We can deal with him. The
President before him, Parvat Singh Chauhan, was educated. He also couldn't change
things. In his time we reduced the cut from 500 grams to 300 grams. He had requested us,
please take heed of my position [meri position ka dhyan rakhte hue] and make it 300 g.
We will not agree below 300 grams," he stated emphatically.
Although Ajit Singh was able to obtain payment for the full weight of his soyabean, most
farmers in the Dhar mandi were forced to accept deductions in weight. Traders held
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strong positions on this issue and usually prevailed over farmers, most of whom visited
the mandi just twice a year to sell their crop. Traders came to the mandi everyday and
were able to exert much greater influence on the government officials who are supposed
to be monitoring their practices and protecting farmers. The last few years have seen
several conflicts erupt in the mandi premises resulting from disputes not only over
weighing but also over the auction, labourers, traffic jams, and timings of the mandi. In
November-December 2007, the mandi was closed for five days because of the inaccurate
weighing and 300 gram deduction issue. The Bharatiya Kisan Union (Indian Farmers'
Association) was on one side while the Traders' Association was on the other. Some
farmers went to jail, several traders were fined, and the District Collector had to intervene
after local officials in the mandi were unable to handle the situation.49 Even though
farmers express strong sentiments about the accurate weight of their crop and farmers'
associations have taken it up seriously, development organisations intervening in agrarian
markets have failed to pay heed to this issue. Similarly, although reports on the
eChoupals have lauded their accurate weighing practices (Annamalai and Rao 2003),
they have failed to engage closely with the main issue faced by farmers when they go to
sell at the choupals--that of judgements over quality. It is to this we now turn.
Questions over Quality at the Choupals
The decision of the final rate to be given to a farmer for the soyabean depends on
the assessment of its quality. Whereas accurate weighing has been a focal point of
conflict at the mandi, farmers have been negotiating at the choupals for lesser penalties
for poorer quality produce. At the choupal in Dhar, Nitin Rai, a young man in his
49 See Nai Dunia, 21 November 2007 and 6-12 December 2007.
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twenties, was the rate-setter who made the final decision regarding the quality of
soyabean of each trolley. He would climb up and take a look at the soyabean just like
traders did at the mandi, dunking his hand into the loose grain or pulling out a handful
from several bags stacked up on the trolley. Based on his estimation of foreign matter,
spoilt or green seed, and moisture, he would give the farmer the FAQ price advertised the
night before or would reduce it accordingly. In the processing plant of ITC-IBD in
Dakachiya in Indore district, contentious samples could be tested in a laboratory which
used a grading machine for removing foreign matter and broken seeds from a sample, but
this device was not available in all the warehouses of the company. The worst level of
quality that ITC-IBD's choupal accepted was 13% moisture, 7% foreign matter [mitti],
5% discoloured seed [daagi], and 10% green seed. 50 Below that, all soyabean was
rejected and farmers would have to find another buyer, mostly another trader at the
mandi. Dr. Jaya Mehta, an independent academic researcher and writer for the magazine,
Sandarbh, in Indore, felt this practice made things difficult for farmers. "Farmers face
uncertainty. ITC-IBD can reject their grain and they have to take it back [and pay extra
costs for transportation to the mandi]. In the mandi such rejected grain can be bought by
another buyer [without the farmer incurring extra expense]." 5'
According to a sanchalak in Sehore district, "Sometimes they [ITC-BD] are very
strict. Their behaviour is argumentative [naram garam vyavahaar] with farmers. They
should produce a grading of the material [through a lab test] but the official gives a rate
based on sight only, not a test. The same thing sometimes sells 50 rupees higher in the
mandi." At the mandi, traders checked the level of moisture by touch and by biting the
50 Mr. Deepak Pathak, Manager of the ITC-IBD choupal in Dhar, October 28, 2006.
51 Interview, March 28, 2006.
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soyabean. 52 At some of the choupals moisture meters were available and they were very
accurate. Nandlal Singh, the sanchalak from Punjapura in Dewas district said that 1%
extra moisture or foreign matter would reduce the rate by the price of 1 kg of soyabean
i.e. 13 Rs less on a rate of 1200 Rs. per quintal (90 kg). The moisture meter at the
choupals gave more accuracy, and hence, penalized farmers in a manner that they were
not used to earlier. In fact, at the Ruchi choupal in Lebad, the moisture meter was so
accurate that farmers complained and asked Guptaji, who been setting rates for 10 years,
to do it instead. He complied. About the ITC choupal in Dakachiya, Bhavani Singhji of
Arjun Baroda village in Indore district complained, "They only want good material from
farmers. From their commission agents in the mandi, they will take poor quality also."
But then he said, "They pay farmers in cash immediately. With traders, they have to pay
only after 10-15 days [and can afford to be more lenient]." 53
Surprisingly, however, the distinctiveness of soyabean is that farmers in Malwa
did not view it from a perspective of quality. Unlike a food crop such as wheat, where
farmers took pride in "making quality" [quality banaate hain], soyabean was simply to be
processed into cattle feed. This was highlighted by Bharat Jat of Ranipura when he said,
at the mandi, "even rotten [sadee hui] soyabean will sell. No one will buy rotten [sadee
hui] wheat." 54
In my interviews with different farmers, the unanimous viewpoint was that quality
was not very important in soyabean. In fact, when I mentioned quality, farmers would
52 According to Dr. Vyas, at the Sehore Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Agricultural College, "If you bite the soyabean
and it gives a sharp sound [kat ki aawaaz] and it breaks, then it is optimal in terms of moisture. If it gets
crushed [pichakjaati hail then there is moisture in it." Interview, Sehore, February 8, 2006.
53 Interview, March 23, 2006.
54 Interview, September 11, 2006
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invariably talk about the seed, and different varieties such as NRC-7, JS-335, Samrat, JS-
71-05, etc. According to Dr. O.P. Joshi at the National Research Centre for Soyabean in
Indore, "By looks there is marginal difference [between different soyabean varieties].
NRC 7 gives 22% oil and JS 335 gives 18% oil but their price is the same. ... The
industry demands it and crushes it. ...Quality-protein level, oil content, fatty acid
spectrum-all this is not very important." 55
What made soyabean most different from many other crops was that poor farmers
had as much a chance of producing good quality soyabean as did rich farmers-the only
difference would be in the yield (quantity produced).56 This was because poor quality as
adjudged in the market yard was a result of external additions to the grain and not due to
intrinsic qualities of the bean stemming from poor use of inputs or low soil fertility. One
of the primary reasons for poor quality was daagi, which was a discolouration of
soyabean where the skin turns bluish/black from its natural yellow. This occurred when
the soyabean had been cut and the plants left on the field in heaps to dry in the sun-and
it rained. Farmers would try to protect the soyabean by covering it with plastic sheets but
any pods with excessive surface contact with water would be affected. It could also result
when a tall plant variety bent down with the weight of its mature pods or due to heavy
rain (known as lodging) and the pods remained in contact with the wet mud for a long
time. This usually happened to the crop of an entire area when untimely rains fell during
and after the harvest, affecting rich and poor, large and small farmers alike. However,
small farmers would be able to save more of their soyabean from daagi because they
would be dealing with a smaller cropping area.
55 Interview, March 29, 2006.
56 Poor farmers would also have smaller sized seeds in the pods but this would only affect the overall
weight of the crop, not the estimation of its quality.
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Another reason for poor quality soyabean was a large quantity of mud and foreign
matter mixed with the seed caused by threshing the crop when it was not completely dry.
Usually the crop was cut and left to dry outside in the fields for two to three days or more
before being threshed. If it was even slightly damp or moist at the time of threshing, the
stem would not get cut properly and would come out with the seeds as small, one inch
sticks [danthal]. The roots may also have moist mud particles stuck to them and this mud
would turn into pellets the size of the soyabean and come out with the seed. This can
happen to any farmer, and possibly more to larger farmers because they have a huge crop
to cut and thresh before the soyabean shatters (see chapter three). This gives them a very
small window to cut the crop using available labour resources. But large farmers also
have the time and resources to clean the mud and danthal from the soyabean-mostly
using labour of the women in the house or employed servants. This could take a few days
to a week and they have the ability to withhold the marketing of their produce for that
time. Without this cleaning the crop will not qualify for purchase at the choupals. Small
farmers usually do not have the financial capability to wait for a few days before selling.
They need to pay back crop loans, consumption loans, and take out new loans for the next
crop, if they are planning to plant wheat. Hence, they would not be able to qualify for
selling their soyabean at the choupals. Dr. Jaya Mehta argued that the representativeness
of the "choupal" as catering to everyone in the village ought to be seriously questioned if
the policy of the choupal continued to exclude farmers due to their small lot size and
poorer quality. Soyabean was the only main crop for many small farmers as most of them
were poor and did not have tubewells and could not grow irrigated wheat or gram in
winter.
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Nevertheless, farmers tried to negotiate the assessment of quality of their
soyabean at all the choupals. At ITC-IBD's choupal, sanchalaks sometimes negotiated a
higher rate for farmers from their own village with the rate-setter by suggesting that the
quality of the farmer's soyabean was not as bad as it had been estimated. The Panditji of
Ranipura presented an interesting case in this regard. We were talking at the Ruchi
choupal in Dhar, where for the first time Panditji had cleaned his soyabean and brought it
on Sameer Singh Rathod's tractor to sell at the choupal in November 2006. At the urging
of Sameer Singh and his brother Vigneshji, Panditji had tried to improve the quality of
his soyabean so that it would be accepted at the choupal. "I would have got only 1100
rupees for it. Sameer and his brothers advised me to clean it. Vigneshji came to check
twice. So I am getting 1380 rupees now. ... First they [rate setter] said 1375. I put 'force',
saying it is good maal [produce]. Then they increased to 80. ... First time I cleaned the
soyabean. And first time I am getting a good rate." The board outside the Ruchi choupal
read 1370 and the highest mandi rate that day was 1400 rupees. The modal rate was Rs.
1350. As one can see, at the choupals farmers [and sanchalaks] can, in effect, 'nudge' the
rate-setter to give 5 or 10 rupees more. The Punjapura sanchalak in Dewas district, too,
had mentioned that at the Ruchi choupal, "They can give a higher rate [than the published
rate] also." Since the mandi price depended upon an auction with several traders in the
fray and poor quality soyabean was not rejected, such negotiations did not take place in
the mandi.57
Most discussions of the eChoupals focus on ITC-IBD's need for obtaining good
quality soyabean. But there is no discussion on the process of judgement of quality at the
57 Such negotiations did, however, take place between mandi traders and farmers when the transaction was
concluded outside the mandi premises, illegally.
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choupals, which ironically, can penalise poor quality as well as best quality soyabean (see
the next section). Judgements over quality at the choupals are always a negotiated
compromise between farmers and the choupal rate-setters-but usually farmers have
little power to influence the outcome in their favour. Surprisingly, there does not seem to
be a uniform standard of judging quality across various buying sites. According to
Ruchi's procurement manager in Indore, if their company employee buys soyabean dal
[cracked seed], he is not penalised because ultimately all seed is crushed to get oil and
DOC. But if a trader buys and sends it to the factory, it will be removed in grading and
the trader will lose weight and money.58 How have the measures of quality historically
come into being in a crop like soyabean, which ultimately is all meant to be crushed into
cattle feed? How are different standards enforced for different buyers in the marketplace?
Who are the actors and which are the forces that determine parameters of quality in the
marketplace and that enforce them on farmers in Malwa? These are questions that must
be engaged with in greater depth to understand and support the struggles that farmers
engage in over determining of the quality of their soyabean in the marketplace.
Playing off the Two Marketplaces
Although farmers decided to sell their soyabean when they required cash, once
they made up their mind that they wanted to sell, they tried to ensure they obtained as
high a price as possible within the timeline they had to obtain cash. If they hit a stretch
when prices were rising, they would get more money, if they didn't, they would settle for
what they got. Many of them who were aware of the choupals would check prices in the
choupals and in the mandi with the help of sanchalaks who would switch between the
58 Interview with Yogesh Shah, Procurement Manager in Indore mandi, Ruchi Soya, April 15, 2006.
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two places all day long, especially when tractors from their own village had come.
Farmers would line up for the auction in the mandi to get a quote for their quality of
soyabean and then make an assessment regarding the amount of reduction in the
choupal's rate they could expect at the choupal to decide which place was better. At the
mandi farmers were free to pay a five rupee penalty and cancel the transaction once the
auction was over if the price did not suit them. Many times, farmers would take only a
small sample of their produce to get an actual quote for it from both places and then take
their trolley to the best place. The sanchalak from Bhaunkhedi (Sehore district) said that
even among farmers who had already taken a transaction number for ITC-IBD's
warehouse, "two out of ten go to the mandi first and if they see the rate is less than the
choupal then they will go to the choupal." In Dhar, the Ruchi choupal's rate was same as
the ITC choupal-both were situated right opposite each other. Both rates were hand
written in chalk on black colour boards hung outside the gate on two trees along the main
road-farmers could see them from the tractor itself.
Mohan Jat was the first farmer from Ranipura who tried out the newly opened
Ruchi choupal in November 2006. He had enquired about the rate from them for two
days over the telephone and on November 6th his trolley reached the choupal at 3 pm in
the afternoon. He asked the rate-setter about the actual price he would get. The rate on the
board said Rs. 1240. The rate setter was willing to give only Rs. 1225, maximum Rs.
1230 because the soyabean was not of the best quality. So Mohan decided to try at the
mandi. By 5 pm the mandi rate reduced to 1200-1210 rupees only. So Mohan
contemplated going back to the choupal. If Modiji [the largest buyer in Dhar mandi]
bought his soyabean, it would take 4 more hours to weigh and get the payment. It took 10
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minutes to go back the two kilometers to the choupal. There was only one tractor there.
The Ruchi rate setter asked why have you come back? Mohan told him that he went to
the mandi to buy fertiliser but it was not available so he came back. He made up the story
otherwise Ruchi might also reduce the price Mohan thought. He finally sold his 38
quintal 8 kg at Rs. 1230 per quintal. He was not charged for weighing and bagging the
soyabean. Mohan left for the village at 6:30 pm. The mandi rate ranged from 1000 to
1261 that day.
During this time, the rush in the Dhar mandi was a sight to see. It was right after
the soyabean harvest and all the roads leading to the mandi were clogged with tractors
lined up for two-three days at a time. Farmers from Ranipura would be sleeping on their
trolleys filled with soyabean all night, at times covering themselves and the soyabean
with plastic sheets to take protection from the untimely rain. Once the auction was over,
empty trolleys would be waiting in an hour long line to be weighed on the lone electronic
weighbridge.
After this experience, Mohan sold two more of his own soyabean trolleys at Ruchi
as well as brought the soyabean of three other tribal farmers from Ranipura to the
choupal on his tractor. It could be that he wanted his tractor back in the village to
complete the sowing of wheat and gram and thus preferred that the transaction get over
soon. In the mandi he would have to waste the whole day in waiting. Mohan's own
brother, Bharat Jat, however, refused to go to the choupal. He preferred to sell in the
mandi a few days later once he got the news that prices were hitting Rs. 1300. On
November 11, 2006 when the highest rate was 1312, he received Rs. 1299 for his tractor.
He reached the mandi at 12:45 pm and his tractor was auctioned at 5:15 pm. He returned
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back to Ranipura only late at night. Whereas Mohan preferred to save time, his brother
preferred the competitive auction in the mandi. He said he did not want only one person
setting the price for his good quality soyabean. The auction provided a greater
opportunity for the price to go higher, he felt. This turned out to be the case with Shiv
bhai's tractor from Ranipura, who also stopped at the Ruchi choupal during this time. He
was given a quote of Rs. 1275 when the board outside read Rs. 1290. So he came to the
mandi and the trolley was auctioned at Rs. 1285 to Modiji, the commission agent (CAG)
of Gujarat Ambuja, the largest processing plant in Dhar district. The auction was
completed at 4 pm but the weighing took several hours since Modiji only uses single-bag
electronic machines. Shiv bhai received the payment at 9:30 pm. But even with the
weighing and bagging charges of Rs. 2.70 per quintal, he benefited by 7 rupees per
quintal.
Gajanandji Maru, an old farmer from Ranipura sold his soyabean on one occasion
to the mandi and on another occasion to the choupal. On October 19, 2006, he brought
one trolley of soyabean in the morning and parked his tractor in the main auction shed.
Before the auction reached his trolley, Prakash Modi, the largest trader in Dhar mandi
came by and saw the grain. He knew Gajanandji from before and said, "You could have
gone directly to the godown. Don't you know we have a shop [Godown pe direct le jate.
Aapko maloom nahi hai humari dukan hai]." Modi was referring to his warehouse about
2 km away from the mandi where he bought from farmers directly, avoiding the mandi
and its regulations. At the warehouse Gajanandji would not have to wait in a long line for
his tractor to be weighed and Modi would have saved on paying the mandi weigher and
most importantly, the mandi tax. Gajanandji replied, "We had to buy things for the house
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so we came here." So Modi responded, "we have four weighing scales being used at the
same time in the mandi too." Gajanandji told my assistant that Modiji really liked the
soyabean.
Some time later the auction reached Gajanandji. 10-12 traders along with two
mandi employees were walking from one tractor to the next. One mandi employee would
take out a sample of soyabean in a steel bowl and pass it around to the traders. The
second person would ask the farmer for his name and the village he was from and note it
on a pink slip. The first one would then start the auction based on his own estimation of
the base price. During the auction several traders also pushed their hands deep into
farmers' trolleys and scooped out a handful of grain to check its quality. They rolled it in
their hands, threw it in the air to release light mud particles and sticks, and caught it
again. Traders would jump in shouting bids, starting with 5 rupee increments and ending
with one or two rupee increments. In Gajanandji's case the auction started at 1100 rupees.
Modi bid 1110 and then 1125. The rate was jumping fast. 1145. Modi was not letting
anyone bid less. Finally Modi said 1193. No one said anything. Then he said 1195, just in
case. But no one responded. So the first employee shouted "1193 one-two-three Modiji".
The second employee scribbled "1193 Modiji" on the pink slip and handed it to
Gajanandji. He got the highest rate of the day. The modal rate for 19th October 2006 was
Rs. 1150.
Gajanandji's nephew was driving the tractor and he asked Modiji where to go.
Modiji said "Take it wherever you like. There are four weighing scales [Jahan iccha ho
vahan chale jao]." My assistant asked the nephew if he would take it to the electronic
weighbridge. He replied, "No, we will take it directly to Modiji's weighing scale. We
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have long standing [purane] relations with Modiji." My assistant asked, "Is there any
difference in the weight?" The nephew replied, "No there is no difference." My assistant
pursued, "You will save time." But the nephew said, "We have trust." There were 4-5
tractors at Modiji's godown in the mandi already. It took 11/2 hours for their turn to come.
The soyabean was bagged and weighed on the single-bag electronic weighing scale at 2
pm. 62 rupees was deducted as weighing and bagging fees. Gajanandji got Rs. 27,520 at
2:15 pm. He took the tractor to the government fertilizer shop outside the mandi and
purchased fertilizer to sow wheat and gram. He also purchased household items like
edible oil, soap, sugar, tea, spices, etc., for about 1000 rupees and then they left back to
Ranipura.
A few weeks later, on November 28, 2006, Gajanandji Maru again brought his
soyabean. The same day, Mahesh Jat of Ranipura also got soyabean in two tractors. He
had called the sanchalak of Chikliya village and learnt the price of Rs. 1370 at the ITC-
IBD choupal. A few hours later, the ITC-IBD rate had increased to Rs. 1380. Tractors at
the mandi were also being auctioned in the 1390s range. The highest priced soyabean
sold at Rs. 1413 in the mandi. Gajanandji's auction started at 1350 rupees and ended at
1365. He was expecting the bidding to go up till Rs. 1400 or so and was very
disappointed. Inspite of his good relations with Modiji and the trust he held in the process
of the mandi, he cancelled his auction in the mandi, paying a penalty of Rs. 5 and took his
trolley to ITC's choupal. He got Rs. 1370, which was same as the modal mandi rate for
that day. He did not have to pay for weighing and bagging and neither was 300 grams
reduced from the total quantity despite weighing the trolley on the electronic
weighbridge. So he got an effective rate of Rs. 1375. Farmers often behaved in this
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manner-finding out the price in both the mandi and the choupals and then taking their
tractor laden with soyabean to both places before making a final decision. This was
feasible in Dhar because the choupals were located within 2 kilometres of the mandi
premises and the cost of going back and forth was minimal. However, in October 2007,
when the ITC-IBD choupal shifted to a location 5 kilometres outside the perimeter of the
town and nearly 8 kilometres away from the mandi (to comply with regulations), it
reduced the ability farmers like Gajanandji to play off the two marketplaces against each
other.
Back to November 2006: The same day Gajanandji sold in the choupal, we
interviewed Mahendraji of Mahendra brothers, the commission agent for Divya Jyoti,
another soyabean processing plant in Dhar. He expressed one problem with the choupal's
rate. The farmer who received Rs. 1413 at the mandi would only have got 1380 rupees
per quintal at the choupal that day (the rate advertised for FAQ). "Farmer is not
benefiting so he should not go. The rate increases because of the auction, the competition.
...Traders get better quality, we improve the quality, and farmer gets more money." He
also added that the government has a loss because the mandi tax is a percentage of the
price. If the price is higher, the government gets more tax. I interjected asking how many
trolleys actually sold above the modal rate. He replied that 25 trolleys out of 240 sold
above 1400 rupees. 75 trolleys were chosen to provide the modal rate of 1370. So in
effect, this refers to about 10% of farmers who come to the mandi.
ITC-IBD's manager in Sehore had explained the same phenomenon to me in
2005. Those with extremely high quality would not benefit immediately at the choupal.
For instance, he explained, that if ITC-IBD's quoted rate for soyabean was 1200 rupees,
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it would be for 2-2-10 (F.A.Q.) level of quality. "If a farmer comes with 0-0-10 quality
then in the mandi he will get 50 rupees more. But ITC will still give him 1200 Rs."
However, added the manager, "ITC will do insurance for the farmer for free next year.59
It is not an immediate gain for the farmer, it is long term. But farmers do not really
believe premium in the future - they want cash now. So top premium quality farmers will
go to the mandi or a trader will stop them on the way." 60 I have argued earlier that since
farmers sell their soyabean only when they require cash for a transaction, it explains why
they would prefer to get a higher price at the mandi rather than get free insurance or some
other benefit in the future from ITC-IBD. At that level, said the manager, ITC-IBD
cannot change the price and it can't change the price upward for one person only. The
company cannot give a rate for 0-0-0 or 0-0-10 (i.e. 1260) because then the majority of
lower quality farmers will feel that ITC-IBD is reducing the rate too much for him i.e. if a
farmer is given 1100 Rs. According to him, it is only those who trust ITC-IBD (for a
future premium) who do this, or otherwise those who do not understand market dynamics
i.e. those who would like benefit in the present and are not able to figure out that they can
make a better gamble at the market yard.61
But what about the opposite? What if prices fell in the mandi during the course of
the day? This is precisely what happened the very next day, November 29, 2006. The
price of soyabean opened at Rs. 1360 in Dhar mandi at the tractor auction but by
afternoon, it fell down to Rs. 1325. Four farmers from Ranipura had brought soyabean to
sell in expectation of the high prices of the last few weeks and we all were waiting in the
59 ITC-IBD was providing insurance to farmers through its rural distribution system and would pay this
farmer's premium for the extra 50 Rs. that the farmer would have obtained for good quality.
60 Interview, July 2005.
61 In fact, when ITC obtains premium quality it is kept separately - 500 tons of such soyabean of #1 quality
was kept at this time in July 2005.
Chapter 2: "Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace
Richa Kumar
auction queue since 10 am. With the terrible rush in the mandi their turn came only
around 4 pm and they couldn't believe that the price had gone down. All four cancelled
their mandi receipts and took the tractors to ITC-IBD's choupal. The choupal rate had to
be kept constant and remained at Rs. 1360 all day. Between 3 pm and 4 pm there was a
flight of trolleys from the mandi to the choupal. The next day I found out from the mandi
records that 59 transactions out of 536 in total (including transactions of bullock carts and
small size transactions of less than 10 quintals-a tractor holds between 25-35 quintals)
had been cancelled and presumably, the farmers had headed over to the choupal. The
choupal manager informed us that more than 90 trolleys had come that day, compared to
an average of 50 to 60 because the market had crashed. The modal rate in the mandi was
1320 that day and the highest rate was Rs. 1376.62 Not only did these farmers get a higher
price, they also did not have to pay for bagging and were saved from the 300 gram per
quintal deduction in weight despite using the weighbridge. ITC-IBD paid for the
weighbridge, the mandi weigher's fees, bagging, the revenue stamp on the transaction
slip, salaries of its own staff and rent of the warehouse.
The establishment of the choupals brought about further competition within the
soyabean marketplace where farmers brought their soyabean to sell. However, the main
elements of the competition focused primarily on non-price elements such as accurate
weighing, courteousness of the buyers, and judgements over quality rather than on the
price itself. Since the price of soyabean both in the mandi and the choupals was dictated
by global trends in soyabean meal and palm oil prices, the price in both places usually
converged around the mandi modal price. But the non-price competition prompted
several mandis in Madhya Pradesh to install (or repair and restart the use of) electronic
62 All four farmers received a rate between 1355 and 1360 rupees per quintal.
Chapter 2: "Empowering" Farmers in the Soyabean Marketplace 185
Richa Kumar
weighbridges and helped farmers in their struggles against inaccurate weighing in the
marketplace.
Conclusion
This research argues that the discourse of empowering farmers through
disintermediation via information technology relies upon a de-contextualised explanation
of farmers' marketing practices and constructs "empowerment" narrowly as a
transactional benefit to farmers. Projects such as the eChoupals have been projected to
the international development community as "empowering" in the name of this discourse.
In contrast, this research argues that farmers marketing practices in soyabean are shaped
by various power relationships in the global and local marketplace starting with
assessments that are made on the quality of their produce, their (in)ability to transport
their produce to the marketplace, the importance of intermediaries in enabling
transactions in a cash crop like soyabean which is not consumed by farmers in India, and
the structure of the global commodity chain in soyabean. The proponents of the eChoupal
project have taken into account some of these concerns and have also acknowledged that
information alone is insufficient to bring about changes in agrarian markets. This research
points to arenas other than information where farmers attempt to exercise power in
various marketplaces where they sell their soyabean. Negotiations over weighment with
traders and over quality at the eChoupal are some alternative sites of struggles for power.
Rather than narrowly focusing on information and prices, supporting farmers in these
struggles over the design of the marketplace will be critical in providing avenues for
"empowerment."
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Appendix 1: Select examples of computer usage in eChoupal villages in Sehore
district in June 2005 and Dhar district in October 2006 (Based on interviews with
sanchalaks)
Khandwa, Sehore
The first year this village did not have a VSAT and the telephone that was
connected to the modem was not working. Company officials told him to learn about
computers even if it was not related to the business right then. So he got some DTP
(Desktop Publishing) course books and MS Excel books from Bhopal and self-taught
himself. In one year the internet started working well (once he got a satellite dish) and he
became proficient. The most important benefit, he says, is that once can information on
all MP mandis through a separate website of the MP government known as "Special Crop
Information." Here one can also get an estimate of the next day's mandi price (how much
above or below today's price it could be). He gives information to villagers on all kinds
of things; for instance, one person wanted information on the agricultural university in
Chandigarh. The CD drive of his computer was broken once and since then he has not
allowed others to use the computer much. There is a computer education Headstart
Kendra (government computer education centre) in the village. But it is closed because
no one knows how to run the computer and there are no computer classes. He says that if
ITC-IBD tells them to teach children, then he might start classes. But he did not seem
optimistic about their ability to learn: "for village kids it is very hard for them to learn
because their base is not strong. Fifth standard kids don't know the alphabet in Hindi," he
lamented.
Divadiya, Sehore
The sanchalak used the computer only a little bit. He did not get a lot of training.
He was told how to access the ITC website and he checked it out. He obtains sauda
numbers through the phone and checks the choupal rate on the website. The computer is
spoilt right now.
Jharkheda, Sehore
The sanchalak obtains some information on agriculture through the computer.
Sometimes he and fellow farmers ask what to do when there is disease in the crop. They
see mandi rates on the computer. But they still get the transaction number on the phone.
They also access websites like www.webdunia.com.
Janpur Bavadiya, Sehore
The sanchalak operated the computer a little bit but did not understand much
about email. The company has given a soil testing video CD, a CD on crop information,
on soyabean diseases and on other ITC-IBD products. The sanchalak and the secretary of
the Panchayat knew that one could get the rate at different mandis through the internet.
But they felt they needed more training in how to use the computer. "The computer is
useful but we don't know how to use it," he said.
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Kalukheda, Dhar
The sanchalak is a graduate with a Masters degree in Commerce. He visits the
soyachoupal website daily, checks email, provides examination results to students, and
visits the webdunia.com website daily. Sometimes he checks the website of the Indian
Meteorological Department and at times the soyabean meal rates. He says there is no
interest in computers in the age-group above 45 years.
Kalasada Bujurg, Dhar
The sanchalak has studied till 7" standard in middle school. His nephew who
completed a Bachelors degree in Arts taught him how to use the computer. He applied to
become a Chemistry teacher in the village school and received an appointment from the
government. He started the choupal in 2002 and 10 months later the computer was
installed. Initially he started with visiting the newspaper websites like Naidunia.com and
Dainikbhaskar.com. A CD with information on the benefits of selling at ITC-IBD, how to
obtain a soil fertility test, and how to apply for insurance through ITC-IBD were given to
him. He checked rates of soyabean oil on the internet sometimes. Mostly children played
games on the computer and internet for free. Three teenage boys from his family were the
primary users of the computer.
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Chapter Three
The Yellow Revolution and the Opportunity for
Adivasi Assertion in Malwa
The yellow revolution created the metaphor of the "good farmer" [acche kisan] in
Malwa, one who is scientific and highly productive. At the same time it allowed the
metaphor to be used against poor adivasi farmers as a justification to push them out of
agriculture by characterizing them as incapable of becoming productive farmers. This
chapter explores another aspect of the yellow revolution-its relationship to adivasi
agricultural labourers in Malwa. I argue that the introduction of soyabean cultivation and
the subsequent intensive agricultural transformation in Madhya Pradesh, and especially in
Malwa, has opened up new spaces that give adivasis, as labourers rather than farmers, an
opportunity to exercise power and assert themselves in social, economic, and cultural
relationships with upper caste villagers. I also suggest that the mechanisms of democratic
politics provide important alternative arenas of struggle for adivasis to make claims upon
the state and counteract, somewhat, the power of upper castes, but which are often
ignored or derided by the language and practice of development. Despite the flawed
nature of electoral politics, it has provided a space and a language of rights for adivasis to
fight for their well-being, and its role must be recognized as such.
Adivasis, tribals, or scheduled tribes' are the poorest and most vulnerable social
group in central India. They form 20.3% of the population of Madhya Pradesh and have
1 Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste, Backward Caste and Upper Caste are categories under the Indian
constitution which gives reservations in government jobs and educational institutions to backward caste,
scheduled caste, and scheduled tribe groups. Scheduled caste (SC) groups are the lower castes also known
as dalits or harijans. Scheduled tribes are tribals or adivasis who are also considered to be lower caste.
Backward caste groups are considered to be the lowest level of upper castes. There is ongoing debate on
designating certain castes as backward caste and this chapter will not go into it.
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historically been the most marginalized group in the state (Census of India 2001b).
During pre-colonial times upper caste groups such as the Marathas, Rajputs, and Patidars
migrated to central India and were granted cultivation rights by Maratha and Rajput
rulers who had defeated the Mughals. Subsequently, the British confirmed these rights
under the revenue settlement of Malwa and adivasis were displaced from land they
commonly farmed and pushed into the hills. Even after independence, adivasis were
consistently denied a right to their livelihood and control over resources such as land and
water in the name of forest conservation and in the pursuit of mineral and forest wealth
extraction by the state and private entrepreneurs (Baviskar 1995, Sundar 1997).
However, post-independence state-led rural development in Madhya Pradesh did
focus on improving the condition of adivasis to some extent. The state redistributed land
to adivasi families in the 1970s and 1980s and instituted reservations (affirmative action)
in government jobs and elected offices for adivasis around the same time. Although these
measures benefited some families, they failed to bring about sustained change. During the
1990s, under a long tenure of the Congress party, all government handouts such as
agricultural implements, money for building toilets, etc., were targeted specifically at
adivasis to bring about the development of this group. These, too, failed to make any
difference to the material condition of adivasis. Similar to critiques of top-down
development projects more broadly, this research argues that the failure of these policies
was related to their poor design, which served more to perpetuate the institutions that
implemented them rather than have any benefit whatsoever on adivasi well-being (cf.
Ferguson 1994, Scott 1998).
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In contrast to these failed projects, however, this research suggests that the
introduction of soyabean has given adivasis of the hills and the plains an alternative
avenue for asserting themselves in socioeconomic relationships with upper castes, even
though many have been pushed into the role of labourers. What I will call an 'economy
of haste' is created every year at the soyabean harvest due to a combination of non-
human actors such as the technical characteristics of the soyabean crop, the rain,
mechanized equipment, and the soil, that increase the requirement of labour and provide
farmers with a very short period of time to complete the harvest. Thousands of adivasis
travel from various parts of Nimar, Dhar, and Jhabua to cut the soyabean in the fields of
Malwa and their labour is crucial to making the soyabean economy work. Prior to
soyabean, large scale labour migration was not a facet of agriculture in Malwa. Against a
history of marginalization (Sundar 1997, Baviskar 1995) and the recent informalisation
and casualisation 2 of adivasi labour (Breman 1996, 2007: 416-420), Harriss-White 2003),
the 'economy of haste' is an anomaly where adivasis all throughout Malwa and Nimar
are able to assertively negotiate the terms of work and relationships with potential
employers (farmers) compared to other times of the year. More importantly, the soyabean
harvest has made space for collective or group negotiation of wages and terms and
conditions, a possibility that did not exist in the past. Successful negotiations by some
groups that raise the wage rate benefit all labourers in general, including those adivasi
labourers coming from the hills and those belonging to plains villages, even though they
are enmeshed in long term relations of debt with upper castes in the village.
2 Informalisation and casualisation refer to the breakdown in patron client relationships and the freeing of
employers from any social obligations towards the labourers they hire. Although used more often in urban
and factory contexts, with the de-unionisation, increased hiring of contract workers with no benefits, and
growing state neglect / apathy and state support to capitalists in industry as well as farmers through
subsidies, it has been exacerbated in the neoliberal era. It is a recent condition in the last 20 years.
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I further argue that an important alternative arena of struggle that adivasis have
participated in to bring about change is that of democratic politics. Through political
mobilization by adivasi activists and other groups to influence legislative policy-making
at the central government level, a constitutional Act guaranteeing employment to all rural
adults was passed in 2005. Formulated as an employment guarantee scheme, it was
implemented in several parts of India in 2006 and 2007. In combination with the
"economy of haste" in Malwa, the scheme enhanced the ability of adivasi labourers to
negotiate higher wage rates with their upper caste farmer-employers in relationships
during and even beyond the soyabean harvest.
This research argues that development projects which seek to constantly
depoliticize their interventions and deride any engagement with politics fail to recognize
politics as a crucial avenue for marginalized groups to make claims upon the state
(Chatterjee 2004, 2008, Corbridge 2008). Moreover, participatory development projects
that became popular in the 1990s are still not accountable towards the people who they
expect to be help. Democratic politics, on the other hand, creates the space where a
differentiated, non-monolithic state is directly accountable to the people it represents.
Disengagement with politics and labeling illegitimate any political action by the
marginalized sets up participatory development projects to remain irrelevant to the needs
and pressing concerns of the marginalized.
History of Settlement in Malwa and Ranipura
Ranipura, like many other villages in Dhar and Malwa was settled about 150 or
200 years ago by families fleeing war and famine in different parts of Rajasthan from
Pali, Jodhpur, and Jaisalmer districts. The nearby town of Dhar was continuously under
Chapter 3: Yellow Revolution and Adivasi Assertion in Malwa 192
Richa Kumar
the rule of various petty rulers ever since the Parmar dynasty of the 12h century. The
most famous ruler was Raja Bhoj who built the famous Bhojshala (university) in the town
of Dhar. But the extent of settlement and cultivation in the surrounding villages was very
small prior to the 19th century-mostly they were covered with forests. After the Parmars,
the area was controlled by Muslim rulers from Delhi and then by the Mughals who were
defeated by various Maratha chieftains during wars fought in the 18th century (Malcolm
1832). The Pawars were one of several Maratha chieftains like the Scindias and Holkars
who settled down in Dhar and Dewas at the southern edge of the Malwa plateau along
with several retainers and notables. The Marathas were defeated by the British in the
mid-19th century who converted princely states like Dhar into principalities under British
protection after the third Anglo-Maratha war of 1818 (Verma 1984). During the colonial
period, Malwa was under the rule of Maratha princely states such as the Holkars of
Indore, Scindias of Gwalior and Pawars of Dhar and Dewas, apart from hundreds of
smaller Rajput principalities, under supervision of British residents and agents. After
independence, these states were amalgamated into the Indian union and became a part of
the state of Madhya Pradesh in 1956.
The only "native" inhabitants of Malwa were the adivasis3 who were pushed into
the Vindhya mountains by the Marathas initially and then by the British. Large tracts of
fertile Malwa land were then distributed to farmers from Rajasthan and Gujarat during
the 18t and 19th century (Baviskar 1995: 54-58, 66). In addition, the hills and forests
were designated as protected areas by the British, not so much for conservation but for
enabling large scale extraction of resources by the colonial (and then postcolonial) state.
3 Adivasis, especially the Bhils were said to have settled in central India from Sindh (Nath 1960), cited in
Baviskar (1995) and Rahul (1996).
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In the 1870s, adivasis were converted into "encroachers" on this newly reserved forest
land (Prasad 2004: 31-35). They were denied access to resources such as rights to natural
forest produce, prevented from swidden cultivation, and pushed into resource poor areas
(Baviskar 1995: 70-71, 81-82, Sundar 1997: 105-123). In the late 19th century the Forest
Department labeled adivasi claims as ecologically destructive, ignoring its own
complicity in supporting commercial extraction of forest and mineral wealth (Gadgil and
Guha 1989). Under such circumstances, adivasis participated willingly and unwillingly
with the representatives of the state, both colonial and post colonial, to extract resources
from forests. Even today, adivasis farm hillsides in plots known as nevad in collusion
with and despite the objection of forest officials, paying tribute to them from the meager
output that comes out of farming in such degraded land and poor quality soil (Baviskar
1995: 149-156).4 The practice has become increasingly unsustainable because of the
state's prior exploitation of the forest and the growing demographic pressure in the hills
(Baviskar 1995: 150-152, cf. Hodgson 2001).
The village of Ranipura lies at the southern edge of the Malwa plateau in the
Jhumki block of Dhar district. About 150 years ago, one family each of upper caste
Rajputs, Jats, Marus, and Garis, and two adivasi families were the initial settlers who
were given land by Dhar Maharaj. 5 Some of them further purchased land from a Muslim
man who sold several hundred bigha to finance his trip to Mecca for Hajj.6 The Raja had
also given land to Brahmins (priests), to the guard [chowkidar], leather worker [chamar],
barber [nai], agricultural worker [balai] and sweeper [bhangi] of the village as part of
4 I describe a similar situation later in this chapter based on my visits to the mountain villages in the
Vindhya hills south of Dhar town.
5 Dhar Maharaj means King of Dhar who was from the Pawar dynasty of Maratha rulers.6 Interview with Anar Singhiji Rathod, August 1, 2006.
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their caste duties in the village and so that they could subsist by growing maize.7 By the
1950s, six more adivasi families migrated to Ranipura to work as year-long labourers
(halis) at the houses of some Jats and Marus. Nearly all the 100 families we see today are
descendants of these original groups. Many adivasi families live in the villages of Malwa,
but most of them are landless labourers and do not own any land.8 They have been
assimilated into the dominant Hindu caste structure and do not share the distinctive
cultural identity of the hill adivasis (Baviskar 1995: 88, 201, Mayer 1960). This chapter
discusses both adivasis from outside (hill adivasis) and adivasis belonging to the village
(Ranipura adivasis) and their relationships with upper castes. Most of the sections refer
specifically to adivasis of Ranipura. The section of the "economy of haste" refers
specifically to hill adivasis as well as to adivasis of Ranipura.
State Programs for Adivasis: Land Reforms and Job Reservations
After independence, the Indian government abolished zamindari,9 thus,
eliminating the intermediaries between the state and the tenant-cultivator of the land. The
Madhya Pradesh government enacted two pieces of legislation, the MP Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings Act 1960 and 1974, to ensure more equitable distribution of land
(Land Reforms Unit 2002). However the state gave lip service to implementing land
reform until the 1970s and 1980s, when the first set of reforms were initiated in some
parts of Madhya Pradesh. Adivasi families who did not own any land in Ranipura
7 Interview with Suraj Jat, Ranipura, August 27, 2006. About 15-20 years ago, Suraj's father Ramaji Jat
purchased these plots from their owners. There are no chamar or bhangi families in Ranipura any more.
Most of these families, such as the ones living in Ranipura, came to work as labourers in the village and
ended up settling there. They could have come from the mountains or they could have come from
elsewhere. Many adivasis in Ranipura could not recall where their ancestors came from.
9 Zamindari was one of the forms of land settlement under the British where the title to large tracts of land
was held by absentee landlords but it was cultivated by tenants living in the villages. This form of land
holding was abolished in land reform acts after independence.
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received allotments ranging from 1/4t hectare (2 bigha) to 1 hectare from common
grazing land and government land with permanent ownership rights and title [patta].
Upper caste villagers in Ranipura consistently lamented the state's largesse in the
redistribution of common grazing land to adivasis and dismissed adivasis as nomads
incapable of being "good farmers" [acche kisan]. They emphasized that Rajputs from
Rajasthan, Patidars from Gujarat and Marathas from Maharashtra, the three main sets of
migrants to Malwa, were invited by the local rulers to "make untilled land productive" in
Malwa. The history of pushing adivasis into the forested hills was all but erased from
their memories.
There were conflicting versions of when adivasis in Ranipura received their plots
of land from the government. According to Ramlalji, an adivasi whose grandfather was
allotted 2 bigha, 12 plots of 2 bigha each were cut from the sarkari beed (government
owned grassland) during Indira Gandhi's time. Where the plot had poor quality soil [halki
zameen], two and a half bigha was allotted. Moreover, he added, "6 plots of 8 bigha each
were also allotted to those adivasi families whose men folk had all got the operation
[vasectomy] done." 10 This amounted to a total of about 72-75 bigha being allotted to
adivasis. Gangadhar's mother, whose husband was one of the 8 bigha allotees recalled
that they got the land the year her husband died, and when Gangadhar, her only child,
was two months old. We tried to calculate the year through life events that she
remembered. She said Gangadhar was 6 or 7 when Indira Gandhi died in 1984, so the
land was possibly given in 1977, during the last phase of the emergency when Sanjay
10 Interview with Ramlalji, Ranipura, October 16, 2006. The vasectomies were part of a large sterilization
operation conducted across the country during the two-year period of emergency rule in India from 1975-
77 under Indira Gandhi. Rohinton Mistry's book, A Fine Balance: A Novel, based in Bombay has a stirring
account of the policy (1996).
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Gandhi, Indira's son, was conducting his massive sterilization operations across the
country.11
Bharat Jat, a backward caste farmer, recalled the year to be about 1975 when the
2-3 bigha land was distributed by Indira Gandhi. 12 Ajit Singh, an upper caste farmer
mentioned that adivasis had been given patte in 1983-84 under the Congress chief
minister Arjun Singh, which was the same time when Indira Gandhi was in power in the
centre before her assassination. 13 Suraj Jat, the village Patel,' 4 said that in 1980 or 82, the
year his cousin got married, adivasis were given a 9 bigha patta.'5 Ajit Singh Rathod also
recalled that the chief minister of Madhya Pradesh, Arjun Singh had organized a Debt
Relief Program (Rin Mukti Karyakram) in 1980-81 where adivasis who had sold their
land got it back. To prevent further land alienation it was legally decreed that adivasi land
could only be sold to another adivasi and not to upper castes. 16 Upper castes are only
allowed to lease land from adivasis.
However even though every adivasi family except one owned some land in
Ranipura, four adivasi families had mortgaged their land to others and were landless for
the 2006 season. A couple of the 2 bigha allottees had sold off their allotment and left the
village. Two of the 8 bigha allottees had leased out their land for the entire year to upper
" Interview with Gangadhar Bhooria, his wife and his mother, Ranipura, October 11, 2006.
12 Interview with Bharat Jat, Ranipura, July 19, 2006.
13 Interview on June 27, 2006.
14 Patel is a hereditary title continuing from colonial times and refers to the village tax collector. Suraj Jat
received the title from Ran Singh Rathod, and not from his father. None of Ran Singhji's sons wanted the
title and the responsibility that went with it--entertaining all official guests who visited the village, taking
care of village-related paperwork, etc. Since Ranipura was part of the Rangwasa panchayat, it did not have
a sarpanch [village head] and the Patel was the de facto village head.
15 Interview August 10, 2006.
16 The priest of Ranipura was cultivating adivasi land in the village and was the de facto owner. He had
worked out a deal with an adivasi family in his ancestral village in Jhabua to buy the land from the adivasi
in Ranipura.
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caste farmers. The sons of the other four allottees were holding the same amount of land
and farming it during both the seasons. They had not divided it yet.
By 2006, many of the 2 bigha allottees had divided the land amongst two or more
sons, and it was not enough to sustain the family for an entire year. The total number of
labour-days required to farm one bigha of soyabean was less than two weeks.'7 In wheat
the effort would be a little more because of the need for watering the crop periodically.
But a majority of adivasi farmers did not have a tubewell in their fields. A small minority
grew unirrigated wheat but most of them gave it on lease to other farmers with tubewells
for the winter wheat season. Those who did farm both seasons, the total number of
working days for two people would be no more than one month.
What does a one bigha farmer do for the other 11 months of the year?
A majority of adivasi families still relied upon wage labour to sustain themselves.
Some adivasi men became permanent yearly servants [hali] at the houses of upper caste
families in Ranipura. In 2006-07, twenty-seven upper caste landed households out of 100
total households in Ranipura, hired adivasi men and boys as yearly or six-monthly
servants [hali or naukar]. The work was either for one year from May, or for six months
from end-June until December, covering both the soyabean and wheat seasons. Adivasi
women found annual employment with households for cleaning animal dung on a daily
basis and making fuel cakes with it or mixing it in the gobar [animal dung] gas unit. The
yearly or six-monthly labourer (hali or naukar) relationship for both men and women was
17 It takes two people a couple of days to plough and sow one bigha of land using bullocks. Another couple
of days are required for weeding and dora [removing weeds using a circular wheel like apparatus]. One day
to spray pesticides or maybe two if it is to be done twice, and three days for the harvest. Threshing done at
the field itself by hand would take another 2-3 days. If the farmer rented a tractor, ploughing and sowing
would take less an hour and threshing, too, would be over in 15 minutes.
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not necessarily a long term relationship. Frequently both sides would mention that "it
didn't work out so I left [jamaa nahi to chod diya]" or "it didn't work out so we hired
another person [jamaa nahi to doosre ko rakh liya]." Usually the labourer would get the
entire yearly salary, plus some extra loan if needed, in advance in April at the time of the
festival of Akha Teej. If a labourer wanted to switch to someone else or leave the job
altogether, he or she would have to pay back the extra loan. The new farmer employer
would then give the labourer a new advance for the coming year, which would go
towards settling the dues of the previous employer. Once again the labourer would take
extra money for daily needs of the family and the cycle would go on (Breman 2007).
For specific agricultural operations labour was hired on daily wages-sowing,
harvest, weeding, spraying pesticides etc. Labourers were usually already loaned money
in advance during the beginning of the rainy season or end of summer when food stocks
were low. By this time the winter wheat had mostly been consumed and one had to wait
till the end of the soyabean harvest in October to get money again. During the soyabean
season, most Ranipura labourers were planting their own small plots of land and also
looking out for wage work. Compared to the winter wheat season, village adivasis said
the soyabean season held better prospects for work such as weeding for women and dore
chalana and pesticide spraying for men. But if it rained for extended periods of time then
no farm work would be possible. At the soyabean harvest, lasting about 15 days to one
month, work was plentiful and labourers from outside Ranipura were also booked in
advance by farmers to come and cut the crop.
After the soyabean season, from November to March, there was still some work
available in the village. For instance, men were employed to water wheat for richer
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farmers, who owned more than 4-5 hectares of land. This was usually a night job because
that was when electricity was available to run the tubewell motors. They could also work
at the construction of houses or buildings in the local area under the supervision of two
upper caste masons of Ranipura. For women work such as weeding in wheat and working
in the government-owned horticulture nursery in Ranipura was also available. A large
majority of adivasis were only qualified for agricultural work or other manual labour.
After Diwali in October, it was common to hear of various seasonal migratory
tales from those left behind-someone had gone to a village 10 km away to water the
wheat fields for a farmer there; another three families had left for Gujarat giving their
half hectare plots to the shopkeeper to cultivate on lease; two young men had started
working in a shop in Dhar town, and so on. Uneducated lower caste and adivasi youths
migrated to places like Pithampur and Gujarat as manual labourers. They became part of
the casualised, informal migrant labour characteristically described by Breman (1996,
2007) and faced increasingly precarious situations where survival itself is in question
(Baviskar 2008, Mosse et al. 2005). However, everyone would be back by April for the
wedding season in the village and to sow the soyabean on their land in the rains,
whatever little they got out of it. Many adivasi families managed their financial liabilities
either by paying off the money through another loan from a more friendly
farmer/neighbour or by mortgaging land or leasing it out for a few years and at times
even postponing the final accounting [hisaab] for later.
Apart from land reform, the government also implemented reservations for
adivasis in government jobs in the 1980 and 1990s. Although reservations for adivasis
and lower castes [scheduled tribes (STs) and scheduled castes (SCs)], had been
Chapter 3: Yellow Revolution and Adivasi Assertion in Malwa 200
Richa Kumar
promulgated in the Indian Constitution from 1950 onwards, they were never seriously
implemented. 20% of all vacancies were reserved for adivasis and 16% for lower castes
but many posts were never filled. In the past, upper caste Rajputs from two families in
Ranipura had obtained several government jobs such as village multipurpose health
worker, anganwadi [day care] worker, irrigation department clerk, school teacher, etc.
These were permanent, secure government jobs because no one could be fired, the
employees received pension until their death, and several other benefits during their
lifetime. The Digvijay Singh government from 1994 stopped the entry of upper castes
into government service altogether and promoted the hiring of adivasis and lower
castes. 18
Rajputs in Ranipura repeatedly expressed their dismay at such a step and the
consequent closure of the avenue of a secure, permanent government service for their
children. One adivasi family from Ranipura benefited from reservations of these posts in
the 1990s. Four male members obtained posts as a forest officer, school teacher,
panchayat secretary, and multipurpose health worker. Two women of the family also
obtained government jobs-one is an anganwadi worker while another is an auxiliary
nurse midwife (ANM). However, by the mid-2000s, government jobs were few and far
between and very hard to get. Nahaar, another young member from the same family
described his experience in trying to get benefits from the reservations (quota) for
scheduled tribes in government jobs. He said, "First I tried for a job in the police where a
Rs. 60,000 bribe was demanded from me." He then applied to the RAF (Rapid Action
18 Reservations for Other Backward Castes (OBCs) were implemented by the central government of V.P.
Singh in 1990. The same year, Ramji Mahajan whose report in 1983 (Mahajan Report) recommended
further reservations for OBCs in Madhya Pradesh, challenged the BJP government to implement it. Finally,
the Congress government of Digvijay Singh implemented the report in 1994 and also gave 27%
reservations to the OBCs (Jaffrelot 1996).
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Force) where there were some published vacancies. He passed all the tests - written,
physical, and interview. "I went through an agent in Dhar who told me that I need to pay
10,000 Rs. to the interviewers to get the job. We arranged for the money and gave it to
him. The night before the interview the agent called and said the interviewers are asking
for more money. Can you get 30,000 tomorrow morning with you? It was impossible to
get so much money so quickly." So it all fell through. The third try was for a position in
the Home Guard where a bribe of Rs. 45,000 was demanded. 19
Some amount of bribery, says Nahaar, is involved in obtaining almost all
government jobs. His observation was supported by another Rajput family who was
trying to get their son, Bhagat, into the CRPF (Central Reseve Police Force). According
to Bhagat's mother, "It takes Rs. 1.5 lakhs for entry. Even near my sister's village in
Neemuch there is a CRPF post but they will also take Rs. 75,000 minimum." 20 These
observations were further supported by the agricultural extension officer of Ranipura, as
well as my own research assistant (who was a suspended clerk in the water resources
department of the Dhar government) who regaled me with stories about the price of
transfers and new appointments in the Dhar district bureaucracy. The main thing that
seems to have changed with the reservations (quota system) is that now scheduled castes
and scheduled tribes have been given an opportunity to bribe whereas earlier only the
financially better off general category (upper caste) applicants could do so. And many of
the former fail to get the posts because they do not have the resources to pay such money
up front.
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State Programs for Adivasis: Handouts
Another approach of the state has focused on giving handouts to poor and
marginalised groups. Despite job reservations for adivasis in government services, most
employees are still upper caste. The main complaint in popular and academic accounts
regarding these schemes is that benefits are usually garnered by upper caste villagers
(Gupta 1998). In addition, my research suggests that even when schemes have been
targeted specifically to adivasi families, they fail because they are poorly planned with
little regard for the actual condition of adivasis, and they are implemented by upper caste
officials who hold patronizing attitudes towards those who are to be helped. Along the
lines suggested by other critics of top-down development (Ferguson 1994, Scott 1998),
this research too, argues that these government schemes represent ineffectual means of
improving the condition of adivasis because adivasis do not participate either in their
formulation or in their implementation.
The story about latrines in Ranipura is an example of such a failed scheme. I
describe how there is a disconnect between upper caste government employees'
expectations of how adivasis should behave and adivasis own behaviour in the
constrained circumstances they find themselves in. According to Ranipura's panchayat
statistics, in 2003, 14 adivasi families in the village have been given material worth Rs.
500 ($12) to make a latrine. Every family was asked to dig a 3-5 feet deep pit near their
house, which almost everyone did. Two farshi (red stone measuring 2x2 feet
approximately) were to be placed side by side covering the pit. One murga (the white
ceramic stone pot which is placed between the two farshi) was fixed to them with
cement. They were given one pipe, 400 bricks (although most families said it was
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between 150 and 250), cement and sand. The bricks were to be laid around the pit walls
to give them stability. It was meant to be a kacchi latrine, i.e., not a flush toilet. The waste
would collect and rot in the pit. The latrine works for about 3 years and when the pit fills
up it has to be closed for 6 months before digging out the pit again.
During interviews with my field assistant in January 2007, two of the 14 families
did not mention that they had been given material to make a latrine; two others
acknowledged it but said the material has all been lost here and there and there is no
latrine. Some said they got the farshi but no murga, others got the murga but nothing
else, still others did not get any bricks and sand, and poor old Budi bua21 got nothing at
all. She told my assistant, "I paid 50 rupees to dig the pit and then had to get it covered
again. Can you ask madam to get me a room-type latrine made [mere ko kamrewali acchi
latrine banva de]?" Jayaram ba and Raju Makwana said that because it was kacchi, the
latrine smelt very bad so they only used it to take a bath and wash clothes. They have
placed the farshis in one corner and have made a covered area with jute bags and plastic
tarp. "If it was a flush latrine we would have used it properly," said Raju. The lone person
who actually built the latrine with his own hard work was Paras Ramji Makwana. He said
he was given 250 bricks, one murga, 2 farshi, and one pipe. Unfortunately for him there
was a drain nearby and the entire 3 feet pit got filled with water. So he had to dismantle
everything.
Ultimately, of the 14 households, not a single family had a latrine during my
fieldwork in 2006. What went wrong? For starters, the panchayat did not give enough
bricks to make a wall around the latrine. The first time I discussed this with him, the
21 Bua is father's sister-she was called that respectfully as she was living in her maternal village.
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Panchayat Secretary [mantri] himself acknowledged, "If we would have given them a
room-type, it may work. In the open area no one will use it." 22 During our next
discussion, he commented, "They would prefer to go out in the fields rather than go in
this type of latrine [Yahan pe nahi jamta, bahar hi jamta hai]. They want the latrine
which costs 5000 rupees to make. ...They sold the farshi and murge [plural] to rich
people in Ranipura. They could have used it. Ladies could have used it. Guests could
have. But they didn't make it."23
Baghelji, the rural agricultural extension officer (RAEO) of Ranipura was also
with us in the meeting with the secretary. We were sitting in the Panchayat office on
broken chairs. The office hadn't been cleaned in weeks. He first commented on the
secretary's tirade-"Can one make a latrine in 500 rupees madam [500 rupaiye mein kya
latrine banti hai madam?" He then informed us that the amount has been increased to
1200 rupees. My field assistant interviewed all the villagers in Ranipura about latrines. 23
households out of 100 had some form of latrine. The average cost of a latrine (both
kacchi and flush) was Rs. 15000. The cheapest was made for Rs. 7000 and the most
expensive was Rs. 22000. Even taking into account inflated reporting, this is a far cry
from 500 rupees and 1200 rupees. It does not seem surprising then that the murge are all
lying on the roof of the adivasi houses. The adivasi households understand that only too
well. Arun Makwana told us, "There was a fund of Rs. 500 to make one latrine. If it was
intended to be of good quality the expense would have been at least Rs. 15000." Even in
the 500 rupee scheme not every family received all the material and equipment it had
expected to get.
22 Interview with Panchayat Secretary, Rangwasa and Ranipura Panchayat, At anganwadi, October 31,
2006.
23 Interview with Panchayat Secretary, Rangwasa and Ranipura Panchayat, November 5, 2006.
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Baghelji had given us a detailed interview about his involvement in the village the
day before. He had told us about another latrine scheme. Under the Village Cleanliness
Scheme [Grameen Swachchata Abhiyaan] 15 adivasi households got 1500 Rs worth of
material to make a flush latrine in Ranipura in 2002. They were given farshi, murga,
pipes, door etc. from the Public Health Department. But even then no one made the
latrine save a handful of people, amongst them Paras Ramji Makwana's elder brother.
Baghelji surmised, "Tribals and SCs [scheduled castes] don't like to go to the bathroom
in a box. They want to go under the sky." He added, "They don't take a bath everyday.
They don't brush their teeth-maybe they chew datun or neem ki lakdi [datun or neem
tree bark were often used in the past to clean teeth]. So there is so much illness. They
don't use soap, maybe they clean their hair with mud,24 a bath means a dip in the pond
[talaab mein dubki]. In my 10 years coming to this village there has been no
improvement [sudhaar]."25
Baghelji was an upper caste Rajput but he was certainly not an idle government
employee. He had made utmost efforts to provide farmers in Ranipura with material and
subsidies from the agricultural department, from agricultural implements, seeds,
pesticides to biogas units and sprinkler systems. During the same interview he described
how he tried to give support to adivasi households at the beginning of his tenure in
Ranipura-but the response was very poor. He complained that they would sell the
objects received to other people involved-for instance, bricks to build a compost pit had
been sold or used to make houses or bathrooms. I saw Baghelji distribute plastic fly traps
to villagers and asked him why he did not give any to the adivasi households. I felt that
24 Before soap and shampoo upper and lower caste women in Ranipura cleaned their hair with a particular
type of mud.
25 Baghelji, November 4, 2006.
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adivasis, who cannot afford to buy expensive pesticides, would benefit most in reducing
pests with these traps. But Baghelji replied that the parents will dump whatever I give
them somewhere and not use it [patak denge] and the kids will then sell the plastic for a
couple of rupees worth of ice candy sticks [gola].
Back at the Panchayat office Baghelji took out some photographs. Two years ago
he had distributed free bullock-related agricultural implements under a government
scheme. I recognized several Makwana family members and other adivasis from
Ranipura in the pictures, proudly standing next to or holding bright green coloured
ploughs, seed drills [tirphan], and rakes [bakkhar and dora]. Baghelji had mentioned this
to me at the start of the 2006 soyabean sowing season but I did not see even one of these
objects being used at the fields. When I asked him about it, he explained, "Most of the
adivasis have very little land. They don't own bullocks. So they rent out a tractor to do
the sowing. ...Since the equipment was free, i.e. it did not require a co-payment from
farmers, everyone took it."
However, during the sowing in 2006 many families used bullocks but not the free
equipment. When I asked them about it, one farmer mentioned that the spacing between
the three teeth of the rake was too wide and he had to take it apart to refashion it in the
way he required to make it usable. The scientifically recommended spacing, which the
rake was manufactured at, was 18 inches, while the farmer had planted his soyabean in
rows separated by 8-12 inches only. Another farmer said that the plough was too heavy
for his not-so-well nourished bullock to pull. It will sow the seed 4 inches deep and not 2
inches as required. I surmised that he could have rented a healthy bullock from a richer
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farmer but he was using his old wooden plough instead.26 Bullocks can usually be rented
for free from a family where one works as a yearly labourer [hali] but not otherwise.
A few months later, at an agricultural fair in Dhar, I had the opportunity to meet
the Senior [Varisht] Agricultural Development Officer (SADO) of Dhar, the head of all
the RAEOs like Baghelji. Four other RAEOs were also present. 27 I mentioned that a
couple of farmers in Ranipura found the iron ploughs and rakes distributed by the
department to be too heavy for their feeble bullocks. The fair also had the stall of the
Agricultural Equipment Department [Yantriki Vibhag] and we asked them about it. One
of them replied that they made it at the designated government weight of 90 kg and
farmers should have strong bullocks who can take the load. "But poor farmers don't have
strong bullocks," I countered, "especially those who are eligible for such a subsidy from
the government. If they did, they would be capable enough of renting a tractor." The
officials there agreed with me that this was a problem. But the SADO expressed his
inability to do anything about it. He said, "We get targets from above [upar se] and the
policy is set from above. We have to distribute it. It is not our responsibility to see if it is
used or not. ... Some farmers sell these things and make money also."
Both these instances display indifference on the part of local government officials
towards the conditions of adivasis. "We cannot take the responsibility," they seem to say.
Planning is done from above and our job is only implementation, they argue. Officials
designing these schemes can find out about actual lived experiences of adivasis from
local officials. But local officials are not empowered to communicate such information
26 Interviews with Ajab bhai Suvan, December 6, 2006 and Arun Makwana, January 12, 2007.
27 Discussion with Dilip Singh More, Varisht Krishi Vikas Adhikari (SADO), Dhar Block and four RAEOs
of Tirla, Ghatabillod, Utavad, and Anaradh, at the Krishi Mela sponsored by Nirala Hindustan, a local
newspaper, October 15, 2006.
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and more importantly, their views are inherently biased against adivasis in general.
Planners themselves may have budgetary or political considerations in mind rather than a
desire for supporting poor adivasis.
The words of the SADO reminded me of a similar conversation I had with
scientists at the Agricultural College in Sehore district and the National Research Centre
for Soyabean in Indore. Scientists were not expected to interact with farmers nor
disseminate their work except through academic publications. They said it is not our
responsibility to ensure that new seed varieties reach farmers in all areas. We are happy
to meet those who come to the institute and extend all support possible to them. It was,
instead, the responsibility of the agricultural department officials, especially those in
extension (like the SADO and RAEOs) to obtain training on new scientific innovations
and information about new varieties and transmit that information to farmers. One of the
primary rationales for scientific research in agriculture is the benefit it is supposed to
bring to farmers, since it is funded by the Ministry of Agriculture and is mostly
undertaken by government-sponsored agricultural research institutes. Yet, scientists are
not accountable to farmers. In practice, their research agenda is not decided on the basis
of farmers' requirements or elicited needs, but rather on their own professionalisation
requirements,28 which are in turn shaped by bureaucratic expectations of performance,
norms of promotions and permanent tenure.29
28 1 owe this insight to Karan Singh Pawar.
29 The lack of incentives for higher performance and the early security of tenure were two points raised by
one scientist as reasons for poor results in government research institutes. He had left his government
position and joined a private pesticide manufacturing firm at the time of the interview. This issue is a much
broader one and this chapter will not go into it in any further detail.
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The following incident about the distribution of water pumpsets to adivasis in the
mountain village of Khandan Buzurg poignantly illustrates how the system fails to meet
the needs of adivasis, and instead, serves the needs of the government employees. These
employees have to meet the targets laid out by the department to justify their work and
obtain their salaries, in an environment where the government is under pressure to show
results while being down-sized at the same time.30 During the rainy season in August
2006 I learnt about an agricultural department meeting in honour of Balram Divas. 31 This
was to celebrate the birthday of Lord Balram who was the brother of Lord Krishna, and
known as the tiller of the soil. His idol is normally shown with a plough. The meeting
was in Jhumki, the block headquarters in which Ranipura was located. Nearly 75% of the
farmers in Jhumki block are adivasis and the meeting was focused on adivasis from the
mountainous villages in the Satpura range, south of Ranipura (around Semlipura where I
visited with Suraj Jat).
About 80-100 adivasi farmers were there, many of them old and withered with
scraggly faces, white hair and large, colourful turbans. A group of young farmers sat
towards the back. Several scientists spoke to the gathering and so did the local Block
Development Officer and Jhumki block officials. It was only when the time for pumpset
distribution came that I realized a large group of about 25 adivasis from one village were
there in the audience only to get their free water pumpset-a monetary benefit of Rs.
20,000. The pumpset or motor was meant for drawing water from wells, canals and
30 This was particularly true during the 10-year regime of Digvijay Singh of the Congress party from 1993-
2003. The BJP government from 2003 onwards has rolled back many of his cost-cutting measures and pro-
adivasi measures, including re-opening hiring into government rolls of upper castes (for the post of patwari
[land-records keeper] and school teachers) and re-forming departments that Digvijay Singh had dissolved.
Phone conversation with Suraj Jat, December 4, 2008.31 It was held on August 25, 2006.
Chapter 3: Yellow Revolution and Adivasi Assertion in Malwa 210
Richa Kumar
rivers. It was not a submersible pump, the kind used in tubewells. The officials had
selected one young man who was to be given the pumpset by the Tirla Janpad Officer, an
adivasi lady. The young man was wearing a bright red shirt, jeans, and sported long hair
like India's current cricketing sensation Mahendra Singh Dhoni.
A young adivasi farmer (sitting on left) being given a free pumpset by the Tirla Block Officer (lady
bending down on the far right) during the Balram Divas meeting organized by the Department of
Agriculture, Dhar district. August 2006. Photo by Richa Kumar
As the photographers crowded around them, the Additional Agricultural
Development Officer announced on the mike, "Please use the pumpset. Do not sell it.
This is a central government scheme. We will come next year and check the serial
number of every pumpset to see if it is still there." I couldn't hide my astonishment. The
department was giving away Rs. 20,000 ($500) worth of material and begging farmers
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not to sell it? Well, it turned out that farmers were not happy with this pumpset. One
farmer asked why they could not be given a submersible pumpset. The officer explained,
"The department only has Rs. 20,000 worth of subsidy and in that you cannot buy a
30,000 rupee submersible pumpset for tubewells." Ironically, in Dhar, tubewell drilling is
not allowed in two blocks because of the over-extraction of ground water (see chapter
one). So the department should not be giving out submersible pumps. But on the other
hand, farmers did not seem to think that these pumpsets were going to be useful. It might
make most practical sense for them sell them for cash. It was precisely such behaviour
that prejudiced upper caste officials like Baghelji. He insisted that during his 10-year
tenure in the village, adivasis had not changed at all. "They are only interested in drink,
madam. They will sell these things and in 8 days they would have finished the money.
They buy mahua [leaves that are brewed into a local intoxicating drink] and make drinks.
All adivasis are in the same condition." 32
Upper caste officials evaluated the behaviour of adivasis by narrowly focusing on
what they did with various objects they received. Such officials did not broaden their
view to question the structure of the agricultural department and their own position
within it in perpetuating policies that only seemed to benefit the department itself.
Instead, they laid the blame squarely upon adivasis themselves and argued that adivasis
did not make serious efforts to improve themselves. In the process, they questioned the
goal of the state to help this group at all (cf. Sharma 2008). Nor did they see the social
and structural constraints faced by adivasi families trying to eke out a living.
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Living Conditions of Adivasis
Despite the programs of the state to improve their condition, adivasis have
remained amongst the poorest of the poor. In the mountain villages in the doonger
[jungle] south of Ranipura, adivasi families lived in houses whose walls were all made of
thin wood covered with thatch and mud plastered on them. I traveled with Suraj Jat, the
Patel of Ranipura, to the villages around Semlipura in August 2006, where he was going
to book his labour for harvest. The whole place was so beautiful with lovely sangwan
[trees] on the mountains, in places where they had not been cleared to make way for
fields. But this lovely view was probably only in the monsoons; after that it must be hot
and dry and dreadful. I was told that plastered mud walls were better than unbaked bricks
because the latter were more easily washed away in the rains. The roof was typically
made of local unbaked tiles [kavelu]. There were very few brick houses. Inside, they
would typically have mud enclosures to store grain and a few utensils. There were very
few other belongings.
These families usually farmed small plots of half a hectare or less of their own in
the mountains. They had encroached upon this land illegally as it was conserved forest
land under the Forest Department. We saw in Semlipura newly felled trees in July. It was
generally done in the monsoon season so that officials did not come to investigate. The
next year that would become a farm. Adivasis would burn the wood and other things on
the land so that the officials would assess their fines for wood loss with leniency. The
land was sloping between 10-40 degrees with very shallow red soil covered by small
stones and pebbles. The cultivation would be done using bullocks, which maneuvered
their way around the tiny sloping plots with the weight of the plough on their backs.
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There were no terraces, just sloping fields. Rain water would wash down the slopes but
according to the adivasi farmers, the small stones would prevent soil erosion so there was
no need to build mud or stone bunds. The output in such plots would be on average 1-2
quintal per bigha and a better plot may yield maximum 3-4 quintal soyabean. Whereas in
Ranipura the average was between 3-4 quintal a bigha and a good plot could yield 5-6
quintal of soyabean.
In 2006, all adivasis in Ranipura lived in kaccha houses without latrines. Their
children were poorly clad and poorly fed. Noses running, clothed in rags, unclean hands
and feet, and protruding bellies was not an uncommon sight. Even at the day care centre
[anganwadi] in the village, adivasi kids below 5 years of age were a heart-wrenching
sight and in striking contrast to the children who went to the private nursery school in the
village.33 There is a clear physical division of the village between adivasi and upper caste
areas. Seemingly, even dogs did not cross this invisible line across either side. In 2006,
the upper caste area had a full cemented road [kharanja], a functioning water tank, two
temples, and a few pacca houses. The adivasi section, known as the tapra, had a muddy
path [keechad] covered with puddles made from uneven footsteps and animal dung. On
either side it was lined with a broken water tank, kaccha houses, and the crumbling
government school, with 80% adivasi enrolment. 34 Small children took out the goats for
grazing in the fields and many of them did not go to school even though it was next door.
33 Two adivasi children went to the private nursery school also and a handful of upper caste children came
to the anganwadi. The latter were definitely better dressed but again, buttons were fallen off or zippers
were not working and at times the dresses were soiled. It was usually a function of how much time and
effort their mothers were able to give to the task of washing clothes, which could only be done by carrying
the entire load to the village pond.
34 The entire village was usually infested with flies, a little more so in the adivasi area. My notebooks have
water stains in most places where I interviewed adivasi families as the roofs leaked in the rains. There were
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With no latrines, adivasis cleaned at the village pond and a particular area near the
tapra always smelled bad. During the summer when the pond dried up they went to the
handful of tubewells that were still functioning to collect drinking water and at times to
bathe and clean. The women cooked on wood fires or used animal dung cakes for fuel.
Some families owned a small number of animals and milk was a rare commodity. During
the day only small children and two old widows were around--the children came back
from the anganwadi by noon. Their parents were both out working as daily labourers
(dahadki).
With the redistribution of grazing land and the introduction of soyabean
cultivation, adivasis in Ranipura have been able to fare much better in the last 40 years.
With cash from the sale of soyabean, and with concrete options for employment outside
the village, at least some adivasis have fulfilled their consumerist aspirations. Since 2006,
items such as motorcycles, mobile phones, and cable television have come to households
in the tapra, and subsequently gone away again as the fortunes of the families who own
them rise and fall. At the same time, most households did not have strong wooden khats
[beds] to sleep on, their roofs were almost always leaking in the monsoons because they
were not replenished with fresh straw and unbaked bricks, and their few personal
possessions such as clothes and shoes would get muddy and wear out within less than a
month of use. Surprisingly, this cyclical nature of ownership extended even to the houses
themselves. It became a common sight to see different tapra houses in various states of
collapse months after having been rebuilt.
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In a conversation with two upper caste Rajput brothers-Dheeraj Singh and
Virendra Singh (who was a farmer)--our discussion ventured towards adivasis. 35 They
said, "20 years ago they were unclean, their environment was unclean. Today they are
still unclean." Dheeraj Singh added, "See their area of the village. They should not be
given seats in the Panchayat. They can't do any good for the village. They do not have
enough to eat and they have been made head of the Parent Teacher Association of the
school [Khane ko nahi hai aur Shikshak Palak sangh ke upadhyaksh bana diye gaye hain
i.e., the school management will be degraded]." I responded by asking them, "There is no
road in their side of the village so how can that area be clean? If there is a road then
automatically cleanliness will come." Dheeraj Singh seemed to agree. He said, "Earlier
when we also didn't have a road we would throw garbage just outside the house."
I asked him "How come there is no road there?" So Dheeraj Singh explained that
the roads have been built in sections. "The funds we got were for this part only. The
section near Suraj Jat's house (covering three adivasi and four Maru families) has been
built with funds obtained from Vikram Verma's MP fund." Suraj Jat, the Patel, had a
special relationship with Verma, who was from the Hindu nationalist BJP party. Suraj
was his right hand man in the Jhumki Block, where Ranipura was situated. Another part
was made using money from the MLA (representative to the state assembly) fund of
Karan Singh Pawar when he was the Congress MLA between 1998 and 2003. A third
part in front of the Rathod houses till the temple was made using money from another
politician, Rajkade. "We asked for money from the MLA [Vidhayak] for building a road
in our area only. The adivasis haven't been involved [jude hue - associated] with the
35 Interview with Dheeraj Singh and Virendra Singh Rathod, Ranipura, August 5, 2006.
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Vidhayaks i.e., helped them in elections etc. They are involved now. Once their
association becomes longer (right now its just 5 years) then they will also get funds for a
road."
After this interaction, I never expected the road in the tapra area to be built any
time soon. But ironically, less than a year later, in April 2007, under the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme, funds from the central government were used to build a
road in the adivasi section of Ranipura. The secretary of Ranipura told me, "I got it
sanctioned because the school teachers used to find it very difficult [aafat aati thi] to get
to school in the rainy season. There was mud [keechad] everywhere." The road made a
huge difference to mobility and cleanliness in the area, especially in the monsoons. But
during the monsoon of 2007, despite the new road or possibly because of drainage issues
relating to it, the entire tapra area was under water for four days.36 The tapra houses were
all situated next to the village pond. The boundary of the pond developed a leak and there
was no other outlet to channel the water away from all the adivasi houses. Several houses
where water remained throughout the monsoon were inhabitable after that. These were
amongst the poorest people in the village who were forced to keep rebuilding their houses
repeatedly.
Neeta and Vijay, two adivasi siblings said that in places like Pithampur, an
industrial town 50 kilometers away, caste discrimination has been reduced a great deal.
Vijay, who works as a mason there, says he goes anywhere in houses of people and even
makes tea in other people's kitchens. In the village, says Neeta, adivasis cannot go into
36 Rama bai, who lived in the tapra, had complained to me earlier that the road had been built without
giving too much thought to the drainage of water in the monsoons. I was not able to find out whether the
flooding was because of the road or due to other reasons.
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the kitchen, the bedroom or the prayer room, else the entire house will have to be cleaned
for purification. Upper caste people won't eat food in a restaurant if they know (from the
symbols, the name, or through word of mouth) that it belongs to a lower caste person. At
tea shops and in houses, the water glass and the tea cup for adivasis is separate. Neeta
adds that education has brought change. So have visits to the city where people get to see
different things. But Ashok Maru, a backward caste farmer who sends his children to the
government school in the village despite being able to afford a private education, and
seems to share sympathies with the adivasis says, "The gap will not close." He had
stopped by Vijay's hut in the adivasi section of the village during our discussion there.
However, the possibilities opened up through democratic politics, as suggested by the
Rathod brothers earlier, have given an alternative avenue for adivasis to make claims
upon the state for obtaining benefits and improving their well-being. In the next section, I
discuss the participation, or lack thereof, of adivasis in this arena in Madhya Pradesh.
Absence of Independent Political Mobilisation
Despite consistent discrimination against adivasis and their state of poverty,
Malwa has not witnessed independent political mobilization by adivasi groups against
upper castes or against the state. Adivasis are nearly 20% of the population of Madhya
Pradesh and in some parts of western Malwa and Nimar they form 60% of the total
population. Non-political movements such as the Narmada Bachao Andolan, which was
fighting against the building of the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada river have been
restricted to the Nimar plains and the hill adivasis in Jhabua district. It has also
disintegrated in the last few years after adverse judgements by the Supreme Court of
India leading to submergence of large areas (Baviskar 2004: 276). The Khedut Mazdoor
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Chetna Sangath has been focused amongst the hill adivasis of Jhabua. But in the plains of
Malwa, most adivasi leaders have been co-opted by the two main political parties in the
state-the Congress and the BJP (Pai 2004). Even adivasis who are elected from reserved
constituencies (where only an adivasi can contest elections) enter the fray on a ticket
from one of the two political parties (Jaffrelot 1998, Gupta 2005). Kela (2003) argues that
the tiny adivasi elite that is able to take advantage of reservations is co-opted by the state
and resistance from the mass of the poor adivasis is thus, resisted and defused.
Madhya Pradesh was created in 1956 with everything that was left over after the
linguistic reorganization of the states around it. It was a fractious union of leftover areas
made up of princely states in Malwa and Bundelkhad, and some tribal areas in the
erstwhile Central Provinces, termed Mahakoshal and Chattisgarh (which became an
independent state in 2000). Even this division of the state does not do justice to the
variety of geographies, crops, rainfall patterns, ecology, culture, language, and food that
make up Madhya Pradesh. Debates about dividing the state into political units have
illustrated the continued influence of administrative divisions from the colonial era-
many erstwhile rulers of princely states are still active politicians from the state37 -
crosscutting against cultural and ecologically cohesive regions, thus discouraging the
formation of contiguous units of adivasi affinity (Jaffrelot 1996a, Rahul 1996a, Rahul
1996b, Jaffrelot 1996b).
A tribal political party, the Gondwana Ganatantra Party (GGP) was formed in
eastern Madhya Pradesh and fought in several elections since the 1990s, even winning a
37 Digvijay Singh hailed from Raghogarh, Arjun Singh from Churhat, Madhav Rao Scindia and his son
Jyotiraditya Scindia from Gwalior, Karan Singh Pawar from Dhar, Tukoji Rao Pawar from Dewas, Shankar
Pratap Singh from Chattarpur, and Rajvardhan Singh from Dattigaon in Badnavar (Press Trust of India
2003).
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few seats (Ramshankar 2004). But the adivasis of the eastern part, the Gonds, are
different in their cultural, social, ecological histories from the adivasis of Malwa and
Nimar, the Bhils and Bhilalas, in the western part of the state (Baviskar 2005, Guha
2007). Moreover, party politics in Madhya Pradesh has seen endemic and endless
factionalism within all its political parties. Even the tribal GGP broke up into factions
early in 2008, possibly engineered by some Congress leaders, and has not been able to
increase its influence beyond eastern Madhya Pradesh (Ray 2008, Ghosh 2008).
With the redistribution of land to labouring adivasi families in parts of Malwa
during the tenure of various Congress governments, they have consistently been a
Congress votebank. The adivasis of Ranipura remember Mrs. Indira Gandhi as "the one
who did something for us." Neeta and Vijay Mana, young adivasi siblings whose
grandparents had benefited from a 2 bigha allotment emphasized her importance to me,
"Indira Gandhi is raising us. She gave us land, she gave us subsidized food through ration
shops, all is given by her [Indira Gandhi paal rahi hai-patta diya, anaj aa raha hai
control se, sab Indira Gandhi ke den hai]." Neeta got married a few years ago and has
one daughter. Vijay is about 18 years old and is working as a mason in Pithampur (the
industrial township or Special Economic Zone in Dhar district). He adds, "Her son [Rajiv
Gandhi] was good too." He hasn't heard the name of the current MLA (Member of
Legislative Assembly of Madhya Pradesh) of Dhar or whether he ever came to visit the
village. But all they need to know is, as Neeta puts it, "If/When you vote, stamp on the
symbol of the hand (the Congress party symbol) [vote dena haath ko punja mein dena]."
But since the late 1980s, the BJP made several efforts to change the scenario.
Although Malwa had traditionally been a BJP stronghold, especially in urban areas like
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Indore and Ujjain where trading castes were historically powerful, the party was weak in
rural areas. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) pracharaks played an important
role in popularizing gods like Hanuman and Ram from the Hindu pantheon and
celebrating festivals like Ganesh Chaturthi and Navratri in the hill areas of Jhabua
(Baviskar 2005). During a visit to the mountain villages around Semlipura in Dhar
district with Suraj Jat we passed by various people he knew-the greeting was "Ram
Ram" and not "Namaskar." 38 Suraj told us that a lot of work has been done in this region
to introduce adivasis to Ram and Hanuman. They did not know about these gods earlier,
he explained, and said he was very proud of the work done by the BJP and RSS to
promote Hinduism.39 Increasingly, the mobilization of adivasis through political parties
in the 1990s started taking place around issues of religion rather than caste and
socioeconomic deprivation (Baviskar 2005).
Known as doonger ka neta [politician of the jungle], Suraj Jat and his late father
had always been with the BJP. The horns of his bullocks in Ranipura were coloured in
the colours of the BJP's party flag. His 12-year old younger son, I was told, burned all
Congress posters and leaflets that he found. Vikram Verma, a Jat farmer from
Dharmapuri in Dhar district was elected on a Jan Sangh ticket to the state legislative
assembly from Dhar constituency for the first time in 1977, right after the Emergency
imposed by Indira Gandhi was lifted. Later the Jan Sangh was re-christened as the BJP.
Verma lost the elections in 1985 but won again in 1990 and 1993. Suraj aggressively
campaigned for him in the adivasi villages in the mountains for every election in the
38 Amita Baviskar has described the rituals of Bhilala adivasis in her area of research in Jhabua district.
These were usually related to spirits and gods with a strong connection to nature and the physical
landscape. The Bhils of Semlipura may have different rituals but these would also be largely associated
with natural phenomena.
39 August 3, 2006.
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1990s, spending his own money traversing the villages around Semlipura several times.
He considered Verma, who is from the same caste, to be his mentor and obtained benefits
for Ranipura through Verma's MLA fund including a water tank and part of a paved road
in front of his house (discussed above).
During the 2003 elections, despite Hindutva or Hindu nationalism not becoming a
major poll issue in other parts of Madhya Pradesh (Manor 2004), the fate of the
Bhojshala, a historic structure in the heart of Dhar town, became the focus of debate in
Dhar. The Bhojshala, literally translated as the University of Bhoj is said to have been
built during the reign of King Bhoj of the Parmar dynasty in the 12th century. It is a
rectangular shaped open space covered with red sandstone tiles and encircled on all sides
by a pillared corridor. In the middle is a small square platform. On one side of the
rectangle there is a larger assembly hall with a set of stairs leading to a small pulpit, and
an alcove where, it is presumed, a small two-feet statue made of eight metals [ashtdhatu]
of Goddess Saraswati stood. She is the goddess of learning. The statue is housed in the
Royal Museum of London today. Once a year on the festival of Basant Panchami, Hindus
congregated at the Bhojshala to offer prayers for the birth of Goddess Saraswati.
In the 1950s, Muslims of Dhar were given the privilege of holding prayers in the
then empty, decrepit Bhojshala premises every Friday by the Dewan, Shri Nadkar, of the
late Raja Anand Rao Pawar because the dargah next to the Bhojshala had become too
small for the faithful to offer prayers. With the rise of the Ayodhya Ram Mandir issue 40
as a point of mobilization by the BJP in the early 1990s, the Bhojshala became the
40 A temple in Ayodhya, in Uttar Pradesh, the birthplace of Lord Ram, had been razed to the ground and a
mosque built on the site by the Mughal emperor Babur in the 16t century. The BJP's followers demolished
the mosque in 1992 and built a makeshift temple on the spot. Today the site is a disputed structure.
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Ayodhya of Madhya Pradesh. The BJP called for halting all Muslim prayers in the
premises of the Bhojshala and started several agitations to make their point heard. In
1995, Digvijay Singh, the Congress chief minister banned the entry of Hindus into the
Bhojshala altogether, except on Basant Panchami day. Muslims were only allowed to
enter on Fridays. The Bhojshala issue remained a focal point for mobilization by the RSS,
and in 2002, it was opened for Hindus to pray every Tuesday.
In the 2003 elections the BJP successfully made this an important election plank.
Uma Bharati, the charismatic leader of the party pledged in the election manifesto to
bring back the statue of Goddess Saraswati from London and install it in the Bhojshala.
According to Karan Singh Pawar, the Congress candidate from Dhar constituency who
lost the election to the BJP, a remark by the Congress chief minister Arjun Singh that the
Bhojshala was a mosque, was an important factor in his loss.4 1
In 2006, the festival of Basant Panchami fell on a Friday creating a conflict with
both Hindus and Muslims desiring to offer prayers in the Bhojshala. Although the BJP
ruled over Madhya Pradesh, since 2004 the Congress party and its allies had formed the
central government in Delhi. Amidst threats by the Congress to impose President's rule
and dissolve the elected BJP government if Muslims were not allowed to say prayers or if
riots broke out, the BJP government had its hands tied. In the ensuing drama, the state
BJP government was forced to orchestrate a short reading of Muslim prayers alongside
day-long Hindu prayers all the while trying to quell a riot amongst thousands of Hindu
villagers who had congregated outside the Bhojshala from all over the district. The
41 In the 2008 elections, Hindutva has once again risen to the top of the agenda of all parties with the arrest
of a priestess with suspicious links to terrorist activities (CNN-IBN 2008). Uma Bharati, who broke away
from the BJP and floated her own Bharatiya Jan Shakti Party, offered an election ticket to the priestess for
the assembly polls (Times of India 2008).
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participants of the "Chalo Bhojshala" [March to the Bhojshala] campaign were lathi-
charged by the police and had to beat a hasty retreat. Amongst them were 10 villagers
from Ranipura along with a few hundred adivasis from the mountain villages, all led by
Suraj Jat. He had been working on the advice of Vikram Verma, who was by 2006 the
Rajya Sabha MP from Dhar constituency and had shifted his base to Delhi. Mobilisation
of adivasis for the BJP cause seems to have been taken up strongly by Suraj Jat, as is
suggested by the story of the Ram temple in Ranipura.
In 2000, Ranipura villagers, led by Suraj Jat starting collecting funds to renovate
the Ram temple in the village. They had done it for the Tejaji temple, the temple of the
snake god revered by the Jats, in the 1990s. Renovation of temples is an activity
conducted in many Malwa villages but is usually conducted by upper caste villagers.
Lower castes and adivasis are generally barred from entry to temples and their
participation in rebuilding activities is not encouraged. In Ranipura, however, the activity
was not restricted to upper caste villagers, as is the usual case, but adivasis and lower
castes were also included. Villagers give a small share of soyabean and wheat to the
collective pool each year to fund this initiative. The money collected is then disbursed as
loans to all villagers at 24% per annum, an interest rate equivalent to informal money
lending rates in Malwa. 42 Every year the money is returned and then re-loaned to keep the
fund going. The entire village participates in the temple fund, contributing money and
borrowing and returning loans, in what is proudly and moralistically claimed as an "[all-
inclusive] village activity [gaon ka karya]."
42 This amount, while seemingly high, compared favourably with rates charged by moneylenders, which
could range from 24%-60% per annum. Such high interest rates are a primary mechanism which helps keep
lower castes and other poor villagers in a weaker economic position and makes it more difficult for them to
recover from financial losses.
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It is deeply surprising that adivasis have been included in contributing money for
a temple where they are not allowed access for holding or attending religious events. The
younger generation can sit on the main platform [otla] without objection during secular
events, such as a meeting called by the agricultural department. But they are usually
barred from sitting at the temple to attend or hold religious events. For instance, a faith-
based movement known as Swadhyay that was started in Ranipura by upper caste
Rajputs, held weekly religious meetings at the Ram temple. Initially when only upper
castes were involved, there was no difficulty in the location. When the movement started
to include adivasis, those upper castes not associated with Swadhyay raised objections to
adivasis sitting at the temple. This was compounded by the fact that two of the most
vehement disapprovers lived right next to the Ram temple and would create a scene
whenever adivasis came to the meeting. Consequently, a separate meeting schedule was
created specifically for adivasi men and women and was conducted in one of the adivasi
houses in the tapra.43
Similarly, during Ganesh Chaturthi, one of the most important festivals in Malwa,
the upper caste palanquin housing an idol of Lord Ganesh was given a place of honour at
the Ram temple. Adivasis living in the tapra never came by to the upper caste side to
pray. Instead, they had built their own Ganesh palanquin which sat in the middle of
adivasi households. Only one set of the Makwana adivasi households whose houses were
contiguous to the main village and who were amongst the financially better off adivasis
in the village, were allowed to pray in front of the upper caste Ganesh palanquin as it
43 Interview with Seema Rathod, Ranipura, October 17, 2007.
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traversed through their locality in a procession around the village. The upper caste
palanquin did not go towards the tapra at all.
Suraj Jat was the one who got the adivasis and the scheduled castes involved in
the Ram temple fund. One explanation I was given was that this would help the money to
multiply faster-at least with the involvement of some of the better-off households. I was
surprised to learn that in 2006, the share of the total temple fund taken on loan by adivasi
and lower caste families was 30%, which was a huge amount considering that their
religious involvement in the temple was minimal. On the other hand, there were
suggestions from some upper caste villagers that Suraj Jat had involved the adivasis
because he was trying to cultivate a BJP vote bank in the village. Historically, adivasis
were staunch Congress supporters because, as they said, Indira Gandhi was the one who
gave them land with rightful ownership. Suraj provided young adivasis in the village with
funds to participate in an acrobatic festival and took them to acrobatic contests in BJP
coloured T-shirts. He supported their requests for loans, lent them agricultural equipment,
and provided his thresher to them for threshing their soybean and wheat. And he had
mobilized some of them to go with him to the Bhojshala in 2006.
On one hand, by attaching them to the temple fund, Suraj Jat enabled a guaranteed
source of low interest 44 credit for adivasis and lower castes. Everyone was loaned out at
least some amount of money regardless of one's credit rating. But on the other hand, this
has created another form of liability. Villagers knew that when they return the money
each year, they get it back the very next day as a new loan. Thus, many of them simply
44 The 24 percent per annum interest rate is the norm in Ranipura and Dhar, with professional
moneylenders charging from 36% to 60% per month. Most adivasis would not qualify for loans from
government cooperative banks at interest rates of 12-15% per annum and this was the next best source of
credit.
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borrowed the amount owed to the temple fund from other sources for one day and
returned it the next day at some mutually agreed upon rate of interest. Poor villagers,
especially adivasis, thus, ended up being in debt without having any money to show for
it. Moreover, with the opposition expressed by some upper castes regarding continued
contributions of adivasis and lower castes, it is not clear at all whether all adivasis will
obtain egalitarian access to the renovated temple once it is actually built. Financial
involvement provides adivasis with a rationale for demanding equal access and
potentially breaking through the hierarchies of caste. Yet at the same time, the temple
fund has created new opportunities for domination of some of the poorest adivasis and
lower castes within spirals of debt.
With the mobilization of dalits in the neighbouring state of Uttar Pradesh, where
the dalit chief minister Mayawati has become a formidable national-level politician, and
of lower castes in Bihar with several political groups challenging upper caste power, poor
and marginalized groups in some regions have been able to raise a voice independently
against upper caste discrimination. But the adivasis of Madhya Pradesh have not raised a
collective voice against deprivation and upper caste discrimination in the state, with most
adivasi leaders having been co-opted by upper caste leaders. Ramachandra Guha has
surmised that since most adivasis do not live alongside upper castes in plains villages,
they cannot influence vote bank politics in a large majority of constituencies the way
dalits can and, consequently, political leaders have little to offer them in return (Guha
2007).
In the next section, I argue that one unintended consequence of the introduction of
soyabean has given adivasis of the hills and the plains an avenue for asserting themselves
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in relationships with upper castes even apart from formal political movements. I also
suggest, however, that even though adivasi leaders have been co-opted by upper caste
political groups, the space of democratic politics provides a crucial arena of struggle
where adivasis can act on the possibility of making the state accountable to them by using
the language of development as entitlement. One example is the successful pushing of the
state to implement programs such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme,
which, in combination with the changes brought about by the yellow revolution, has
given more teeth to the agency of marginalized groups in Madhya Pradesh.
Creating an Economy of Haste
In this section I describe an alternative arena of struggle where adivasis assert
themselves and make demands for their rights and well-being upon upper caste farmers
through circumstances created by the yellow revolution. State-promoted schemes and
policies for the development of adivasi groups, which I discussed earlier in the chapter,
do not recognize this arena as an important platform where adivasis wage an annual
struggle fairly successfully for higher wages during the soyabean harvest.
What I call an 'economy of haste' is created every year at the soyabean harvest
due to a combination of non-human actors such as technical characteristic of the
soyabean crop, rain, characteristics of mechanized equipment, and the soil. These agents
constrain the actions of farmers of all categories-big, small, rich, poor, low caste,
adivasi, upper caste-giving a window of opportunity to labourers who are primarily
adivasis to turn the tables. The labour of the adivasis of Malwa and Nimar is crucial to
making the soyabean economy of Malwa work. Every year at the soyabean harvest
thousands of adivasis travel from various parts of Nimar, Dhar, and Jhabua to cut the
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soyabean in the fields of Malwa. Against a history of marginalization (Sundar 1997,
Baviskar 1995) and the recent informalisation and casualisation of adivasi labour
(Breman 1996, 2007: 416-420), Harriss-White 2003), the 'economy of haste' is an
anomaly when adivasis all throughout Malwa and Nimar are able to assertively negotiate
the terms of work and relationships with potential employers (farmers) compared to other
times of the year.
Once soyabean matures, some varieties, more than others, exhibit the quality of
shattering. As soon as the seeds in the pod mature, the leaves of the plant fall off and the
stem dries up. If the crop is not cut within a few days, the pod becomes too dry and
cracks open. This is known as shattering. The seeds inside it fall to the ground, and are
almost impossible to recover, even by labourers or little children who spend time
gleaning the field, i.e. picking up left over soyabean stalks with pods on them.45 This
necessitates immediate harvesting of soyabean as soon as it has matured, unlike other
crops such as wheat.
The obvious option in such a situation would be using a harvester machine. In
Malwa, the shift to large-scale soyabean cultivation took place in the late 1980s and
1990s when mechanized equipment such as tractors and harvesters were becoming
widely available.46 Such equipment came to be used despite the fragmented nature of
45 Little children, especially adivasi and lower caste, as young as 3-4 years old, look forward to gleaning
soyabean from fields once they are cut. Their parents help them thresh the small bundles of soyabean stalks
and with the money, the children go to Dhar with their parents and buy new clothes and firecrackers for the
festival of Diwali which follows the harvest.
46 In 1985, nearly 90% of farming was done by bullocks according to Vignesh Singh Rathod. He bought the
second tractor in the village in 1995. The first was bought by Suraj Jat. Before that tractors from nearby
villages were rented by villagers from Ranipura (Interview, May 4, 2006).
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Indian farms and the large number of small and marginal farmers.47 By the late 1990s,
almost 100% of the farmland, in places like Ranipura and the rest of Malwa, was under
soyabean cultivation, leaving very little for grassland. Farmers recalled that prior to
mechanization, they were unable to farm large areas-bullocks were not enough to
manage a large cultivated area. Use of tractors for sowing, weeding, and pesticide
spraying helped increase cultivation. But harvesters faced major obstacles in their use.
According to Suresh Patel, owner of one himself, around 2000-2001 there were at
least 9 harvesters in a 20-25 km region around Ranipura. By 2006, only six remained.
The harvester boom was five years ago, he explained. Many machines had been
purchased on financing from private companies. He bought his for Rs. 850,000 whereas
today the cost has increased to Rs. 1.1 million. Initially they charged Rs. 1000 a hectare
for cutting and threshing soyabean. Today the rate is Rs. 1400 a hectare-not much of an
increase. The rates did not go up because of excessive competition amongst harvester
owners in the region, according to Suresh Patel, and especially against machines
travelling down the country from Punjab. "Some cut at 100 Rs a bigha [1/4fi hectare],
some at 80 Rs, and some just upon payment of the cost of diesel. Most were running
under loss since 2001 when a drought hit the region. Since then harvesters stopped
making money." The consecutive years of drought reduced incomes and "many
47 Indian farm land is one of the most heterogeneous and physically divided spaces one could imagine.
Very few of the large landowners-that 30% segment of farmers which owns and operates more than 2
hectares of land-have their entire land in one place. It is usually scattered across the village fields in three,
maybe four, possibly many more small plots. For instance, the 21 hectares of Suraj Jat, the largest
landowner in Ranipura village, comprised more than 10 smaller plots ranging from 1 to 5 hectares each.
One of the main reasons for this is sub-division of land of equal quality amongst sons upon inheritance of
land. If 10 hectares are in two different parts of the village, and half is good quality soil while the other half
is poor, then both plots will be equally divided amongst the sons to ensure each gets some part of the good
quality land along with the poor quality one [pathrili zameen]. Further, although farmers prefer to buy or
take on lease plots of land next to the boundary of their own fields, many times this is not possible. Those
farmers who cultivated land entirely in one area were able to complete their farming tasks much quicker
compared to those who had to go in two or three different directions.
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harvesters were sold off because people didn't want to run a business on loss." 4 8 But the
competition was the least of the problems.
First, all mechanized equipment like tractors and harvesters cannot be used in wet
fields. 49 If it rains just before or during harvest in October, and there is a fair chance of
rain since this is usually the end of the monsoon, then the tyres of these machines will not
be maneuverable in the wet soil until the sun can dry it out enough. There is a risk that
the soyabean will shatter before the soil can completely dry out. In the first week of
October 2006, the harvest in Ranipura was all being done by labourers by hand because it
was too wet in the fields for harvesters to come in.
Second, the soyabean plant has to be completely dry else the sap in the stem sticks
in the machine and spoils the soyabean. Moreover, "the entire field has to be at the same
level of dryness else the harvester will get stuck," says Suraj Jat, the patel of Ranipura
village and the largest farmer in Ranipura. 50 If you wait for the wet plants to dry, then the
plants that have already dried may shatter.
Third, in some soyabean varieties such as JS-71-05 soyabean pods grow on the
stem starting from less than 6 inches above the ground. Harvesters cut at least 1 or 1.5
48 Interview with Suresh Patel from Tomod and Mohanlalji, Rangwasa, October 15, 2006.
49 Although tractors and harvesters became common in many villages, the fact that soyabean is a rainy
season crop created a major hurdle in their use. In the soyabean season of 2006, farmers with tractors were
not able to get them into the fields at all after July. Ever since the continuous rain started on 19 h July, it
didn't stop for a month and even after that it rained every few days not allowing the ground or the
surrounding pathways to completely dry up. Farmers couldn't use the tractor to spray pesticide, nor could
they use it for weeding (dora chalana). They had to hire labourers for both these tasks. As all large farmers
in the area around Ranipura were in the same situation, they ended up paying a higher rate to labourers, and
thus, excluded the medium and small farmers from being able to hire labourers at all.
50 Interview with Suraj Jat, Ranipura, October 5, 2006. Soyabean can be manually cut even if it is still a
little wet and all the leaves have not fallen off because it can be left in small heaps to dry in the field under
the hot sun before being bundled up for threshing a few days later.
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feet above the ground level so farmers planting short varieties stand to lose some
percentage of the soybean.
Fourth, and the most commonly expressed problem, is the loss of fodder
[bhoosa]. Currently available harvesters scatter the chopped remains of the soy plant all
over the field (although in wheat there seems to have been innovation to collect the
fodder in a separate compartment). 51 Those farmers who rear animals require fodder and
prefer hand-cutting and stationary threshing of the crop. Usually they are medium and
small farmers who keep animals for milk and farm operations. Their own family labour is
enough to cultivate the land they own using bullocks. They save on tractor rent and are
able to complete farming operations such as sowing, weeding, etc., according to their
own schedule without having to wait around for the tractor to become available. For these
operations they may employ some local labour on a daily basis as and when required. But
at harvest, even these middling farmers require more than family labour to cut their
soyabean in time to avoid shattering.
Large farmers with 20-40 hectares, too, will get at least 3-5 hectares cut by hand
to obtain fodder for the animals they own. 52 Greater availability of tractors has decreased
the need to keep many animals, especially bullocks, for the richest farmers and the
poorest ones. The former use their own tractors for farming and unless they have a side
business of milk or dairy products, such households have over time reduced the number
of animals they own. The poorest farmers rent tractors for farming operations such as
5 The fodder scattered all over the field has to either be burned or ploughed in. If you burn it then the land
becomes hard and the moisture in the soil at the end of the monsoons goes away. So one has to irrigate
before sowing wheat and this increases the cost. Farmers for whom irrigation costs are very high burn the
field only if it there is less water available anyway and they won't be sowing this year according to a group
of farmers in Ranipura (discussion at Tejilal Maru's shop, Ranipura, September 11, 2006).52 Discussion at Tejilal Maru's shop, Ranipura, September 11, 2006.
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sowing because they cannot afford to feed bullocks all year long although they may keep
a goat or a cow for milk. But the need for fodder has to be balanced with the need for
expediting the harvest.
With the rapid expansion of soyabean cultivation to almost every cultivable piece
of land in the villages of Malwa during the 1990s, and with the coming together of the
weather, the technical characteristic of shattering of soyabean, and the difficulty of using
mechanized equipment available, an atypical "economy of haste" came to be formed at
the soyabean harvest for a very short period of time. The pressures of time and financial
loss bearing upon farmers temporarily ruptured the traditional power structure of the
farmer-labourer relationship. In 2006, the sowing of the entire village fields was
completed within a space of 3-5 days so Gautam Singh Rathod said that farmers expected
to face more labour problems at harvest since the soyabean would all mature at the same
time. Village labour is never enough to complete the task53 so for a few weeks during
harvest, thousands of adivasi labourers come to cut the soyabean of Malwa from the
farthest parts of Nimar and Jhabua, in southern and western Madhya Pradesh. Every bus
is overloaded with passengers hanging onto the sides and sitting on the roof, dangerously
tilting it to one side as it traverses the mountain passes on its way to the Malwa plateau.
These adivasis came in groups with entire families traveling together and children
tagging along with their parents, leaving them out of school. Adivasi labourers from
outside stay in a farmer's field pitching plastic tents (made out of empty fertilizer bags
53 In Ranipura, not enough labour is available within the village. Out of 100 households, 32 households
(about 75 men, women, and adult children) own some land but also hire themselves out as labour. Fifty-
seven households hire labour at the time of harvest. As most labour in Ranipura is not landless, they need
3-4 days to finish their own harvest depending on how close to shattering is their own soyabean. Two
households are completely landless and 9 households have leased out or mortgaged their entire land. They,
too, hire themselves out as labour.
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stitched together) or at times just sleep out in the open, the place being known as the
'dera'. In 2006 October, the main dera in Ranipura hosted almost 100 people. The
adivasis brought with them thin blankets, a sheet, a few clothes, and cooking utensils.
The farmer who hired them was to provide firewood, water cans, and sometimes, wheat.
The women would get up by 4 am, clean at the local pond or nearby well (if there was
water in it), go to the toilet in the open behind some bushes, and come back to the dera
and cook the morning and afternoon meal of corn bread and lentils [makke ki roti and
chowli or moong dal], which they would have brought along with them. They would
carry the bread in a cloth [potli] and leave for work by 7 am. At 8 they would start cutting
the soyabean and would break between 1-2 pm for lunch.
By 6 pm in the evening they would come back to the dera, the women would light
up the fires again and make bread [rotis] by hand for the night and cook vegetable [sabzi]
if they had plucked any and got it back from the farmer's fields. They might also make a
liquid chick pea flour [besan] soup. One lady would usually cook for 3 to 5 persons and
one wood fire [chulah] would be shared by 2-3 families. Most of those who came were
close relatives of each other. There was very rarely, if at all, any outsider in the group.
The men would hang out at the dera or go to the village shops and buy bidi [local
cigarettes] and tobacco. Young boys and girls would come to get puffed rice cakes [pohe]
and sweetmeats [jalebi] when it was being made fresh at one shop in Ranipura. Women
would purchase sugar, corn [makka], and rice for cooking. Each labourer would have a
credit account at the shop which would be settled on the last day of accounts [hisaab]
with the farmer on whose field he or she worked. During the last few days when all the
cutting was over, the shops would also buy soyabean gleaned by the labourers from the
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fields, at cheaper rates of 9 rupees a kg, when the rates in the Dhar mandi [market yard]
were almost Rs. 13 a kg.
Young children, as small as one or two years old would be taken care of by an
older child during the day-either at the dera or next to the field where the parents would
be cutting. Most of them would be malnourished because their main diet was only maize.
They would rarely have milk or fresh vegetables with vitamins and other nutrients in their
diet. By 7 pm these kids would be sleeping half on a blanket and half fallen over on bare
soil of the field. In the 2006 harvest, as I walked through the groups of people in the
starry twilight, it was impossible to see where to step or to navigate a path between
people. With no light to guide me except for the cooling embers from the cooking fires, I
could have stepped on a sleeping child, or a hot cooking pan, a fire dying out, or a stone,
or even food. Eating the evening meal, cleaning up and settling down would take almost
till 10 pm when everyone finally fell asleep. Despite these poor living conditions,
adivasis displayed an assertive spirit in negotiating terms and conditions of wages and
work with farmers taking full advantage of the "economy of haste."
Chapter 3: Yellow Revolution and Adivasi Assertion in Malwa 235
Richa Kumar
A group of adivasi labourers from Bhediya and Kamta villages at the Ranipura adivasi dera in October
2006. Photo by Richa Kumar
Opportunity for Group Negotiation by Labourers
In Ranipura, several such groups were working for different farmers during the
harvest. Farmers prided themselves on maintaining long term relationships with such
groups and in ensuring that the group returned each year during the harvest. Medium and
large farmers went to negotiate with adivasi groups outside the village to come at harvest.
They usually went around the festival of Rakhi,54 in August, and gave an advance to the
head of a group of 10-12 labourers. This was to book the person and his group for
October. Rakhi is a time when money and resources are in short supply so people need
54 Rakhi is a festival where girls tie a band on their brother's wrist to symbolize the brother-sister bond and
brothers pledge to help and protect their sisters. Brothers are expected to give gifts in cash and kind to their
sisters. In villages, it is a time when brothers come to take their married sisters back to their natal village.
This is one of the handful of socially sanctioned avenues for married women to go meet their own parents
and family and for her family to give her personal spending money.
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the advance money--the soyabean is yet to ripen and the wheat harvested in March has
all been consumed.
Adivasi groups have bargaining power over upper caste farmers in these
interactions. They can refuse to come in October when the farmer comes to call them and
can ask for more money as advance. They can also ask for more money per day once they
reach the harvest site, saying that another farmer has offered them 10 rupees more or that
others in the village have been offered a higher rate. They may also not show up. Stories
abound of labouring groups going to another farmer who picks them up in his trolley
from the bus stop "enticing" them with more money. Or of labourer groups taking
advances from more than one farmer and finally ending up at a third place altogether. In
2006 in Ranipura, 3-4 farmers had to run around at the last minute finding replacement
labour for those who did not turn up. Farmers in the village, whose own harvesting was
over, lent their labouring groups to others. Such exchanges were generally within families
or with those with whom one had good personal relations. Labourers usually acquiesced
to such requests because they earned extra money unless they were in a hurry to return to
their village to cut their own soyabean.
Farmers are typically on the back foot in such interactions. They are worried
about the shattering of their soyabean and losing a great deal of money. Ajit Singh
Rathod, for instance, had given his 2.2 hectares on piece rate to an adivasi family in
Ranipura itself. The head of the family was not in the village for a few days and the
family delayed the cutting. Because of that Ajit Singh estimated that almost one quintal
of soyabean had shattered in the field. He lamented that he lost 1500 Rs. worth of
soyabean and he would have to pay 1500-2000 Rs. extra during the wheat season to
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labourers for weeding the field and getting rid of all the unwanted soyabean that would
grow.55 For a large farmer, the costs can be much higher if there is any form of delay by
labourers.
To avoid such situations, farmers go to great lengths to maintain good
relationships with their labouring groups. Many pride themselves on calling the same
group to harvest for them for years together. Suraj Jat ensures that his own contracted
labourers reach Ranipura by sending his tractor trolley all the way to their village
Semlipura, 30 kilometers away, in the mountainous jungle to pick them up and drop them
off. At end of work he also gives them flour, lentils, animal dung fuel [atta, dal, gobar ke
kande], ghee, money for liquor etc., and they go after freshening up at his well. The head
of his labourer group, affectionately known as Pawna (son-in-law), was also sitting with
us during this discussion. He told us that a farmer from Kachrod offered them Rs 125 a
day per person to go with him. Pawna said "no, even if you give us 200 Rs. we won't go
with you." Pawna had a long term relationship with Suraj Jat and it would take a great
deal of effort to break their trust. He added, "Those who say Rs. 120 in the beginning
don't give that amount after the work is done. They give excuses saying that is not the
going rate in my village." 56
Gajendra Singh, a farmer with 2 hectares of land, described to me the efforts
required to maintain a good working relationship with labour. He only hires labourers
from the village. "Why spend Rs. 200 going outside to get labourers," he asks? At the
field, "as labourers cut different rows of soyabean and someone falls behind, I cut with
him to encourage him along. I give them tobacco, beedi (local cigarettes) at the field and
55 Interview with Ajit Singh, Ranipura, October 17, 2006.
56 Interview with Suraj Jat and Pawna, Ranipura, October 5, 2006.
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later 10- 20 rupees for liquor." On the day of the interview, it was around 5 pm and all his
fields had been cut. He told us that his wife has ordered the labourers not to leave and to
collect the piles of soyabean and stack them in one place. The workers seemed restless.
He salvaged the situation. "I put it [dhalna] in a nice way. I explained to them that if they
leave now, the labourers on others' fields will also stop working. So they should stay
back and collect all the bundles until 6 pm." If someone comes to the shop he runs in the
village asking for something on loan, he adds, "I ask them to cut two bales of grass in
return. They do not refuse." He says he goes to labourers houses to placate them
[manaana] (Oct 7, 2006). He doesn't insist on quick repayment [hisaab] and behaves in a
good manner [accha vyavahaar] with people. If they cannot pay now then they can pay
after the next wheat season or if not then the next soyabean season. There is no rush of
returning money.57
Farmers like Gautam Singh Rathod, who owns 2 hectares of land and leases in
another hectare, usually give advance money to people in the village itself to book them
for harvest. "Richer farmers get labour from outside because there are not enough
numbers in the village and they need almost 20 people at a time. My nephew will get
[labour] from outside but I have given advance to 20 people in the village itself." Gautam
Singh gives money in the rains, in summer and for weddings. He needs 40 labour days in
total and if he gets 10 persons each day then his work is over in 4 days. On the first day
57 On November 29, 2006, I met Gajendra Singh in the mandi. This was the end of the soyabean season and
the start of the sowing of wheat. He said "right now wheat is not available. It is 13 -14 Rs per kg. There is
nothing extra with farmers to lend to others. During the wheat harvest season the price is not more than Rs.
7 per kg. With such high prices right now, a farmer doesn't want to freely give it away. Some might give at
an expensive rate of 1V2 or 1 /4 times in return, i.e. you borrow one quintal and you return 1.25 or 1.5
quintals. So adivasis are not getting enough wheat to eat. They are eating rice or poha (puffed rice). They
have already eaten what they got earlier. So I am buying corn [makka] to stock in my shop to give to them.
Later they will also help me."
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of his harvest in October, he needed 10 but finally hired all the 17 people who showed
up. He showed me the different notebooks in which he recorded the advance (or rather,
loans) given out to various people. From some he charged no interest, for others he did.
Usually, he said, adivasis end up asking for much more money so at the end of the year
they still owe money.58 That way Gautam Singh does not have a labour problem. "I get
the help I need and these people get money when they need it. But they may also commit
to two people and then you are in trouble." 59
Suraj Jat recounted his own story from 2005. His old labour group leader had
brought with him 15 new labourers. It turned out that these new people had also taken
advance money from someone in another village, Betma. On the second day of work,
Suraj Jat was in Dhar and his wife was supervising the cutting in the Tankawala field.
The Betma farmer came and talked to the labourers and left. In the evening Suraj Jat was
guarding [rakhwali] the Tankawala field and suddenly a phone call came that his
labourers have tied their belongings [potlis] and are leaving. He rushed to the highway
just in time to see them sitting in a tractor and tractor key ready in the ignition. He started
pulling them off the trolley one by one and beating them. A crowd gathered and the
farmer from Betma, who had come in the tractor, simply stood there. Finally they both
worked out a compromise of hiring 7 labourers each.60
Farmers call their relatives or other older men in the village for mediation when
such situations arise. For instance Sameer Singh Rathod was called on 6h October, in the
58 Gautam Singh (and many others in the village) also pays them at less than minimum wage - 30, 35, 40
Rs. a day. He says the labour inspector could catch him if the labourers complained or if I said anything.
59 Interview with Gautam Singh Rathod, Ranipura, August 2, 2006. The Ram temple priest estimated that
Gautam Singh had almost I lakh rupees on interest floating around the village.
60 Interview with Suraj Jat, Ranipura, October 5, 2006.
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middle of his own harvest, to sort out a labour problem on his nephew's farm in Nagda
village. The labourers came from Sameer's sister's village, where she was married. Her
husband also came to Nagda. The labourers had been paid Rs. 2000 in advance and the
piece rate [udhadaa] had been fixed at Rs. 300 per bigha. But at harvest, the going rate in
Nagda was Rs. 450, so the labourers stopped work. Similarly, Suraj Jat rushed on 8th
October to Ghatabillod village when he got an urgent call from his relative. Instead of 15
labourers, 25 had reached and had finished the work in three days. Since they were free,
they contracted with another farmer on a per bigha basis [udhadaa] for 80 bigha (20
hectares). But after cutting the field, the labourers were insisting that it was 95 bigha and
they refused to collect and bring back all the soyabean piles from the field to one place
for threshing. They said we will go back. Since the labourers had initially been called by
Suraj's relative, he was involved in the mediation and called Suraj for help. "What a
headache! (Kya sir dardi hai!)," Suraj complained to us, when he himself was in the
middle of his own harvest. "There are so many labour problems." Every farmer is
concerned with saving his own soyabean from shattering. Hence, they do not want to
spend the little time they have in sorting out other people's problems, but due to family
and kin relationships, they are forced to do so.
In general, agricultural harvests have historically provided farm labourers with the
opportunity to exercise some bargaining power in relationships with potential employer-
farmers. In American agriculture in the 20th century, for instance, several acts of
collective resistance have been centered on this seasonal time. Most such actions,
however, have been unsuccessful in the long run, as migrant workers have led an illegal
existence and have been suppressed by the collusion of farmers and state officials
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(Hahamovitch 1997). But the case of adivasi migrant workers in soyabean fields in
Malwa is different.
First, there was no large scale labour migration taking place in Malwa prior to
soyabean. Land was not extensively cultivated and crops like wheat and maize did not
require large amounts of labour. Even today, wheat can be cut by hand over a period of a
month or longer and family labour and village labour is adequate for the task. In contrast,
in soyabean there is a spurt in demand for labour for a short period of time that has
developed over the last 20 years as farming has extended to all possible cultivable land in
the village. The characteristics of soyabean grown in India make it less amenable to being
cut using the available harvester technology, which is suited for wheat.
Second, the soyabean harvest makes space for collective or group negotiation of
wages and terms and conditions that affect an entire village (albeit not outside of it to any
great extent). Adivasi labourers both from Ranipura and outside it cut farmers' fields in
groups. The contract could be on piece rate (per bigha cut) or daily wages but it was
always negotiated for a group of people. This was in contrast to all other farmer-labourer
negotiations that were conducted between individual labourers (and sometimes their
spouse and children) and farmers in a patron-client relationship. In articulation with the
"economy of haste," this created a situation where the wage rate for each group decided
upon in the end would be comparable to the "going rate in the village," which was the
cumulative result of separate negotiations between each group and the farmer they were
working for. This provided labourers with a village-level context and reference point for
greater assertion and voice in such negotiations, despite being wound up in webs of debt
relations with upper caste farmers. As some groups were able to increase the final rate, all
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groups in the village would benefit, including those labourers belonging to Ranipura
itself. This was in contrast to Jan Breman's findings in south Gujarat where migrant
labourers were cheaper than village labour and were easier to hire and fire. In the
competition with village labourers, both groups suffered downward pressure on wages
and were unable to demand any allied support or benefits from their employers (Breman
2007: 52-63). The next section describes how the negotiations of labourers play out in
practice.
Adivasi Assertion: Khemraj Jat and the labour from Kamta
The following episode from the 2006 harvest in Ranipura is a negotiation for
payment between labourers and two farmers they worked for. At this point in time the
harvest is already over and the farmer's soyabean is safely in his house. But the backdrop
of the annual cycle of the "economy of haste" frames the actions of these labourers and
gives them the ability to exercise power in these negotiations. As they invoke various
reasons to make claims upon the farmers, they are successfully able to draw upon the
force of group negotiations that have already taken place in the village.
My assistant and I had been interviewing the outside labourers from Kamta
village who had come to work for Khemraj Jat, a large farmer in Ranipura. We went
along with them to Khemrajji's house at the time of payment.61 As we entered, his
teenage son was doing final calculations [hisaab] of the number of days worked, the total
amount due, and the advance to be subtracted. Both Khemrajji and Sitaramba were sitting
on a cot, I was sitting on top of a bag of soyabean and the eight labourers were sitting on
the floor and on soyabean bags around the room. Khemraj Jat and Sitaram Maru were
61 This incident took place on October 17, 2006.
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known for their poor reputations in maintaining social relationships in the village. When
the time for payment came, Khemrajji asked Sitaramba for money since they had shared
the labourers. Sitaramba pulled out money from his pocket and said, "I only have Rs
300." Khemrajji said, "What kind of a farmer are you? Don't you know labour has to be
paid?" Sitaramba replied, "I have given Rs 1000 as advance to Misru (the head of the
group). His actual payment is Rs. 650. So let's cancel that amount and then do the
calculations [hisaab]."
At this point the labourers sitting there became concerned. One of them said,
"You don't attach our payment to Misru. You give our individual payment for the
amount we have worked." Others chimed in repeating this refrain. Khemraj Jat also
supported the labourers' claim and asked Sitaramba to shell out the money. "You do
separate accounts with the labour. I will do my accounts separate with them." Sitaramba
said he didn't have anymore money. At this Misru got angry. He said, "I will repay your
money later. I don't have any money right now even to go back to my village. I need
more money from you now. I'll do my accounts with you, where am I denying that [mein
kahan mana kar raha hoon]?"
Sitaram retaliated: "Four times we went to your village to call you. Who will pay
for that?" Misru shot back, "You aren't doing any special favour to me by coming. You
came because you had to get your own soyabean cut [Mere mathe ehsaan thode kar rahe
ho. Aapko soyabeej katwani hai isiliye aap aaye]". They spoke in raised voices. Misru
then turned to the room in general and said, "I have not seen a farmer like you. How will
it work if you pay attention to little things like this [Choti choti baton pe dhyan karoge to
kaise chalega]?"
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At this point, Khemrajji opened his cards. He said to Sitaramba, "We have to pay
the labour but even I don't have more than Rs. 600. I couldn't get it from the bank. It
slipped from my mind. Today, Tuesday, the bank is closed. You have created a problem
for me too."
Hearing this Misru commented, "Girija Seth [Khemrajji's younger brother] is
very good compared to you. He paid 40 labourers in one shot and his labourers from
Bhediya village came for the first time. They have no complaints. We've been telling you
for 3 days that you keep payment ready, we have to leave. And today you are saying you
don't have any money." In fact I learnt later that Girijalal paid 5 Rs. extra per day to each
labourer at the rate of Rs. 85 and sent them back happy.
Finally Khemrajji said, "We have no money. We'll pay those who need to leave
urgently." Jamuna bai immediately said, "Mine is urgent [Mera urgent hai]. I have to
go." So he paid her Rs. 560. The rest of the seven started shouting, "You pay us today;
we have to go. We don't have wheat or anything. You borrow money from the village
and pay us." Khemrajji suggested, "You come back and take it." The labourers
responded: "We have no money to go home. How will we come back? Why should we
pay the transportation twice? Diwali is round the corner. We haven't seen people like
you. First time we have worked for someone who isn't paying." Khemrajji retaliated
saying, "We won't eat away your payment. We will give it but we don't have money
today."
The labourers didn't agree. This group was part of a larger group that had come to
work for another farmer in the village. Khemrajji had requested for labourers because the
group that was to come and work for him did not show up. So even though Misru had
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been given advance money by Sitaramba and Khemrajji, these labourers did not receive
any share of that. Given that traditionally farmers have more power in a negotiation
between farmers and labourers, and more importantly, the harvest of Khemrajji was
already over so there was no longer any "economy of haste," he seemed to have the upper
hand here. He could have very well insisted that he cannot pay the others and that they
must come back. However, that did not happen. Instead, after some more wrangling,
Khemrajji sent his sons to borrow money.
I was watching all this and scribbling notes all along. Sitaramba was
smiling/smirking [hanste jaa rahe the] all throughout, Khemrajji was getting angry and
the labourers were getting angry at Khemrajji. I, too, got exasperated with Khemrajji and
couldn't help but ask him how come he hadn't made arrangements of money, especially
when it wasn't a very large amount-just 8 labourers. My assistant got scared upon this
interference of mine because Khemrajji has a reputation of being extremely unfriendly to
everyone in the village. He doesn't get along with anyone, even his own brothers.
Khemrajji replied very casually that he was busy with ploughing his fields for sowing
wheat so he forgot.
Here is where the nature of group negotiation played a role. The eight labourers
from Kamta insisted upon payment through several means. First they raised the question
of their right to be paid for the work they had individually done. Next they reminded the
farmer that he spent money on the tractor not for them but because he was caught up in
the "economy of haste." Then they appealed to the idea of reciprocity-if you don't treat
us well you will find it hard to get help next year. Finally, they invoked the notion of the
"going rate in the village" and drove the point home with a direct comparison with
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Khemrajji's brother, the same brother with whom Khemrajji was not on talking terms.
The labourers were able to push Khemrajji to accede to their demands for payment partly
because there were other groups in the village who had successfully negotiated a higher
rate and been paid that amount already. The village of Bhediya, where Girijalal's
labourers hailed from, was only a few kilometers from Kamta and the groups knew
members from each other's party very well.
After a hail of heated exchanges Khemrajji's wife, who was standing in the
doorway to the room commented, "Everyone's payment will be made today only. With
one call I can gather thousands of rupees in this village. Who do you think we are?
Saying such terrible things to us all this while [Sabka hisaab aaj hi ho jayega, ek awaaj
pe main hajaron rupye iikatha kar sakti hoon gaon mein. Kya samajhte aap humko, itni
dere se bole ja rahe hain.]." The labourers responded, "If you had the money you should
have collected it before hand and given it to us. We would have taken it and gone without
saying a word. There wouldn't have been any necessity to say all this. We will have to
think about next year. How can one work under such circumstances?" Upon this
Khemrajji said, "We will think about next year only next year. We also don't want labour
which can't wait for money. You have come on behalf of Misru, you tell him if you have
problems. Who are you to say things to us? We don't know you. We only know Misru."
Finally Khemrajji's son got Rs. 700 from his mausi (mother's sister, i.e., Suraj's
mother) and Rs. 2000 from Suraj. Khemrajji started giving out the money and then his
wife suddenly remembered, "They lost the water can also [Bodali bhi inhone gayab kar
dee]." She reminded her husband to take that money from them-Rs. 40. Misru said,
"We forgot it at the field, we didn't lose it. So what is this Rs. 40 for? It was a second
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hand can, you can buy it for 20 rupees." Khemrajji threatened, "No you have to give me
Rs 40. You can't leave otherwise." Misru said, "I go to Dhar and spend Rs. 100 just like
that in drinks, fun and frolic [mauj masti]. For Rs. 40 you have shown your pettiness
[dikha di apni aukat]. For a 15-20 rupee can! We'll give back your 40 rupees, don't
worry." Misru got all the eight labourers to give 5 rupees each and he gave it to
Khemrajji.
Meanwhile Khemrajji's son was muttering, "We had fixed with you for Rs. 70 per
day per person and now we are paying Rs. 80." The labourers just got more agitated. "We
can't wait. With such an attitude there can be no basis for a future relationship [aise
vyavahaar mein aage jamega nahi]." They took their payment and we all finally left. As
we walked to another house to see another payment session, the labourers expressed their
disdain that Sitaramba asked them to pay him for the tractor expenses for bringing them
to Ranipura. "We told him," they told my assistant and some other villagers, "If you
brought us in a tractor you must have been in a hurry. We would have come on our own
anyway. What kind of person asks for tractor expenses like that?!" Upon hearing this
Akhil Jat, another distant cousin of Khemrajji, said, "I had told you before that you have
got trapped at a butcher's house [kasai]."
It is odd that Khemrajji bought his fertilizer already, got his ploughing done by a
rented tractor, and did all other arrangements related to his farming except the payment
for labour. The norm in Ranipura was that a farmer could hold off paying a tractor owner
but not labour. From the richest villager Suraj Jat to the 2 hectare farmers like Dheeraj
Singh, all were queuing up in the mandi to sell soyabean in the middle of October to
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arrange payment for labourers. Else, how would the labourers come back next year? How
would the soyabean be cut before it shattered and caused enormous financial loss?
Bharatji Jat, Khemrajji's older cousin and a farmer with 10 hectares of land, had
gone to Bildari village to give advance to his labourers eight days prior to the harvest in
2006. Initially he had fixed the rate at Rs. 50 but the final "going rate" in the village was
between 70 and 80 Rs. per person per day. Bharatji paid them at the rate of 80 Rs. "There
is no discrimination [bhed bhav] with our labouring group. Whatever is the going rate in
the village, we give that," he told me. The same 20 labourers had been coming to cut
Bharatji's soyabean for the last 15 years and he prided himself immensely for
maintaining such strong relationships. Ajit Singh Rathod paid the highest rate in 2006 to
his labouring group from outside the village-Rs. 90 a day-because they went off to the
highway village, Rangwasa, before completing the work and refused to come back unless
he paid them more.
The articulation of the economy of haste with the opportunity for group
negotiation gave adivasi labourers the power to demand their rightful wages and
negotiate a higher price, even when they were embroiled in past debt relationships with
these farmers (like Misru was). This was different from the past when adivasi labourers
were engaged in individual relationships with upper caste farmers and were forced to
accede to unequal terms and conditions. This articulation was not restricted to the
labouring groups who came from outside. It resulted in benefits for labourers belonging
to Ranipura also. Even though they were enmeshed in long term relations of debt with
upper castes in the village, they, too, were able to demand higher wages in accordance
with or even higher than the "going rate."
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On the other hand, for adivasi farmers who lacked resources compared to
wealthier upper caste farmers, the "economy of haste" created even more problems for
them. For instance, adivasi farmers like Ajab Suvan, who farmed 2 hectares on his own
and did not have a large extended family to form a sowing or harvesting network 62 (not
unlike the threshing rings of the Midwest, cf. Rikoon 1988), needed labourers to help him
out. He could not afford to hire labourers from outside but looked within the village
itself. Since village labourers had already taken advance money from other well-to-do
farmers in the village, the latter had first right on their labour. He was forced to give them
a lot of flexibility, failing which no one would come and work for him. He told us a
month after harvest in 2006 that he paid five labourers from the village at the rate of Rs.
100 a day to help him cut his 2 hectares. He told them, "I'll pay you for the entire day's
work, you come, even if it is 1-2 hours late". 63 In poorer quality soil [halki zameen]
soyabean starts shattering even more quickly than in deep black soils. Most adivasi
farmers like Ajab bhai did not have the means to replenish their top soil every year like
the other Jat and Maru farmers in the village and hence face this problem even quicker
than others.64 Unfortunately, they get hold of labour only towards the end of the harvest.
But the labourers who worked for them were even worse off than Ajab bhai-most of
them farmed less than a bigha of land themselves and usually migrated out of the village
to survive after the soyabean harvest. In comparison, Ajab bhai had a tubewell and was
able to grow irrigated wheat.
62 About 25 members of the largest adivasi family in the village, the Makwanas, did their entire soyabean
sowing, weeding, harvesting and threshing altogether. Split into two groups, they would start from the
fields of one family and move on depending on the maturity level of the soyabean. Each family paid every
worker at the rate of Rs. 50 in 2006. Most of the transactions cancelled out because every member was also
a worker. Those who had less land and worked more on others' fields got wages in cash at the end.
63 Interview with Ajab Suvan, Ranipura, December 6, 2006.
64 Interview with Mohan Jat, Ranipura, October 12, 2006.
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The economy of haste also hurt labourers like Jagatji Makwana and his wife who
worked for upper caste farmers all year long as halis and did not have the option of open
negotiation of wages. They were only able to go and cut their 1/4h hectare of soyabean
when the entire harvest was already over. Premabai and her husband were yearly
labourers [hali] at a backward caste Jat household and had to finish the Jat's work before
commencing their own. I found her alone on her field next to the pond. The soyabean had
long dried and the stalks were all deep yellow, their height was short and the pods were
few and far between. Much of the soyabean had already shattered and had fallen on the
ground, not available for picking any more. I found the situation to be helpless and
pathetic-whatever efforts Jagatji and his wife had been able to put in the field, much of
that was staring back at us from the folds of the soil. But what surprised me was the
exuberance, brightness of Prema bai. As she shuffled along on her haunches cutting
away, she chatted with me nonchalantly. I felt more pained by her loss but she didn't
sound like a woman of despair. She explained to me that because the demand for labour
was over, she could now get two women from the village to work for her for Rs. 50 a
day. She needed help because working all alone would result in even greater percentage
of soyabean being shattered. 65
Beyond the Harvest
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, the economy of haste has been an annual
feature of the Malwa landscape. However, the assertion of adivasis articulated during an
"economy of haste" has been limited only to that one month period during the year. After
the harvest, adivasi labourers went back to their own villages or moved on to other urban
65 Interview with Prema bai, Ranipura, October 18, 2006.
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sites for construction work. Villagers in Ranipura started looking for wage labour in the
village and increasingly many of them migrated to places like Pithampur and Gujarat.
Every year new bonds of solidarity and group assertion would form and then dissipate
with the end of the harvest.
From Diwali, in October, right after cutting soyabean in the fields of Malwa and
in their own fields in the Nimar hills, the adivasi labourers from outside would go and
work in the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Pithampur until the rains. I presumed they
came back to their village to plant soyabean but the adivasis who came to cut the
soyabean at Ranipura said that they had very little land. So it was not worth coming back
for the farming. They came back because they have nowhere to take shelter in the rains-
there was no house to live in at Pithampur-they lived in makeshift tents/sheds all year
round moving from one site of work to another. They worked as manual labour in making
houses where they carried bricks, water, and mixed cement. They sold wood from the
nearby forests, made tunnels for phone lines (phone ki nali), installed big water pipes,
helped in factory construction, and even worked as helpers to masons (judai ka kaam).
Their ration cards could be used to purchase subsidized foodgrains, kerosene and sugar
only in their village in the mountains and not in Pithampur, so they were forced to buy
expensive food and fuel from the town. One family I spoke to was working at
constructing a plastic factory there in 2006. For the last 10-12 years they had been
coming to Malwa to cut soyabean and for nearly 15 years they had also been going to
Pithampur every year.66
66 Interview with Juvan Singh and family from Bhediya village, Ranipura dera, October 2006.
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At the end of the harvest, adivasis in Ranipura headed over in the opposite
direction, towards Gujarat. In the last five years or so, some of them discovered a new
site of work. According to Umang, one of the earliest migrants, "there is no [continuous]
daily employment available in Ranipura that is why we need to go to Gujarat." They
farmed their 1-2 bighas of land during the soyabean season and then took off in
November or December to return only during the wedding season in April. At least 5-6
families had consistently been going to Gujarat in the last few years. There, they made
and sold coal by a piece rate of Rs. 150 for 40 kg. They cut wood from the nearby forest
of babool trees, bundled it together, covered it with jute bags and then with mud, made a
makeshift bhatti. This would burn and after 4-5 days they would pour water over it and
open it to retrieve the coal. The total process of 5-6 days yielded 25 sacks of coal which
they sold to the two seths [businessmen], Ameen and Aalaana. 67
Raju Makwana, another adivasi villager, had never been that far away from
Ranipura but he told me in one of our conversations, "I am thinking of going to Gujarat
with Kamal [the first person who went to Gujarat and organized the travel of everyone
else in Ranipura]. You get continuous unskilled work [salang mazdoori] there. You get
Rs. 100 everyday in Gujarat compared to Dhar where you get only 50-60 Rs a day."
Increasingly more and more tribal labourer-farmers are contemplating going to Gujarat.
In fact, in late 2007, one of the poorest upper caste Rajput families also migrated to
Gujarat to work in the salt mines expecting to earn between 100-150 rupees a day. This
was Rajay Singhji who had only 2 bigha of land left and was mired in debt of more than
one lakh rupees. Rajay Singhji's only son ran away from home many years ago and a lot
67 Interview with Nagar Singh and Umang, March 7, 2007, Both have gone there several times.
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of money was spent trying to find him. He also had to pay a dowry for his daughter's
wedding as well as for the ceremonies at his mother's funeral. The family lived at the
mercy of Rajay Singhji's wife's family but finally decided to come back to Ranipura in
2007. They spent the soyabean season working on their field but left for Gujarat in
October. 68 Amita Baviskar has described the horrifying working conditions of these
migrant labourers from Jhabua and Dhar district, many of whom have contracted silicosis
and died after working in stone crushing units in Gujarat (Baviskar 2008).
The Role of the Democratic State: Accountability and Representation
In the earlier part of this chapter, I have described the failure of state programs to
help adivasis in Madhya Pradesh, I would like to turn now to another aspect of the state
in India, which is infrequently referred to during discussions of development-that of
electoral politics and democratic accountability. The processes of electoral democracy
have taken root very strongly in India unlike many other countries of the world. Much of
the critical literature on development, especially that written by anthropologists, stems
from experiences in Africa where the state is weak, development programs are mostly
organized and funded by international donor agencies, and the institutions of democratic
politics are absent in many places. As a few political scientists in India have recently
suggested (Chatterjee 2004, Corbridge 2007), I too, would like to argue that democratic
politics is an important arena of struggle where marginalized groups like adivasis can
make claims upon the state to shift resources to them, and they can hold the state
68 The biggest casualty of such temporary migration is the education of the children in primary and middle
school who are able to attend school only for three months a year. So where on the one hand the state is
pushing for 100% enrolment in primary education, on the other hand it is not able to provide any options
for such children. Many of them leave in October and come back in March, when examinations are about to
begin. Some even take the exams and then end up sitting in the same class next year, but only for three
months.
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accountable to them for their well-being. The following section describes how one such
instance has played out in Madhya Pradesh in combination with the "economy of haste"
and supported adivasi assertion of their rights in a significant manner.
In December 2006, a new government scheme to provide employment to
labourers during periods of low availability of wage labour brought new dynamics into
the relationship between farmers and labourers in Ranipura. The central (federal)
government in Delhi which had been formed by a coalition of parties under the Congress
party promulgated the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in 2005,
which provided guaranteed employment to all villagers for at least 100 days in the year in
their own village. The scheme was a result of the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act, which was passed by the parliament in response to struggles by non-governmental
organisations, some in Madhya Pradesh, which argued for creating government programs
to support a large group of people in villages who did not have a significant source of
income from farming nor found year-round employment opportunities in agriculture
(Shah 2005a, Shah 2008b).69 This was especially true of a dryland region like western
Madhya Pradesh. The scheme was also the flagship program of the Congress party which
viewed lower castes and adivasis as a major rural vote bank in country as opposed to the
upper caste and trader-businessman vote bank of the BJP.
In December 2006, the NREGS was implemented in Dhar district and almost
every village panchayat in Jhumki block was given money by the central government to
employ villagers to build local infrastructure. The cornerstone of the program was an
69 See http://www.righttofoodindia.org/rtoworklega intro.html for a comprehensive compendium of
articles, critiques, and data submitted to the Parliament on the NREG Bill and information on the
implementation of the NREG Act and the NREG Scheme from 2004 to the present.
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emphasis on "right to work"-if a villager was not given 100 days of work in a year, he
or she would be eligible for unemployment compensation. Villagers could go and
demand employment from their panchayat sarpanch and secretary. Every household was
eligible to work, both upper and lower caste, and each household would get one job card
with the photographs of all members eligible to work on it. 7 0 The exercise saw the
villagers of Ranipura build a stone road half way to the main highway as well as a
cemented road in the tribal section of the village [tapra] and in front of the school. It also
ensured that villagers received a wage equivalent to the minimum daily wage guaranteed
by the government-Rs. 67 per day. Almost 90-100 villagers, nearly all adivasis,
participated in the program during the four months from January to April 2007. During
the summer of May and June no work was undertaken.
With the coming of the rains in July when the soyabean season began, the daily
rates for weeding suddenly shot up from 35-40 Rs. the year before to 50 or 60 Rs., which
was still below the minimum wage of Rs. 67 per day. At harvest in October, farmers paid
wages of 120 Rs. per day when in 2006 the maximum rate was Rs. 80 (one farmer paid
Rs. 90). The explanation given to me by upper caste farmers was that the adivasi
labourers, both in the village and in other outside villages, had made enough money in
the first half of the year through NREGS work. Usually, the rainy season is the most
difficult time of the year because the stock of wheat obtained in March (through one's
own field and through payment for one's labour) is over and the harvest of soyabean is
still three months away. Adivasi villagers are always on the lookout for some work at this
70 Interview with Panchayat Secretary of Rangwasa village, November 5, 2006. There were several
anomalies in the villagers' understanding of what they were to get under the NREGS and what the
panchayat secretary told me in an interview with him. The villagers were told they would get 90 days of
work and were paid only 60 rupees a day, as opposed to 63 rupees, which was the original minim wage.
Later on the minimum wage was raised to 67 rupees.
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time. In 2007, according to upper caste farmers, the only way they could be coaxed to
work in the rains was through a rise in wages. At harvest, upper caste farmers further
complained that adivasi labourers played one farmer against the other and in the
competition for scarce labour, obtained a very high wage rate. According to the Suraj Jat
the employment provided by the state was expected to augment the opportunities
available for wage employment in agriculture. Instead, it created a scarcity of labour in
the main agricultural season.71 From the point of view of adivasi labourers in Malwa, this
program of the state helped extend their power of assertion in relationships with farmers
to other times of the year, which in the past, was limited to the soyabean harvest. This
kind of impact on wages was not restricted to Ranipura or to Dhar alone. There was a
similar response from farmers in several states in the country (Kang 2008).72
The main difference between the NREGS and state programs I described earlier in
the chapter was the arena on which they were designed and implemented. State programs
such as handouts to adivasis were formulated by upper caste officials in the agricultural
department bureaucracy in Madhya Pradesh without any participation or inputs from
adivasis themselves. In contrast, the NREGS was formulated in the legislative parliament
in Delhi with grassroots organisations, many of them representing adivasis from Madhya
Pradesh, putting pressure on their respective Members of Parliament to make legislation
supporting their constituents in rural areas. The important distinction here is that the
NREGS is a result of a right to employment that is guaranteed under the Indian
constitution. This gives labourers the legal ability to make the government enforce this
right, and thus, makes the government accountable to them for its actions.
71 October 18, 2007, Suraj Jat's field.72 See Sukumar (2008) specifically for Andhra Pradesh and Khera (2008) for analysis of the impact in
Badwani district in Madhya Pradesh.
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The success of the NREGS reflects the successful mobilization of voices of the
poor which "echoed during the Rozgar Adhikar Yatra that criss-crossed ten States in
May-June 2005," writes Mihir Shah, an academic and grassroots activist working in the
adivasi areas of western Madhya Pradesh for the last 20 years through his organisation
Samaj Pragati Sahyog (Shah 2005a). The cross-party coalition of political representatives
who were responsible for drafting the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, were
responding to political demands for creating a "right to employment" for all rural
inhabitants, regardless of income levels. In Malwa, in combination with the economy of
haste at the soyabean harvest, this created unprecedented opportunities for adivasi
labourers to assertively and successfully demand higher wages from farmer-employers.
Conclusion
Those who "do development," whether it is aid agencies, NGOs, the World Bank,
or development experts, criticize politics as an interference in technical solutions to the
problems of poverty and hunger and seek to make their interventions as "apolitical" or
"depoliticized" as possible. Despite the shift towards participatory development in the
1990s, project sponsors and funding agencies ultimately determine what are legitimate
needs and what projects should be implemented (Walley 2004). Only those needs of the
poor that are determined to be "apolitical" are considered legitimate claims for being
funded through development projects. Even though participatory projects emerged from
political struggles by feminist and leftist groups, concepts like empowerment were
quickly co-opted by the discourse of development promulgated by state and neoliberal
actors (Sharma 2008, Paley 2001a). In contrast, Stuart Corbridge argues that the
fetishization of concepts like good governance, civil society, participatory development
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and the like by development studies and the practitioners of development "demeans the
efforts and achievements" of people through political claims made upon the state (2007:
193).
For the marginalized adivasis of Ranipura, change has not come through apolitical
development projects of the state that have sought to give them handouts of things they
need. Rather, change has been a result of efforts made by marginalized groups and their
grassroots organisations that has influenced the shape of legislation through active
participation in democratic politics. Although it has been said in the past, it is worth
repeating once more that "the state" is not a monolithic entity and that different levels of
government act in response to different political groups (Gupta 1995). Just like
development experts and development organisations, the permanent bureaucracy of
appointed government officials in India is not directly accountable to the people for their
actions. They respond to pressures of accountability that stem from their donors or their
seniors in the bureaucratic system. In contrast, representatives elected to office through
the mechanisms of democratic politics are also a facet of "the state" and inhabit a
position which makes them directly accountable to the constituents who elected them. In
the strong and resilient framework of India's democracy, if these representatives do not
satisfy the needs and demands of their constituents, they are booted out of power.
Different political groups and parties also respond to different social groups in
society. The NREGA was the flagship program of the Congress party which got elected
to power at the national level in 2004 on the basis of an election plank that promised
extensive support to rural areas. The Congress party was also trying to woo adivasis and
dalits away from the BJP, the two main groups that would benefit the most from such a
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scheme. In the multiparty framework of Indian democracy, there is political space for a
wide range of interests to be articulated, whether it is through tribal political parties in
Madhya Pradesh or through a nationalist Hindu party like the BJP.
In thinking about the state, it is useful to consider Partha Chatterjee's argument
about political society (2004, 2008a). He argues that a majority of rural and urban Indians
make claims upon the state as part of larger groups such as adivasis, dalits, slum dwellers,
etc., within the space of political society, rather than as individuals participating in
processes of civil society, whose will is supposed to be reflected in the governance of the
state. He suggests that the constituents of political society use the language of rights (and
I add, of development as an entitlement) to mobilize the state to act in their interests. The
state, however, responds to these actions not as it would respond to rights-bearing
citizens in civil society. Rather, it considers them to be claims that can potentially be
fulfilled based on political expediency. According to Chatterjee, the inhabitants of
political society live in a space of illegality and marginality, which denies them the
possibility of being treated as rightful, rights-bearing citizens whose demands are to be
taken seriously as shortcomings of the state. However, successful mobilization and
implementation of Acts like the NREGA provide a space for marginalized groups to use
the language of rights to make demands upon the state and at the same time, make the
state respond to them through legal mechanisms of redress, rather than through the
expediency of political society.
Nevertheless, I agree with Chatterjee when he argues that, "Policy and politics
mutually constitute each other on the field of mass democracy" (2008b). In other words,
policies for bringing about change are the result of political action. At the same time,
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political action stems from the failure or success of policies that help or hurt various
groups of people. The depolicitised language of development fails to recognize this
fundamental dynamic that characterizes the relationship between the state and society in
India. It does not see this as a vital arena of struggle for marginalized groups to make
claims upon the state in the name of development.
When development projects refuse to engage with political questions they relegate
themselves to a marginal space in rural society and set themselves up for failure. But
more importantly, their dismissal of politics blinds them to the vibrant possibilities of
change that can arise from an engagement with politics, which according to Chatterjee is
the only means for change for a majority of the poor in India. These possibilities are
premised upon the democratic process which has made a differentiated state accountable
to those it represents in democratic politics. The refusal of development practitioners and
agencies to engage in political action and the constant depoliticization of their
interventions sets them up for failure because they do not engage with the structures of
domination in society. In efforts to sanitize politics and depoliticize development,
agendas of participation and good governance end up becoming irrelevant to the needs of
the people they are supposed to help.
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Chapter Four
Lines of Exclusion and Languages of Empowerment
The yellow revolution has mapped itself onto the "rural" along the lines of
exclusion that frame rural society. This chapter is an attempt to delineate the lives of
people who remain invisible in academic and popular discussions of the "rural" that focus
only on farmers and labourers. There is a growing number of farming families in Malwa
and other parts of India' who will not be able to survive on agricultural production alone
in the near future, despite growing cash crops like soyabean. Semi-educated young men
from these families do not see a future in farming, yet are unable to participate in the
urban industrial economy. There is also that fifty percent of the rural population-
women-who are subsumed within the larger categories of "farmers" or "labourers" and
whose exclusion from the monetary benefits of the yellow revolution are hidden behind
the glitzy motorbikes and tractors seen in every village in Malwa. Thus, instead of
transforming these people's lives, development projects such as the yellow revolution
have reproduced their subordinate positions within society.
Development projects pursued by international organisations as well as state
agencies may target their benefits specifically towards marginalized groups and even help
them overcome some forms of social exclusion that people may find themselves in. But
they do not lend themselves to critiquing the nature of the lines of exclusion that
circumscribe people's lives, nor provide any avenues to engage in questioning, and
perhaps, erasing those lines themselves. Even projects of political mobilization, while
' In parts of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the demographic shift has already happened and more people are
landless than ever before in rural areas. In Madhya Pradesh, the trend is becoming more serious and will
result in greater landlessness in the coming decade.
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enabling marginalized groups to make demands upon the state using the language of
development as entitlement, often co-opt women into larger categories based on class or
caste and do not focus on gender-specific exclusions arising locally.
This research argues that development need not be the only language to think
about transformation in society or the only category for people to interpret and make
sense of their experiences. I suggest that cultural projects can provide equally powerful
languages of empowerment that enable marginalized groups to fundamentally question
the lines of exclusion framing their lives and to exercise agency and bring about change.
In Malwa, such a project has taken the form of a religious revivalist movement known as
Swadhyay which invokes an egalitarian ethic that rejects caste and patriarchy. Swadhyay
has provided some women and adivasis in Ranipura with culturally constructed subject
positions where they can exercise agency and feel empowered in ways that are often not
recognized in discussions of development. During my fieldwork, it became clear that the
framework of Swadhyay was more important to people in thinking about social
transformation than the language of development. Hence, this research takes the unusual
step of considering development alongside a religious movement.
In the language of development, those who are the "targets" of development, or
receive aid, are always positioned as being in need-as backward, poor, and lacking. The
discourse of Swadhyay on the other hand, does not position women or lower castes as
lacking or as a subaltern. Rather, it helps them participate in everyday acts of working,
eating and learning, as actors working alongside other individuals in society in equal,
reciprocal relationships. It has provided excluded groups an opportunity to make attempts
at being rightful agents in world which does not wish to acknowledge their existence.
Such cultural projects are typically seen as outside the frame of development. But I argue
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that they can be equally powerful metaphors to speak to the deeper aspirations of people
who are framed along the lines of exclusion in rural society. Hence, they should be
considered as important alternative arenas of struggle where people engage in projects to
bring about social transformation.
Further, this research cautions against the tendency to create a monolithic identity
of all Hindu religious expression as Hindutva or Hindu fundamentalism. I, too,
subscribed to such a tendency when I was questioned by a Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) volunteer in Ranipura whether I was a Christian missionary with the aim of
religious conversion, just when I had begun my fieldwork. Initially, I was suspicious of
Swadhyay and of the desire of some women and adivasis to participate in it. But over
time, I realized that I needed to take seriously the reasons why this movement appealed to
them rather than just dismissing it as a "cultural" phenomenon-one that could either be
denigrated as traditional or glorified as upholding cultural values.
The egalitarian ethic of Swadhyay draws from Hindu religious texts but it is the
anti-thesis of the singular vision of Hinduism espoused by the political proponents of
Hindutva. Although the actions of upper caste men who participate in Swadhyay reflect
the contradictions of caste pride and patriarchal values grinding against an egalitarian
ethic, the movement offers unprecedented opportunities for the excluded to
fundamentally challenge their position in society. I suggest that we pay attention to such
alternative arenas of struggle which have captured the imagination of people in Malwa in
a way that the language and framework of development has not, and to open our minds to
other possibilities of social transformation.
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Fragmentation of Land: Displacing the Youth from Agriculture
In spite of the yellow revolution in Malwa, families from upper and lower
(scheduled) caste groups face the threat of land fragmentation and their agrarian viability
is called into question by a hybrid set of dynamics-social and demographic pressures
working alongside economic pressures of farming. The young men from these families
comprise a semi-educated rural proletariat, which is struggling to find its foothold in an
agrarian economy that is steadily foreclosing on them. They cannot see a future as
farmers, yet they cannot bring themselves to do manual work expected of labourers.
Marxist-inspired historians and economists have argued that after liberalization in
1991, the primary reason for the displacement of "peasants" from the means of
production has been the growing power of corporate capital in conjunction with state
power (Sanyal 2007, Chatterjee 2008). This research suggests there are more complex
dynamics in play. The introduction of soyabean agriculture and with soyabean processing
companies being fundamental to sustaining the cultivation of the crop, the introduction of
corporate capital into agriculture in western Madhya Pradesh should be predated to the
1970s.2 Chatterjee writes that it is "pressures of market cultivation that make small
peasant cultivation unviable over time because it is unable to increase productivity."
While the predatory role of corporate capital may be in play in other parts of the country,
especially in zones of land acquisition such as parts of West Bengal, the situation in
Malwa is different. As discussed in earlier chapters, soyabean cultivation, in fact,
provides an opportunity for poorest producers to gain something from the land-even the
poorest of farmers stay in the village to grow soyabean before migrating elsewhere for
2 If we go back to the opium economy of the colonial period then the role of mercantile capital must also be
recognized (Farooqui 1998).
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wage labour-it helps them stay afloat. It is a market crop that, ironically, allows farmers
to stay on the land and be able to subsist (Mitchell 2002).
Instead it is quirks of demography that have played a primary role in
fragmentation and subsequent shrinking of the sustenance possibilities from the land, in
ordinary, average, everyday villages like Ranipura. Inter-generational farm fragmentation
has become a serious issue for large number of households (Gupta 2005). Unlike other
parts of India like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, in western Madhya Pradesh the situation
hasn't reached crisis point yet. But in the next generation, almost 80% of Ranipura will
have to find something else to do besides farming. The constancy of high birth rates and
decline in infant mortality over the last 40 years has brought Ranipura to the point of
maximum surviving population between the ages of 15-45. On the demographic
transition curve, Ranipura is slowly entering a phase of lower birth rates, although the
quirks of demography arise when families have more number of boys or girls. In a
patrilineal society where boys are deemed vital to the survival of the family name and
patrimony, women who give birth to only to girls are expected to reproduce until a male
heir is produced. Despite laws to the contrary, land is still inherited only by male children
(with sisters signing off their legal shares to their brothers) and the more number of boys,
the greater number of parcels of the land.
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A satellite image of Ranipura village showing the sub-divided plots of farm land. The residential area is
marked with a rectangle and the fields within the village boundaries are surrounding it.
Source: Wikimapia, accessed December 24, 2008.
The upper caste Rajputs have historically been amongst the most powerful in
Ranipura village. Forty years ago, Hare Singh Rathod's family was one of three main
Rajput descendents in Ranipura who had migrated from Rajasthan more than 150 years
ago. He owned 130 bigha (out of about 1000) but most of it was uncultivated grassland.
About thirty years ago Hare Singh's son killed his own cousin in the village in an
"honour fight." Although this saved their pride [izzat], it also forced Hare Singh to sell
20-25 bigha of land for court fees, worsening their financial position and causing
interruptions in the education of some of his grandchildren. Today his grandchildren
comprise ten brothers, 3 each owning not more than 8-10 bigha (2 to 2.5 hectares) of land,
and a total of 85 bigha or 21 hectares. These brothers comprise the typical "small farmer"
3 They have two sisters who are married and living in other villages in Malwa.
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in the Indian context-running somewhat economically viable farms because they are
supported by a little outside income. Some brothers support themselves through
permanent government jobs (obtained before the implementation of reservations for
lower castes), and a side business of selling milk and milk products. Others manage with
the farm land they own and by leasing in land during the rabi (winter) crop to grow more
wheat and the newly profitable "dollar chana."4 One brother is in the health department,
another brother and two nephews are government school teachers, and a third brother is
in the irrigation department while his wife is a government creche [anganwadi] worker.
Each of the ten brothers has one or two sons for whom survival on one hectare of
land in the future is next to impossible. The next generation of Rajputs consists of 17
boys and 12 girls. The 17 boys would expect to inherit 5 bigha or 1.25 hectares each on
average of land. These 17 young men (and boys) would not be able to maintain the same
standard of living as their parents by relying on the farm alone.
The adivasi (tribal) Makwana family settled down in Ranipura almost at the same
time as the Rajputs. Their ancestor Bhurji owned about 50 bigha some 50 years ago and
did not have any sons. His only son-in-law Punjaji came and settled in Ranipura and had
seven children. The seven brothers also purchased land individually and today each owns
about 8-14 bigha (2-3 hectares). They were the only adivasi family apart from the village
chowkidar [guard] who owned land prior to the redistribution initiated by the
government. The seven sons of Punjaji have 25 sons in turn5 and this new generation
farms 88 bigha of land. Each of these individual families owns on average 3.5 bigha of
4 "Dollar chana" is a type of gram or chick pea whose seed was imported by farmers themselves, seemingly
from Mexico. It is called dollar (and a larger variety is called 'double dollar') because it was sourced from
somewhere in America. It is suspiciously similar to garbanzo beans in size, colour and taste and was not
grown in India earlier. It is not consumed domestically but is entirely an export crop. It is not approved as a
crop by the Indian government's Ministry of Agriculture.
5 The 25 brothers have 23 sisters who are all married outside the village.
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land which is less than one hectare. Four out of the 25 sons obtained a government job
owing to the reservations for scheduled tribes implemented by the MP government. 6 One
is a forest officer, one is a school teacher, one is a panchayat secretary, and one is a
multipurpose health worker. Their jobs are outside Ranipura and none of them stay in the
village. The job is their main source of their income and they all lease out their land to
their cousins.
The Jats, on the other hand, are descendants of two brothers Issaji and Ghisaji.
They had 10 grandsons too, and the following generation has 14 boys. The Jats farm 360
bigha of village land and each of these 14 boys would expect to get about 25 bigha or 6
hectares of land. Both Suraj Jat and his cousin Girijalal are only sons with 7 sisters each.
Their cousin Bharatba has four daughters and no sons. His younger brother Mohan Jat
has one son who will inherit the entire land of his father and uncle.
A few Rajput and adivasi families have lost their land in the past due to debt and
mortgage-the reasons for debt have varied from court cases and lawyer's fees, excessive
alcoholism, medical treatment, weddings, dowry, and funerals among others. Even
though the Jats and Marus owned a greater amount of land to begin with,
demographically they have less number of men in the current generation who are dividing
up the land. Hence, they can afford to live off the land alone for the next generation at
least. From the following table it is clear that 75% of the households in Ranipura will
have to supplement their income from farming in the near future.
6 Two women of the Makwana family also have government jobs-one sister is an anganwadi worker while
another is an auxiliary nurse midwife (ANM).
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No. of
% of men Avg land
Households No. of village No. of inheriting parcel per In
by caste bigha land households land male member hectares
Makwanas 88 9 23 25 3.5 bigha 0.87
Adivasis 99 10 30 30 3.3 bigha 0.82
Rathods 201 19 21 38 5.2 bigha 1.3
Marus 266 27 12 11 24 bigha 6
Jats 361 36 12 14 26 bigha 6.5
Table 1: Land distribution in Ranipura village by caste showing the average land size farmed by the current
generation. The data is an approximation based on my own surveys in the village. It does not correspond to
the data in the Ranipura village land records. It includes some portions of land listed under the nearby
Rangwasa village and Gulwa village records as many Ranipura farmers own land there. The average
landholding for adivasi families hides large discrepancies in ownership. The modal ownership in the
Makwana households was 2 bigha.
Planning for their Future: Rajputs and Makwanas
Young men in Ranipura have responded to these constraints of fragmented
landholdings in different ways. Their situation is circumscribed by their position in the
caste hierarchy and this mediates the kinds of avenues for employment they find available
and acceptable to them and their families. The following section describes the
circumstances a few young men from the Rajput and Makwana families of Ranipura find
themselves in and the aspirations they have for their future.
Sharad, a young Rajput in his early twenties was completing his Bachelors degree
in Commerce from Dhar in 2006 while his younger brother, who was less interested in
studies, was apprenticing at a tailor's shop. Their father, Gajendra Singh owns 8 bigha of
land. As a young boy Gajendra Singh was electrocuted from a high voltage wire at the
fields and was unable to do any major physical activity for several years. His father left
him in Dhar to work as a house servant and baby sitter for P.B. Modi, the largest
businessman/trader in the town. Gajendra Singh never had the opportunity to study or
apply for government jobs like his siblings. He opened a sundry [kirana] shop in the
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village in 2007 to provide an alternative source of income for his sons. He said that 4
bigha (one hectare) is not enough for each son to take care of an entire family. He does
not plan to give his daughter any share in the land because he has already given her a
dowry. He said, "My financial setting was disturbed [Meri setting bigad gayi thi] after
marrying off my daughter. I had to take loans to give her dowry. It took me four years to
repay most of that debt. Now I have taken a new loan from the cooperative bank to start
this shop. ...There are no government jobs available anymore for my children. All new
job openings are reserved for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (see chapter three).
And there is nothing much left in farming either. I am enough to do it. At harvest or
sowing I get my sons to help me but otherwise they are not required. When the land will
be sub-divided what will each one get out of it?"
Sharad told me during my visit in April 2008 that he wants to do an MBA. "But I
don't know enough English to give the entrance examination," he stated. He cannot cope
with the syllabus. I asked if he took English coaching classes and he said they don't teach
the English related to management education. "I want to leave Dhar and do other things
in life but an MBA is so expensive. If my family gives me money for that, it will become
very difficult for them in the village. I also have a responsibility at home." Moreover, his
family wants him to get married soon so that his wife can come and relieve his mother
from the burden of household chores. If he left, there would be excessive burden on his
parents and younger brother and he is in two minds about his future.
Kanak is Sharad's first cousin and the only son of Harivansh Rathod. He is very
good at studies and completed his 12th grade from the "School of Excellence" for bright
students in Dhar. Kanak doesn't help on the farm and is keen to pursue a university
education. He applied for entrance examinations to medical and technical colleges for
Chapter 4: Lines of Exclusion and Languages of Empowerment 272
Richa Kumar
admission in 2008. He hopes to get into a medical college and become a doctor. He had
joined Dhar's premier English Speaking Course, La Pinakin. Harivansh Rathod says, "for
his education, I need to give attention to him, get him enrolled in tuition classes on time,
bring him the things he needs. The child also needs to have talent. Kanak got good results
in 5t standard and 10h standard board exams." Harivansh Rathod is almost 60. He retired
from Madhya Pradesh government service in 2008 as a multipurpose village health
worker. He has two married daughters and a third daughter, who is studying B.A. by
correspondence. He grows soyabean on his 2 hectares during kharif with outside help and
leases out his land to his brothers during winter. Harivansh Rathod has been able to
afford Kanak's education because he has a side business of selling milk and milk
products to villagers as well as the income (and now pension) from his government job.
He will probably lease his land permanently to his brothers or sell it to them in the future.
Rajesh, the son of Dheeraj Singh Rathod has been trying to pursue academics but
unsuccessfully. He enrolled in the "School of Excellence" in Dhar and from there he was
selected to the Dhar technical college for 12th standard on a merit scholarship. After
graduation, "I applied to engineering colleges," explained Rajesh, "and would have got a
seat under the 33% quota reserved for graduates from technical schools. But I was a
general category student [upper caste Rajput] and did not get a scholarship. I would need
to pay Rs. 30-40,000 per year as fees, which I could not afford. My father's illness and
sister's death had left us struggling for money." His father underwent an operation for
cancer of the mouth caused by excessive smoking and chewing tobacco. One of his
sisters died in childbirth leaving behind a young baby girl while the second sister gave
birth to a boy with backward feet. Dheeraj Singh spent several lakh rupees on medical
bills and was unable to take care of his farming. In 2006 he was neck deep in loans.
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Rajesh started working in Dhar that year, first with a financier cum broker and
then with an auto parts garage for one year. He always wanted to get away from the
village but in January 2007 he got the opportunity to teach in the Ranipura village school
as a temporary teacher for one semester. "I came back and worked hard for 4 months,
took extra tuitions for 5"t standard children and the exam result was also good." But even
at the end of the year he was not paid by the government nor was he hired again.
Meanwhile he had started a B.Sc. degree, paying for it on his own. His father lamented,
"He had always been good at studies in school but he failed his first year B.Sc. exams
[twice]. He did not take tuitions and did not get the correct books. He only studied from
the kunji (guide books). ...He has to handle his own education." Finally in January 2008,
Rajesh got a job as a teacher at a private school in Dhar through the recommendation of
my field research assistant. He planned to shift permanently to Dhar in August 2008.
Rajesh hopes to apply to the Navy after becoming a graduate.
Amongst the 17 Rajput cousins there are 11 young men of working age, apart
from Sharad, Pawan, and Rajesh. Two are tractor mechanics, one repairs computer
hardware, and two are government school teachers. Only three cousins in this generation
are into farming full-time, including Sharad's younger brother Himesh. These young
Rajput men sport the stylish bootleg fashion shaded jeans and long sleeved body hugging
T-shirts. They frequently go to Dhar and "hang out" with "city" kids. Partha Chatterjee
(2008) argues that the penetration of government technologies of education, health,
agriculture etc., and of the media and communication technologies has transformed the
desires of somewhat-educated village youth, who do not want to live the life of a peasant
anymore and want to move to the anonymity of the town, despite the hardships it would
entail.
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Yet, the aspirations of these young Rajputs are strongly shaped by the fragmented
nature of their landholdings and the reality that the village does not have much to offer
them. None of the Rathod boys would consider manual labour for wages as a choice of
work in the village or outside, although working on their own farm would be an
exception. During the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) work in
Ranipura in 2007, where all households regardless of caste were provided with the
opportunity for manual wage labour by the government, none of the Rajput boys were
seen working. The only exception was Pawan Rathod, Rajesh's elder brother, who was
the supervisor entering attendance details in a register and making payments to all the
labourers.
Despite having fallen on hard times, the Rajput families in Ranipura retain their
caste pride and exhibit an attitude of being the most cultured social group in the village.
Their ancestors were the patrons of the village who hired labour and never went to the
fields. Today, most of the brothers cannot afford to keep full-time servants like in the past
and hire labourers only on a temporary basis. Their wives work in the fields with them-
a fact, which causes considerable slight to their prestige. Despite the hardship, Rajput
men do not sell their physical labour to others. They expect respect [izzat] from villagers
and continue to hold sway [rutba] over village affairs because of their superior social
position in the caste hierarchy.
When I first saw Nahaar Makwana's father, Panchilalji, he was sitting quietly at
one end of the Ram temple in Ranipura in tattered clothes wearing the look of a shriveled
old man. This was my first visit to Ranipura and I had been introduced to group of
Rathod, Maru and Jat men who, I was told, would be happy to talk to me about soyabean
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agriculture. Panchilalji was a non-entity at that temple discussion-he simply merged
into the background. The Rajputs told me that I won't learn much about cultivation from
any adivasi farmers when I expressed my desire to meet them. Adivasis do not have the
prestige or authority that Rajputs hold in the village. They are used to sitting on the floor
when upper castes sit on the cot. Rajputs themselves recall days when lower castes had to
sit down in front of upper caste men, waste time waiting, and then humbly request for
help or work [gidgidao]. Food and water was never shared between them and upper
castes.7
Unlike a majority of the Rajput brothers, none of the Makwana households,
including Nahaar, lived in a pacca house. Their houses were built of unburnt bricks
covered with mud-small, one room units with a kitchen on one side and space for tying
animals in the same room on the other side. The Rajputs lived in pacca houses with two
or more rooms and separate areas for keeping their animals. They also had 'modern'
furniture such as beds and steel cupboards and most brothers had built pacca latrines. The
Makwanas had jute cots and straw mats [chataais] and mud enclosures to store grain and
valuables. They did not have pacca latrines.
When I visited the Makwanas at the start of my fieldwork, they were most
subservient and slightly fearful of me. Kedar and his uncle Panchilalji sat on the floor
while I sat on a cot in front of their mud house. The kids playing nearby were not fully
clothed, their hair unkempt and they seemed unclean. They were playing with slippers
(chappals), with the wheel of a dora (weeding equipment), with pieces of string, with all
kinds of things that I felt could hurt them. On the second visit, after my assistant
Bhosleji's prodding, Panchilalji sat on the same cot as Bhosleji and seemed much more
7 Interview with Dheeraj Singh and Virendra Singh Rathod, August 5, 2006.
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lively and animated. He talked a lot and seemed in command over the younger
generations sitting around him. His brother Gendaramji sat behind him on the cot.
Another brother Kaniramji joined later but he sat on the ground.8 Almost three months
later, during a subsequent visit, Panchilalji was sitting on the floor and I said he can sit on
the same charpoy as me. So half an hour through he climbed up. Although he was my
grandfather's age, since I was a young woman, I was surprised when he soon stretched
his legs in the back! I am sure other villagers must have been amused as the charpoy was
in view of the main road entering the village.9
Nahaar passed his 10th grade exams in 2008. His cousin Kedar had completed 12th
grade. Nahaar usually dressed in jeans and T-shirts and hung out with Sharad Rathod and
others in the village in the evenings. Nahaar and his. elder brother were almost as
prosperous as Sharad's family. They owned a motorcycle, a colour television, a mobile
phone, a biogas, a tubewell and most bullock related farm implements. Along with his
cousins from the younger generation, Nahaar freely sat at the Ram temple during non-
religious events. He even participated with upper caste young men in serving the food
and water during village events such as weddings.
Yet, Nahaar and Anup were an aberration amongst the Makwanas and other
adivasis in Ranipura. Out of 25 cousins of Nahaar, 13 were dependent upon income from
tiny plots of land less than 1 hectare each and supplemented that with agricultural labour
in the village or work for wages under the NREGS scheme of the government. Eight
more had given up farming altogether and had moved as manual labourers or daily wage
8 Visit on April 29, 2006.
9 Visit on July 12, 2006.
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workers to Dhar. Only two of these eight had retained their plots of land and leased them
out to their brothers. The others were landless. A majority of them were uneducated.
Being semi-educated Nahaar could think of applying for a government job, like
four of his cousins who had benefited from reservations. Yet, as described in chapter
three, he was unsuccessful in obtaining one. At the same time, he did not hesitate to work
as a manual labourer on the road being built in Ranipura under the NREGS. He also did
not express a strong desire to leave the village like the Rajput boys did. But he did go to
Pithampur, the industrial township, along with a few other young men from Ranipura,
only to come back disappointed.
Nahaar represents a small number of adivasi youth who are somewhat educated
and are financially equivalent in status to some middle-income upper caste families in the
village, yet they occupy a liminal space on the boundary. Their experience with urban
enclaves like SEZs is similar to that faced by upper caste youth but being adivasi, their
social status in the village is still linked to their uneducated, poor adivasi cousins. Nahaar
and Anup became closely involved in Swadhyay, the religious revivalist movement in
Ranipura, in the last two years and found it to be an important alternative avenue to
overcome this sense of social exclusion. I discuss Swadhyay in the later part of this
chapter.
Before that I want to discuss the experience of some of the semi-educated young
men described above in the industrial township of Pithampur. I argue that their education
gives them an expectation that they do not have to do manual work, whether in
agriculture or elsewhere, anymore. But at the same time, they do not have the requisite
skills to participate in the industrial or the service economy nor have they got the
opportunities to hone skills such as learning English or operating computers. This puts
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them in a liminal space where, they are not recognized either as part of the rural or the
urban economy-they fall into the cracks when development projects are constructed
along divisions such as urban and rural.
Joining an Industrial Workforce: The Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
In Madhya Pradesh, under a Backward District Development Scheme, an
industrial township was developed in Pithampur in Dhar district in the 1980s. In last few
years it has been converted into a special economic zone (SEZ). This research shows that
young men who migrate away from the village find that they are unable to participate in
urban enclaves like SEZs where financial aspirations collide with incapability and
loneliness. Contrary to expectations, these young people are finding themselves drawn
back to the village-to family support, a cleaner environment, and daily fulfillment of
basic needs like food and shelter.
An SEZ is a Special Economic Zone, where industry is given special concessions
and preferentially provided with subsidized land, electricity, and water. Dhar has one of
the oldest such SEZs in the tehsil known as Pithampur, which was conceived in 1982-83
under the Arjun Singh (Congress) government in MP and started in 1984 with a cold
storage unit. It was launched under the Backward District Scheme hence placed in Dhar
district but it is just 22 km from Indore city. There is no railway line connecting Dhar and
Pithampur to Indore so everything is transported through trucks by road. In 2006, MAN
AG, Germany's premier transport and engineering company opened one of the largest
truck manufacturing plants in Asia known as Force Motors in Pithampur. The SEZ has
become the [erstwhile] Detroit of India, i.e. a major automobile manufacturing hub along
with several other factories, including soyabean processing, plastics, and textiles.
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The SEZ is an enclave created by the state ostensibly to provide jobs in rural areas
and bring employment for semi-educated young people like Nahaar and Sharad. Nahaar's
poorer illiterate cousins cannot hope to get a salaried job as a worker or foreman in the
factories-they are only qualified for manual work. But according to Karan Singh Pawar,
the erstwhile Raja of Dhar and an ex-Congress MLA, "The factory environment is alien
to the rural farmer." 10 The stories of Nahaar, Narendra, and Deepak are quite illuminating
along these lines. The problems they face are related to health and safety, to poor pay
compared to the cost of living, to difficult timings, and unsurprisingly, to urban
loneliness.
Nahaar spent a few months trying out different jobs in Pithampur with his sister's
husband who worked in a plastics factory there. He narrated his story which started with
work in a medicine factory. "I stayed there only for two days because the work was with
acid. It would fall all over and I could have burned my hands and feet. Then my jija
(sister's husband) got me a night shift in the plastics factory where he was working,
which I refused." He didn't want to work at night. Then he was offered the job of a
gatekeeper, which he did not like, and finally he tried his hand in a diamond factory.
After 4-5 days, he quit because the diamond dust [chura] would hurt the eyes. Nahaar did
not discount Pithampur altogether despite his past experiences. "My jija's jija is still
there and he is calling me. I want to go but my family has stopped me because of our
family dispute in Ranipura," he explained towards the end of our conversation. 11
Nahaar is not the only one who has tried his hand in Pithampur and come back to
the village. Lakhan, the son of Abhinash Jat, ran away and came back home leaving an
10 Interview April 18-19, 2007.
11 Nahaar was referring to a land dispute that was in progress between different members of his own
extended family.
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overseer's job in Pithampur. His father along with Panditji, the priest of Ranipura had
gone to seek the help of Karan Singh Pawar to find jobs in Pithampur for their sons.
Lakhan and Kanhaiya got jobs in a polyethylene bag factory with a salary of 1900 Rs per
month. Panditji had explained to me with great enthusiasm that with a bonus, savings in a
provident fund, and with overtime, the total salary could go up to Rs. 3000 a month. But
Abhinash Jat's son came back within a few months because he didn't like it there, living
all alone away from family, cooking for oneself. Abhinash Jat expressed his frustration to
my research assistant one day. He said, "I will tell madam to take my elder son to Delhi
with her. He is a rogue [badmash]. He came back from Pithampur. With such difficulty I
had arranged a job for him by taking a favour from Babasahab (Karan Singh Pawar)
[Babasahab ko bol ke]. He doesn't work here in the fields also. I am very troubled
[pareshan] by him." Kanhaiya stayed on in Pithampur but he too left after a year and a
half because most of the money he was making went into paying for rent and living
expenses. The bonus and overtime did not materialise.
The only young man from Ranipura who has settled down successfully in
Pithampur is Vijay Mana, an adivasi whose father died of alcoholism and whose mother
and three younger brothers make up the poorest family in Ranipura. Vijay works as a
mason with his uncle from another village. He got married in 2007 and took his wife with
him. He is staying in a rented house and has even bought a mobile phone. He says there is
enough construction work to keep him busy most of the time.
Some middle-aged Rajput farmers suggested to me that living in the village would
give people a better lifestyle than the city. There is open space, less congestion [khuli
hava], clean air, no pollution, no dearth of fresh food (unless there is massive drought),
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security and safety, community and family. 12 If good transportation and roads,
communication such as telephones, 13 as well as medical help and good education are
available in the village itself, people would not want to migrate to the cities, they argued.
Dipankar Gupta (2005) has provocatively written about the demise of the Indian village
as a cultural and sociological phenomenon. He argues that growing numbers of villagers
are dependent upon non-agrarian sources for income and agriculture has stagnated in
most parts of the country. But young people like Sharad and Nahaar, although they
sought out the opportunities of the city or town, expressed a conflicting desire not to part
with the quality of life and support system provided by the village. Thus, even though
agriculture may not end up being the main source of income for a large number of
villagers, the village may continue to remain a sociological entity-it would be almost
akin to western suburbanization but bypassing the step of urbanization altogether.
The SEZ has provided very little benefit for Dhar according to Karan Singh Pawar
who has played an important role in the smooth functioning of the SEZ over the last 20
years. He says there are hardly any people from Dhar working in the companies and
factories in Pithampur; most are from other parts of India. The problem, according to him
is a dearth of skilled workers in Dhar. The requisite skill levels to participate in the urban
industrial economy beyond the level of a manual worker, i.e. to become a factory
foreman or supervisor are absent. Even if rural students may have completed middle
school or high school, their bookish knowledge is of no use in these skill-oriented jobs.
12 The village is still an important sociological phenomenon where kinship ties are a critical source of
support. Such ties are valuable even in urban slums and squatter settlements, although to a lesser degree.
The moral economy inherent in patron-client relationships is still visible to some extent between farmers
and labourers who are hired monthly or annually. But even for those who do not work for others in the
village, extended family relationships provide a support system on a daily basis, despite constant disputes
and conflicts inherent in such kinship relationships. The desire for urban anonymity and the need to get
away from constant social interference in the village is at the same time tempered by urban experiences of
loneliness and struggle.
13 Spiraling mobile phone ownership since 2007 has rapidly fulfilled this condition in the last 2 years.
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Companies do provide initial training for jobs but because of overall poor level of skill
development, most potential candidates from Dhar do not get selected according to
Pawar. Any other managerial level job requires a modicum of English, which is absent
wholesale from Dhar. Although there are a handful of "English Speaking Classes," their
focus on everyday conversation does not help students like Sharad who want to learn the
English required to study for an MBA degree and who may want to be a manager
someday. Even though Sharad may have the innate abilities to hold a white collar job, he
does not have the stepping stones in front of him to take that path. Laments Pawar, "The
SEZs in Madhya Pradesh have been successful as satellite cities of the three big towns-
Indore, Bhopal and Jabalpur. But as a rural policy, they have had no impact." Rather than
an opportunity for rural youth, the SEZ typically functions as a satellite to an urban center
where skilled workers from far off urban peripheries find jobs and the product of their
labour is sent back outside.
Even if the skill levels may be developed amongst these young men from
Ranipura, it is unclear where a policy of setting up industries in backward districts is
sustainable in the long run. In a "backward" district like Dhar there is no local raw
material available and neither is there local human capital (apart from manual labour),
everything comes from outside. This can create circumstances where the economics of
production do not work out. For instance, in the 1980s, the state-run Madhya Pradesh Oil
Federation built two soyabean and oil processing plants in "backward" districts.
Unfortunately, the location of the plants was based not on proximity to soyabean growing
areas or ports of export or soyabean processing facilities. A vanaspati (solidified oil, a
substitute for clarified butter or ghee) plant was established in Churhat, in Sidhi district,
more than a 1200 km from Sehore, the closest processing plant which supplied it with
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crude oil. Not only was it a backward district, Churhat was also the constituency of Arjun
Singh, the chief minister of MP from 1980 to 1985 and is the Minister for Human
Resource Development in the current Congress government in Delhi. The finished
product was sent back to Indore because the marketing branch of the Oilfed was located
there. It was obvious that the prohibitive transportation cost (especially with the poor rail
and road infrastructure in MP) would make the vanaspati plant unprofitable. 14 Another
plant was opened in Chhindwara, again a backward district as well as the constituency of
Kamal Nath, the current Congress government's commerce minister. The plant was
located on top of a hill. Somehow, the technical viability report, which should have been
negative, was positive."
If implemented with some foresight, the backward district policy might have led
to profitable industrialization instead of creating a trail of white elephants. There was, in
fact, a "no industry district" policy where private enterprises were given concessions and
subsidies to establish factories. O.P. Goel, the ex-President of the Soyabean Processors
Association (SOPA) started his factory, Krishna Oil Extraction Limited, under this
scheme in Pachor tehsil of Rajgarh district. This falls at the outer edge of the fertile
Malwa plateau where most of the soyabean is grown in Madhya Pradesh. His plant
benefited from the policy and was profitable. 16 But Pithampur as an SEZ survives
because it is linked to the city of Indore from where it can access the railway network to
source raw materials such as steel and aluminium and send out finished goods such as
cars and trucks. Very few local persons from Dhar have set up industries in Pithampur
and hardly any of them have been successful, according to Pawar.
14 Mr. Shaheed of Dhar and Mr. Rana of Indore, both worked for the Oil Federation in the 1980s and early
1990s.
15 Interview, Mr. Rana, Indore.
16 Interview, 28 February 2006.
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Finally, even ancillary economic effects on local commerce, retail, transport etc.,
that one would expect from an SEZ are also unfortunately not found in Pithampur. The
factories are self-sustained campuses within themselves, preferring to have their own
canteens, own transportation fleets, and own residential compounds (if at all). They are
able to provide quality support to their staff, which the poor public infrastructure of Dhar
cannot provide. In fact, most of the infrastructure in Pithampur tehsil, such as road
maintenance and power backup, has been paid for by the companies themselves,
according to Pawar; the government of Dhar has had a very small role to play. Moreover,
since the SEZ comes under special tax rules and is exempted from duties, the local
government does not receive much in the way of remuneration from these companies. In
fact, the sales tax office of Pithampur tehsil is actually in Indore, not in Dhar town. Pawar
estimates that the local economy generated via the SEZ is not more than 5% of the entire
turnover of Pithampur. This includes those people who may be deriving salaries as
drivers or gatekeepers, or earning through retail as shopkeepers in Pithampur, as well as
manual construction workers, mostly adivasis from other districts of Dhar who abound. 17
All that a backward district can provide is land and it is easier to acquire land for
industrial development in "backward" district. The SEZ was established in a somewhat
hilly area of Dhar and the state government played an important role in obtaining the
land. Ironically, the SEZ exists because it was able to obtain land in a "backward" district
like Dhar, but it survives because it is close to the commercial city of Indore from where
it can source skilled manpower, raw materials, and a market for finished goods.
Nahaar, Sharad, Lakhan and Kanhaiya are part of a growing group of youth who
are finding themselves displaced from agriculture altogether and unable to share in the
17 Interview, April 18-19, 2007.
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benefits accruing to Malwa through the yellow revolution. At the same time, they have
been unable to find the kind of work they want to do in the urban economy. They are
joining the ranks of a rural proletariat that is a mute participant, marginalized without
requisite skills to meaningfully participate and without the power to make its voice heard
above those of rural agricultural elites. This proletariat is finding itself increasingly
invisible, expendable, and outcast from narratives of development that focus specifically
on the rural through agricultural interventions or on the urban through industrial
projects-a dichotomy that leaves these young people in the middle of nowhere.
Bypassed by the Yellow Revolution: Women in Malwa
Discussions of the rural and specifically, the yellow revolution, subsume women
within the category of "the farmer." It is assumed that when the discussion is about upper
caste farmers or lower caste labourers, their wives and female family members are all part
of "the male farmer/labourer" and are affected in the same way. In contrast, this research
shows, the yellow revolution has for all intents and purposes, not significantly benefited
women of all castes in Ranipura. The shift to growing soyabean has transferred control
over household resources to the male domain and reduced the access of women to the
fruits of their labour, except through mediation with men (cf. Agarwal 1994).
Soyabean is a cash crop and its value can only be realised by selling it for cash
through an intermediary in the village or taking it to the market yard, activities which are
conducted almost always by men. Women do not ordinarily go to the market yard nor
interact with traders in the village-their husbands, brothers, sons, or other male family
members do so. But women's labour is crucial to the growing of soyabean. In those
families using bullocks and family labour to farm, women participate in the sowing
alongside men as two people are needed for the task. They also complete the weeding by
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themselves, usually when men are working on other farmers' lands in the village spraying
pesticide or hoeing. Most such women also go to work in soyabean fields of others for
weeding. Families with a large amount of land sow soyabean using borrowed or self-
owned tractors and they hire labourers to weed, hoe, and spray pesticides. But their
women supervise these labourers and often participate in the weeding alongside. At the
harvest all women, regardless of whether they belong to tractor families or bullock
families, work alongside agricultural labourers in harvesting the crop with sickles,
working in the sun all day long. Male farmers do not participate in the actual process of
cutting but walk alongside supervising the labourers. Women's labour is also critical for
improving the quality of the soyabean crop. They are the ones who sieve the soyabean,
remove impurities like small stones and foreign matter by hand and improve its quality
thus, fetching a higher price for the farmer.
Yet, even though women labour longer and harder in the soyabean fields than
men, they do not have direct access to the cash resulting from the sale of the crop. Other
crops like lentils, vegetables, spices, and corn, unless specifically grown for the market,
are directly under women's control and are often used to trade for clothing items, food or
other accessories. Even wheat is commonly used within the village to conduct
transactions. But although village shopkeepers take payment in soyabean, other
households do not. Even though soyabean may be stored in the house as a form of
savings, and even if women use it to trade, ultimately they have to entrust the task of
converting it into a usable unit of value or cash to a male intermediary.
The implication of this is that even though the there is availability of more cash in
the village, it has not resulted in greater consumption or easing of the labour burden for
women. When I first started my fieldwork in Ranipura, I could not see the "yellow
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revolution" and monetary prosperity that scientists and "good farmers" had spoken to me
about. Yes, I saw tractors, several motorcycles, televisions, farm implements, tubewells,
cable television antennas, and later on, mobile phones. But Rajput, Jat, Maru, and adivasi
women still walked to the handpump or the water tank or a tubewell to fill water in
aluminum and earthen pots and carried them back to their house on their heads. Upper
and lower women still carried bundles of clothes in aluminium baskets to the pond and
washed them at the edge of the spillway. 80 percent of the women still cooked food using
firewood or dung cakes in mud stoves that created smoke, made them teary-eyed and
caused difficulty breathing. Almost all the women cooked and cleaned and did the
household work under very little light from the kerosene lamp. Even during the
brightness of day, houses were pitch dark and it would take about five minutes for the
eyesight to get adjusted. Most women completed all the households tasks in this light.
Almost 70 percent of the women went to the bathroom out in the fields-Jat, Rajput,
Maru and adivasi. A recently widowed young Jat woman's only grievance to me was that
she could not freely go to the bathroom during the day. Being a new widow she was not
expected to leave her house but in this case she did not have a choice. She had to go
under the cover of darkness either early morning or in the evening. A few weeks earlier
we had heard of an old woman from a nearby village who died of a snake bite during one
such trip. With the severe water shortages that began as a result of growing soyabean and
high-yielding varieties of wheat (see chapter one), maintaining cleanliness and sanitation
became an even more difficult task for women. It was worse in the summer when water
needed to be brought from a handful of tubewells from far away fields as all the
handpumps and tubewells in the village dried up, and everyone had to make do with
using the bare minimum possible for all their needs.
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It was no wonder then that most of the children in the village were poorly dressed,
their clothes unkempt and unclean. Their mothers barely had time in the day to finish all
the household chores, fetching water, the cooking and cleaning, washing clothes, feeding
the children, taking care of guests like me, and finally heading over to the fields for
weeding, cutting, supervising. Or else, cleaning the newly harvested crop, pickling fruits
and vegetables, grinding spices, grinding wheat flour, gram flour or making chana dal
from chickpeas. The list was endless. In all this, until they bore a male child, their
reproductive responsibilities were not over.
On the other hand, it was common to see upper caste men sitting at the Tejaji
temple or the Ram temple sharing gossip and playing cards. Diesel threshers reduced the
threshing time spent by men from several days to several hours. Tractor sowing reduced
the sowing time from a few days to a few hours. From the cash obtained with the sale of
soyabean, lower caste men purchased motorycles, mobile phones, radios and televisions.
Upper caste men dug more tubewells and purchased diesel generators. But the 300 rupees
every year for the electricity bill for a water tank in the village was consistently not paid
on time by most upper caste families. Every day that the water tank was not functional,
upper caste women walked to the handful of tubewell spouts in the village located in the
houses of a few upper caste families to fill water. And this was a very frequent
occurrence.
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Jat and Maru women filling water pots from the tubewell behind Bharat Jat's house when the
water tank was not working. July 2007. Photo by Richa Kumar.
Thus, shifting to growing soyabean has transferred control over household
resources to the male domain and reduced the ability of women to directly access the
fruits of their labour. Even though the yellow revolution resulted in more cash in the
hands of farmers, the consumption it engendered reduced the labour burden of men and
did not greatly impact the labour of women. The popularity of motorcycles, tractors,
threshers, tubewells and tubewell motors, diesel generators, and other such items,
alongside the absence of indoor plumbing, latrines, light bulbs in the house, domestic gas
connections or biogas units, and even refrigerators and home inverters, reflected the deep
gender-bias of the prosperity that came through Malwa with the yellow revolution-a
gender bias that transcended class and caste.' 8
18 Ruth Shwartz Cowan (1983) has argued that domestic technologies in rural America replaced men's
work with machines that could be used by women and thus, converted it into women's work. In many
cases, technologies raised the expected standard of cleanliness and housekeeping rather than actually
reducing the labour of women. Ronald Kline (2000) has further argued that women ended up doing more
barn work and farm work rather than housework with the time saved by using new technologies. Similarly,
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Suraj Jat and his brother Girijalal were the two richest households in Ranipura.
Their wives laboured as long and hard as Rewa bai, the poorest adivasi widow in the
village. Girijalal's wife, Savitabai expressed her frustration to me one day. In general
interactions she had seemed quite spunky and upbeat, quite unlike a typical daughter-in-
law with downcast eyes that I had met in other upper caste households. She never stepped
out of the house but inside she seems to exhibit her freedom. Jat women had more
freedom than Rajput women in terms of covering their faces, talking to outsiders, and
going out of the house. But one day I asked her about the house we were sitting in. It was
built of cement and concrete but it was unfinished. There were no doors or windows or
any other wood work. There was no paint and no flooring. No lights or fans or electric
connections. She said, what you see is in itself a big thing. "I gave an ultimatum to my
husband and father-in-law that I want a new house built. I moved to the back of the old
house with all my utensils. The old house leaked. I couldn't work." She got all the hay
moved from the back of the old house by a labourer. She ensured that the whole house
was broken. And so the new house was made. But then the money was spent. So the
house just has cement and a white wash. They spent 7-8 lakh rupees already but 3-4 lakh
rupees more is still needed.
In 2006, her husband sold the wheat and bought a new tractor from a bank
foreclosure and a brand new thresher. He already had both a tractor and a thresher. The
new set was to give out on hire to other people in the village and make some money on
the side. The total cost would be about 5-6 lakh rupees approximately. "I told him to fix
the house but he didn't listen," she said. "Now he's working 24 hours threshing other
people's soyabean and sowing other people's wheat. I told him, you are all alone, you
one could expect the introduction of domestic technologies in rural India to have a similar impact-women
might raise their standard of living, but these technologies might still reinforce a patriarchal way of life.
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won't be able to handle it, you don't have any brothers. He didn't listen. Now he comes
back for lunch and dinner and shouts at me and everyone in the house, including Manju. I
told him, I never asked you to buy a tractor or a thresher. So why are you yelling at me?
But it is all the same." Manju is Girijalal's niece and she has come to stay in Ranipura
and help out with the housework because Savitabai cannot handle it all by herself with
two little children. Since Girijalal has no brothers and all his sisters are married, Savita
bai has to handle the household and the family all by herself and Girijalal had to take care
of his 15 hectares and the rent out business single-handed.
During another visit to their house, I saw Manju and Savitabai cleaning sacks of
soyabean that had too many mud particles and sticks. They had already done 6-7 quintals
and several more bags were stacked around them. I asked Girijalal, who had just stopped
by, why he could not get labourers to do the work? He replied, "What will the women do
in their free time at home anyway?" Later on Savita bai said, "He [Girijilal] keeps saying
that women don't have any work in the house. But there are so many animals, so much
animal dung I have to clean every morning, cleaning, cooking. In my mother's home
[maika] women do not have to work so hard. In Ranipura women have so much work in
the fields and at home. I don't go to the fields because of my little one but all other
women have to do that also." They did not even have a television for some distraction
and entertainment. Girijalal sold the old one they had and had not bought a new one till
then. He simply refused to acknowledge that the women of the family worked all day and
barely got any rest.
The situation of Suraj Jat's wife, Gangabai was worse. With her husband being
the village Patel and interested in politics, she had guests, non-stop in her house. Suraj
Jat, too, was an only son and his wife was all alone handling the housework, supervising
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the farm labourers, and dealing with her difficult mother-in-law all day long. After a few
months into my fieldwork when I realized her situation, every time I stayed over for
lunch with my assistant and driver, I tried to help her out in the kitchen. In the summer of
2007, when I stopped by, Suraj Jat asked her to give everyone cold buttermilk [chhaach].
She said to him, "I don't have cold buttermilk for everybody. If you will not buy me a
fridge and an inverter, how do you expect me to keep cold buttermilk for everyone?" As
if on cue, I expressed my shock to Suraj Jat asking him why he couldn't buy her these
items for a few thousand rupees when he had just spent more than one lakh rupees
digging a tubewell 1000 feet deep that yielded no water? His wife responded, "He is like
that only." Some weeks later, both items were installed in the house.
A few months later during the harvest in 2007, I sat with Gangabai at the edge of
one of their fields one afternoon. Labourers were harvesting the crop and Suraj Jat was
supervising the threshing. Gangabai had been supervising the labourers and was tired.
She started out saying, "how much can one supervise the labourers? At some point one
has to trust them. But Bai [Suraj Jat's mother] does not trust anyone. She is never
satisfied with what I do. She shouts all the time, there is never any word of kindness
[daya nahi hai, vishwas nahi hai]." I had already had my own experiences with Bai. I had
learnt that Suraj Jat's daughter Tina wanted to study further but had been taken out of
school after 10h standard because Bai had raised objections. For some reason I thought,
let me try to intervene. I tried to talk to Bai in a light hearted manner about Tina but Bai
took it as a serious affront. She replied, albeit casually, "It does not suit us [our caste, our
family] to educate girls [Ladkiyon ko padhaana hamare ko suit nahi karta]." Since that
day Bai waged a cold war against me. Whereas in the past she had been very keen for her
picture to be taken, after this episode, whenever I visited, she would not talk to me.
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Gangabai continued, "There is everything that God has given us. What is it that
we lack? Enough land, farms, food, house, good children, good son/husband. But there is
no peace [shanti] in the house. Without peace it is meaningless. Ever since the day I got
married Bai is this way. ... Tina is suffering. Bai doesn't allow any tape, any music. No
TV. She even shuts off the fridge saying it consumes lot of electricity, you have to stop
the bill. ... She never trusts anyone. That's why she doesn't want to send Tina anywhere."
Tina's two younger brothers were living in a hostel in Dhar and going to school. Tina
wanted to go stay with them in the hostel, attend tuition classes and prepare for her 12th
standard exams. But Bai had raised such a hue and cry that both Suraj Jat and his wife
told Tina to forget about it. She was persistent and said they were sacrificing her life
because of Bai. But they couldn't do anything about it. Gangabai may be the wife of the
richest farmer in Ranipura and the most powerful man in the village, yet, she felt a
complete lack of control over her life and that of her daughter.
As a married woman myself, women often asked me whether my husband or my
in-laws raised any objections about my work, my travel to the village, being so far away
from home. I was lucky, I told them. My mother-in-law had always encouraged me to do
this. My husband, too, had been most supportive about my travels-I started my
fieldwork exactly two months after getting married. Women were always surprised to
hear this. They would nod their head and wonder if I was really married or not. I did not
wear any of the marks of a married woman-red sindoor in the parting of my hair,
bangles in my hands, a round bindi on my forehead, or toe-rings in my feet. Whenever
women asked me about it (no men ever questioned me directly about it but several of
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them questioned my assistant), 19 I would say, "Men don't have to wear any mark to show
that they are married, why should we women? I wear a ring and my husband does too. So
that is my mark." And then I would show them my ring. But a few months into my
fieldwork, once women felt they had got to know me a bit more, many of them started
criticizing my lack of wearing any wedding symbols. At least wear a toe-ring, they said.
It is not right to be married and not wear anything. Ironically, I had been defying my own
mother-in-law's requests to wear these symbols but I acquiesced to the wishes of other
married women in the village and started wearing a bangle and a toe-ring.
The rules of the gender hierarchy of patrilineality were most often implemented
by women upon other women. While they would often feel constrained in their own
relationships, many women did not question such hierarchies in the way someone of my
social and class background would often want to do. Nevertheless, some women found a
sense of freedom in participating in Swadhyay, the religious revivalist movement which
questioned the very lines of exclusion that framed their lives. I now turn to describing
Swadhyay and discuss the language of empowerment it provides to some women and
semi-educated young adivasi men of Ranipura.
Swadhyay: Creating a Sociality of Faith
The lines of exclusion that circumscribe the lives of people like Nahaar and
Gangabai have not been challenged by the yellow revolution. Both semi-educated young
adivasi men and upper caste women have tried to overcome their situation by
19 My assistant was Maharashtrian and his wife only wore a mangalsutra (black bead necklace) around her
neck. In their caste, women did not put sindoor. He would tell the villagers that in Orissa (where my
husband is from), women don't have to put sindoor. Moreover, "Madam is from Delhi," he would explain,
"In the cities women don't wear these things any more." But, of course no one believed him because even
on television they would see urban women in the Ekta Kapoor soap operas wearing fancy bindis and
mangalsutras and sindoor. It was only a year after my fieldwork began that my husband visited Ranipura-
and that's when everyone truly believed that I was married.
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participating in a religious revivalist movement in Ranipura, known as Swadhyay.
Swadhyay is a Hindu religious movement popular in parts of western India (Hardiman
2007: 57-60) that is based on the philosophy that each person is equal--the same blood
flows through all our bodies. The Swadhyay movement was started in the 1950s by
Pandurang Shastri Athavale, a Brahmin, as a response to divisions in Indian society.
Based on the fundamental teachings of the Gita, one of the holy books of Hinduism, the
aim of Swadhyay is to make people self-aware and transcend their ego. The Gita is the
sermon given by Lord Krishna to prince Arjun as he heads into the battlefield to fight
against his own cousins in a battle of good against evil. It is part of the Mahabharata, one
of the two main epic mythological stories of Hinduism. Athavale received the Ramon
Magsaysay Award for Community Leadership in 1996 (Magsayay 1996).
Kanak, the 16-year old son of Harivansh Rathod who wanted to become a doctor
was one of the most enthusiastic young Swadhyayees in Ranipura. When asked why was
he a part of Swadhyay when it would not help in his career or future, he replied he was a
part of it for "improving his life U[eevan vikas ke liye]. It is a study of the self [Swa-
adhyay] through meditation. We must be grateful to God for giving us this life."
Swadhyay first began in Ranipura in 1995 when Swadhyayees from Dhar came to
Ranipura and stayed for 6 days. No one gave them shelter and they finally stayed at the
Hanuman temple. They didn't take food or tea from anyone and they didn't ask anything.
They just went around telling people about God, the Gita, and Trikaal Sandhya (the
prayer of Swadhyay) and that we need to remember God.
Seema, a 30 year old married Rajput woman described to me how it all began.
When the group came to Ranipura, Seema was at her mother's place delivering her
second child. Some people liked the Swadhyayees and their words while others didn't,
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recalls Seema. Her husband and three other Rajput and Maru men were influenced by
these people and decided to start a kendra, or a centre, in their village. Dadaji, Pandit
Athavale Shastri, the founder of Swadhyay had recorded his teachings in videos, lectures,
and other literature. Each week the kendra centred around one set of written or visual
materials sent from Bombay by the Swadhyay trust. Five educated persons had to explain
what they felt was the essence of the material to others in groups of 20 or so. Participants
were encouraged to read and view the material, comment upon it individually and
conduct a discussion in the group. There were different kendras for young men, older
men, young girls, older women, and even children.
"When I came back to Ranipura, I did not understand why my husband used to go
once a week for one hour to the Kendra," said Seema. "I didn't let him go saying let's
watch TV here or you spend time with your wife. ... Slowly slowly he tried to make me
understand. I had only studied till 5th standard. I couldn't read Hindi very well and this
was Sanskrit. It took me two years to finally start figuring out the Trikaal Sandhya. My
husband would ensure he always said it in front of me and made me say it. He would
ensure we had meals together so I would say it."
The Trikaal Sandhya is the foundational prayer of Swadhyay. According to
Seema, "We must remember God at least thrice a day, while continuing to do our own
work. We must say "thanks" to him. When we sleep God takes away all our memories
and lets us sleep soundly. In the morning we ask God for smriti and get all our memories
back. Before lunch we ask God for shakti. The food we eat is made into our "blood" and
we get energy from it. Before we sleep we ask God to give us sound sleep and get
shanti."
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The first time her husband took Seema to the temple for the kendra, she only went
because some ladies had come in a group from Gujarat. Her fear was "what will people
say that a lady is going out like that or a lady is talking?" Her fear was not unjustified.
Women of the Rajput caste did not uncover their heads and faces in front of any male
member in the family. Even today a Rajput widow cannot remarry even if her husband
died before ever seeing her. Seema recounts how in the past ladies had to remove their
shoes while crossing the Ram temple, which they invariably did several times a day to
fetch water from the water tank and wash clothes in the village pond. Men didn't have to
do that. "It was so hard with the heavy load on the head and the mud. There wasn't any
road earlier. Stones used to prick (chubhte) the feet. ...People used to think women are
like pair ki jooti; that women are good for nothing. They are only fit to be at the chowki
[hearth] and raise kids."
But Seema persisted because of the insistence of her husband. She learned to read
Hindi to some extent and now, although she cannot read all the material that comes, her
children and their cousins read it out to her. "We get "knowledge" about different things.
We have learnt how to live a better life because of the character sketches which come as
reading material. How Sita lived and how Ram lived; what it means to be a good human
being. ...I have finally got the confidence to speak, to speak with outsiders [baharwale]
like you. Earlier I would just laugh and not know what to say. Now I can talk with so
much confidence, so much "knowledge"." In the past her husband used to get angry with
her and once right after marriage family elders saw her with her head partially uncovered.
Her husband shouted at her and she agreed with him that women should keep fully
covered, it was her fault. But after joining Swadhyay her husband has changed, says
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Seema. "He never beat me but he used to get angry. Now he does not even get that
angry."
Swadhyay has a unique method of propagation. According to Balwant, another
young Rajput who has completed all five levels of study of Swadhyay philosophy and the
Gita, they take their own time, ticket, and tiffin.20 Wherever they visit, they only take
water and nothing else. They give freely of their time. Seema says, "once others see that
we are freely giving and not asking for anything they start to change their attitude." As a
rule only couples go to other houses to talk about Swadhyay. Says Seema, "A woman is
not so weak. She can fend for herself. Dadaji says she has eight times the strength of
men. Only if the woman goes along in visiting others can the message reach inside to the
hearth [chulah]. No one will entertain a man alone." Seema and her husband have a set of
14 households that they visit once every fortnight, including lower caste adivasi families.
This is known as the bhavpheri or bhaktipheri [devotional visit]. Seema even had
the opportunity to visit families in a village 30 km away with her husband and two other
couples from Ranipura. Seema and her husband keep visiting the designated houses in the
village till the couple finally agrees to come and attend the kendra. They handhold a
couple through the prayers, the readings, and discussions. Once a couple is comfortable,
Seema and her husband move on to another couple. They have been going to sit at the
house of the adivasi family of Kedar Makwana and his wife (Nahaar's cousin). Seema
said that although both understood the teachings, they had not yet started coming to the
kendra all the time.
20 Ticket refers to paying for their own travel to visit other villages and tiffin refers to the food they would
carry with them when they visited.
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Nahaar, on the other hand, was deeply involved in Swadhyay and had even
traveled to Bombay and Shirdi in Maharashtra to visit the headquarters of Swadhyay and
the temple of Sai baba. He had gone with Sitaramba Maru, one of the earlier organizers
of Swadhyay in Ranipura. Nahaar's wife and his mother attended the Swadhyay kendra
regularly, which was held in Anup Makwana's house. Sitaramba took the kendra for men
and Balwant's wife took the kendra for women. A few older adivasi ladies attended the
kendra but they were only beginning to understand about the movement. According to
Seema, adivasis were not allowed to come and sit at the main Swadhyay kendra at the
Ram temple. Some Rajput elders who were not part of Swadhyay raised objections to
having them do so, hence the separate kendra at Anup's house. However, only somewhat
educated and financially better off adivasis like Nahaar and Anup have joined the
movement, wholeheartedly.
This is where the Swadhyay movement is foundationally challenging the lines of
exclusion that frame rural society. The central philosophical idea is that "God is inside
each one of us. Because of the God inside we are all divine brothers and sisters [dev bhai
bahen]. If we behave badly towards one another [raag dvesh] then we are hurting that
God." Hence, acts like mistreating women and discriminating against those from other
castes are acts against God. This fundamental egalitarian ethic makes Swadhyay
appealing to the oppressed. But simply having an egalitarian ethic does not bring about
change. The transformational potential of Swadhyay is in its weekly kendras and its
method of propagation that insists upon the direct participation of women. Kanak
Rathod's elder sister Juhi is another enthusiastic Swadhyayee. She is the leader of the
young women's kendra in Ranipura. She says because of Swadhyay, "Girls get to talk to
each other, go to other people's houses, participate in debates, elocution, and even travel
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to other places. Earlier, they would not let girls even go out of the house. Girls couldn't
even go talk to their female relatives in other parts of the village." Juhi is referring
primarily to Rajput girls, who were under the strictest of supervision lest there be any
untoward incident to scandalize the family name.
Juhi's father is completely against Swadhyay. He has been unsuccessfully trying
to find a groom for her for the last several years. Unfortunately, in terms of marriage
prospects, she is highly educated compared to other Rajput girls her age, having finished
her second year Bachelor of Arts through correspondence. She is also one of the foremost
young Swadhyayees in the village. Her father explained to my assistant during a lunch
sponsored by Swadhyay families in the village,
"I am "against" Swadhyay. I have come today because all the villagers have come. ... Our
relatives are angry. They are not accepting matrimonial alliances with our boys and girls.
The first question I am asked when I go to see a prospective match is, which village are
you from? I say Ranipura. They say there everyone is part of Swadhyay. Are you also
part of it? [Aap jude hain kya?] They say we don't want a girl from that village. I am
forced to lie to them saying the [Rajput] Swadhyayees are very distant relations, they are
not from our family. But they still refuse saying that it will still have some impact on the
girl's character [us se ladki mein bhi sanskaar aayenge]."
Juhi's father has been the most vehement and public face of opposition to
Swadhyay in Ranipura, even against his own cousins and family members. He is a tired
and frustrated old man. He failed in his efforts to find an alliance for Juhi before retiring
from government service in 2008. His second daughter also stays with him because her
husband has been in prison for the last few years. He may have a pacca house and enough
income to feed his family and pay for Kanak's education, but with an unmarried daughter
he has not yet fulfilled the most important duty of a father and fears losing self-respect
and status amongst the larger Rajput community.
He further told my assistant,
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"Earlier ladies would not come in front of us and would stay covered under the veil
[ladies log purdah pratha se humare saamne bahaar nahi aati thi]. Now in Swadhyay
they go to Dhar, they are giving lectures on the podium, they are debating. ... Outsiders
say Rajput's are losing respect [Rajput logon ki naak kat rahi hai]. Rajputs are known for
their pride [Aan baan shaan ke liye jo Rajput log jana jate hain]. Now Rajput ladies are
going out of the house, they are going to study [Ab Rajput ladies ghar ke bahaar nikal
rahi hain, padhne likhne ja rahi hain]. ... Swadhyay will spell the doom for Rajputs in the
coming time [Swadhyay le doobega Rajput logon ko aanewale samay mein]."
It was surprising to see the resilience of Juhi and Kanak in their enthusiastic
participation in Swadhyay against such opposition from their father. Their mother always
behaved like the traditional Rajput wife and never once came out to the front of the house
whenever I visited. Even when I went to the kitchen to talk to her, I would only end up
talking to her daughters.
Similarly, Suraj Jat's mother has been dead against Swadhyay but for completely
different reasons. According to Gangabai, her daughter-in-law, Bai was never involved in
God much. When some Swadhyay couples came visiting, Bai drove them out of the
house. Every Monday Seema's sister-in-law and some others would come. Gangabai
liked it but Bai would keep shouting and raising objections. So finally the group shifted
their meeting to the house of a Maru family next door. Gangabai started following
Swadhyay since 2004. She recites the Trikaal Sandhya prayer three times a day with her
daughter Tina. Her husband does not do it himself but he lets her and Tina do it. He does
not stop them.
"He will come and take his food at 8:30 in the evening on his own if he sees us doing the
prayer. He will not disturb. ....Bai does not understand. She doesn't have anything to do
with God. She doesn't let me light even one incense stick. But I don't listen to her any
longer [Ek agarbatti nahi lagane deti. Par main nahi sunti ab]. ...This is the work of
God. Why should I not do it? I will do it. If we cannot take out 10 minutes for God from
the day, what use is it?" she says.
The moral righteousness in Gangabai's words is apparent. She feels empowered
enough to contradict her mother-in-law because she has been able to occupy a culturally
constructed subject position where her authority comes from within the particular social
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and cultural milieu of Ranipura. Although structures of meaning and positions of power
can also emerge by evoking universal discourses of rights and using the language of
development as entitlement, for Gangabai, these positions are unavailable. At the same
time, even though it may not change her everyday life labouring from dawn to dusk, she
has found within her own cultural hierarchies and inequalities, a position allowing her to
express agency and feel empowered.
Vignesh Singh Rathod, the main leader of Swadhyay in Ranipura, expressed his
anger and sadness at the response of people like Bai. We were having a conversation
almost one and a half years after I started my fieldwork in Ranipura. I was trying to
arrange for a female tutor to help a few girls in the village study for the 10th standard and
12h standard examinations that they were taking by correspondence. One of the girls was
Suraj Jat's daughter. Another was Vigneshji's daughter. I was asking for Vigneshji's
advice regarding a place we could use in the village to bring all the girls together. He
suggested Suraj Jat's house as it was the only large pacca house in the village with a lot
of space in front. Vigneshji's own house was cramped with the families of the three
brothers and bags of soyabean, garlic, and wheat stacked everywhere. I responded to the
suggestion saying that Bai was not keen to encourage the girls to study. That is when
Vigneshji responded with veiled anger. "Bai does not understand. She does not
understand God's work [Bhagwan ke karya]. God makes our blood, he helps us digest
our food. ...Bai thinks will we get more money through this? Will we personally benefit?
She only sees material things. She does not see how much she will gain inside. Having a
lot of money but not having good behaviour, no kindness [daya], no feeling for others,
what is there in such a life? Even beggars are returned from that house empty-handed."
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When I had just started my fieldwork and interviewed Vigneshji for the first time,
he was the one who explained Swadhyay to me. He was very enthusiastic and tried to
enroll me into the project. I am a Hindu but my personal beliefs about religion have been
very passive. I did not actively participate in rituals nor did I visit temples as part of my
life routine. I bordered on the agnostic but I would celebrate festivals like Diwali and
Holi. Hence, I found Vigneshji's insistence on talking to me only about Swadhyay rather
than soyabean difficult to handle. Every time I met him he would launch into an
exposition on Swadhyay, questioning my lack of religiosity, and emphasizing the notion
that one should remember God, thank him for giving us life, and treat each other as
divine brothers and sisters. A few months into my fieldwork I learnt that his daughter's
studies had been terminated at the end of the 9 th standard. She could not go to school
anymore to finish her 10th standard. His son was in 10h standard in the same school. I
asked him, "Couldn't they walk the one kilometer distance together?" His mother replied,
"She can only go if there are other girls her age going to school also." I responded that
two girls from the Maru caste were studying in 9th standard in the same school. At this his
mother said, "She cannot go with the Maru girls because they are not from our caste." My
immediate response was how can this be the case for your own family when you are a
part of Swadhyay? Vigneshji said, "Not everyone is a part of it, maybe not even everyone
in my family." For the moment forgetting about Swadhyay, he emphasized the social
demands of his caste and need for maintaining Rajput honour-his desire not to forego
the respect, the honour, the pride. He said, "Our [caste's] standards are very high. There
is so much delicateness [bareeki] involved in our caste that you have to be very careful. If
something is done by one son or daughter then the entire family is outcasted from the
Rajput samaj [caste]."
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When a year later, I was trying to find a female tutor for the girls, I asked
Vigneshji for his support. We needed a place to use as a school. That is when Vigneshji
suggested the use of Suraj Jat's house. I told him I had found a young woman in Dhar
who was willing to come to Ranipura once a week and teach the girls for the next six
months until the examinations. Although initially I thought that Vigneshji would be
supportive, when he heard that I had found a lady tutor, he became uncomfortable. He
told me in no uncertain terms that so far my reputation in the village had been very good,
but if something untoward happened, then he would not be responsible for the
consequences. "Make sure that the madam you bring has a good character. She should
not have loose moral character." I was taken aback. He was telling me that my reputation
would be at stake. Everything I had built up in the last one and a half years would come
to naught. He said, "I am telling you this because you are like our family. Otherwise no
one in the village will say this to you." At one level I felt good that he opened up and told
me this directly. I responded by saying, "I am glad you told me this. We will try our best
but we need your help and support. If possible can you vet the character of the potential
teacher in Dhar since you know people there? If something is wrong we will change her."
He replied, "If something is wrong we will not send our girl. If others want to send, it's
their choice." Here I was taken aback. He was simply washing his hands off the whole
thing. I said, "Don't do that...if you take your girl out, others will also not send their
girls. So it won't work out anyway."
Ultimately, despite all the interventions of Swadhyay, women were still
considered to be the crucible of the morality and honour of the men and caste pride of the
Rajputs was paramount. Swadhyay questioned the very basic cultural self-perceptions of
Rajputs as conservative patriarchs. One could argue that even though Vigneshji believes
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in the egalitarian ethic as a philosophy, too much adherence to it will fundamentally
break down the very basis of the Hindu joint family and cause more conflict in the
village. Vigneshji's family is held up as the model joint family in the village where there
is a single hearth and the farming is still undivided. The family has grown out of poverty
through the hard work of the three brothers. Yet, Vigneshji has to contend with the fact
that both his younger brothers drink alcohol excessively and have behaved badly with
others in the village. If he does not exercise the power of being the eldest brother, he
cannot control them and he cannot keep his own house in order. Even though Vigneshji
was a faithful adherent of Swadhyay, everyday interactions like these brought out the
contradictions inherent in his life, as he tried to maintain order through traditional
patrilineal structures but at the same time advocated for equality of castes and gender
within a traditional religious setup.
Conclusion
Development, like culture, can be seen as a dominating discursive force
structuring the way people think about change. At the same time, it is a project of
meaning making and enabling people to empower themselves by using it as a project of
claiming rights within the nation state. It is a shared vocabulary of entitlements that can
be demanded. But the language of entitlement and development and the benefits of the
yellow revolution have not been available to people like Seema and Gangabai. Their
subordinate position in society has instead, been reinforced. Young adults like Nahaar
and Sharad who do see themselves as belonging to the agrarian economy but do not have
the requisite skills to fully participate in the industrializing or service economy, also fall
through the cracks when rural development is approached solely through mechanisms
such as the yellow revolution or the Special Economic Zone.
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This chapter has tried to delineate the lives of these people who live in a space of
interruptions. It has argued for paying attention to cultural projects that they participate
in, which provide them with a language of empowerment and an avenue for struggling
against the lines of exclusion which frame their lives. Even though the contradictions
between caste pride, patriarchal values, and the values of Swadhyay are visible, this
religious revivalist movement offers upper caste women and some semi-educated and
financially better-off adivasis a socially acceptable avenue to feel empowered and assert
greater control over their lives. By linking upper castes and lower castes together in
ascribing to a faith based on the principle of equality, Swadhyay has the greatest potential
for rupturing traditional hierarchies of caste and gender. The egalitarian ethic of
Swadhyay provides a culturally framed and thus, socially acceptable model for human
feeling, intention and action for people like Nahaar and Seema to follow (Ortner 1997).
Seema says, "Before Swadhyay I didn't know what life was meant for. Now I know what
is the meaning of my life. God has given us this body and this life so that we make
something of it and don't live like animals."
Yet, Swadhyay is not an avenue chosen by a majority of adivasis in Ranipura.
Unlike Nahaar and Anup who are already financially somewhat better off and feel the
need to be more like the upper castes, most adivasis are still struggling to make ends meet
in a daily quest to find work. Adivasis have historically been caught up in webs of
domination by the state, by market actors, and by structures of caste, and their
mobilization until the 1990s was in the form of an indigenous right to land and resources
(Baviskar 2005). But many of them in Dhar and Jhabua have been enamoured by the
BJP's version of Hindutva. Amita Baviskar, an anthropologist who studied the Narmada
Bachao Andolan through the eyes of a village on the river in Jhabua writes that by joining
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the ranks of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), adivasis feel empowered not only
in everyday encounters but by imagining themselves as part of a hegemonic Hindu
majority, rather than in a disempowered subaltern state (Baviskar 2005: 5107, 5110). Of
course, such empowerment comes with a whole new dominating discursive framework of
a singular Hindu identity against a Muslim other.
For the young people discussed above, both Hindutva and Swadhyay have
provided them culturally constructed subject positions where they can exercise agency
and feel empowered. But the difference between the BJP's Hindutva and Athavale's
Swadhyay is that while one recruits by creating a hated other, the other recruits by
transcending the self. Thus, it is necessary to contest a monolithic version of Hindu
religious practice that subsumes all religious expression as directed towards the hatred of
the other. At the same time, it suggests that there is a need to try and understand in
sociological terms why such a religious revivalist movement with an egalitarian ethic and
disruptive potential appeals to upper caste men, who it ostensibly seeks to disempower. I
argue that it is important to pay attention to these alternative languages and cultural
projects of meaning making that people pursue to resist marginalization, for there may be
no other languages within the framework of development that they could use to question
and subvert the lines of exclusion framing their lives.
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Conclusion
Throughout this dissertation I have focused on the transformations that have taken
place in Malwa over the last forty years with the introduction of soyabean cultivation.
Having come to the end of this journey I feel it is useful to go back once more to the
beginning--to the place where I started. A few months after I began research in Dhar in
2006, I wrote the following notes about my initial impressions of the place:
When I say I am in Dhar, two hours from Indore, many Delhi-dwellers have to
first figure out where is Indore in Madhya Pradesh? Dhar and Ranipura are not conjured
up in the images of "India shining"-the India that is poised to take off. They are part of
"India watching"-seeing where the former goes. Dhar is described as one of the most
"backward" districts of MP with an adivasi population of more than 50% and with very
high rates of poverty. Before my visit, I had imagined a place with poor infrastructure,
very few buildings, sparsely populated, with no public transportation, frequent electricity
blackouts, and no modern goods and services.
But the town defies its image that is in the minds of the urban, westernized
audience. In the last year itself, Dhar got three ATM machines, gleaming new, with
security guards sometimes there, sometimes just an empty chair. Over the last ten years,
new housing colonies were built with houses of all sizes and styles for every budget. One
of these buildings is the swanky new Airtel office, the largest mobile phone company in
India that is expanding operations in Madhya Pradesh. Another is the bungalow of Lal
Seth, the chickpea trader who built a fortune in the Dhar market yard. With sandstone
exteriors, two large ornate gates, a manicured garden, parapets and turrets, his house
looks like an import from any of Delhi's latest colonies. Cable television and satellite
dish TV are commonly available; cable wars have slashed rates for consumers, and even
foreign channels are available. I suggested to my landlady's cousin's daughter to watch
Star World or Hallmark channels for re-runs of Friends, Everybody loves Raymond,
Seinfeld, etc., to get a hang of the American accent to prepare for her call centre job
application.
In Ranipura, on lifetime-free, one-time 2000-rupee paid satellite dish televisions,
I have watched news from all over the world with villagers whenever the electricity
comes back on. Whether it is bomb blasts in Mumbai, new malls and fashion shows in
Delhi, the wedding of filmstars, George Bush's visit to India, or the Asian Games in
Doha, most TV-owners are well-informed about the latest in the news. Villagers ask me
about the Iraq war and about buying a new Nokia mobile phone from Delhi. They hire a
digital video photographer to capture a village wedding, and dream of someday flying to
Delhi on a low cost airline along with me. Young men with stylish hairdos sport
fashionably shaded jeans-some imitating Mahendra Singh Dhoni, India's new
cricketing sensation.
One young man [Nahaar] showed me a book on Amway products with the photo
of two Americans on the cover, and showed me a product, Apsa-80, that he is using on
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his soyabean. The booklet says it's for making golf courses smooth and for giving a shine
to the leaves. He said that at the meeting in Dhar they told him it will improve his
soyabean quality and output. He has become a link in the chain and is trying to convince
two of his cousins to also join.
I went to Dhar expecting poverty. I had heard about Dhar only through the stories about
poor tribals and their experience with Gyandoot, the village cyber kiosk project
sponsored by the district administration, which had failed by 2001. So when I found
"modern" things like fancy houses, ATM machines, American sitcoms, satellite cable,
digital videography, and even Amway, I was pleasantly surprised at how "connected"
Dhar and Ranipura had become by 2006. But when I reread these notes almost two years
after I had penned them down, these impressions conveyed less to me about Dhar and
more about myself and my vantage position as an ethnographer.
My impressions communicated nothing about any particular characteristics of
Dhar and Ranipura, nor about any teleological change that could be labeled as
development. They reflected the things which I seemed to value in my own mind as
representative of development-things that were linked to urban India and the west-and
consequently, framed the images of what poverty should look like. I was surprised
because my own images and expectations about poverty in a remote place like Dhar did
not play out. Despite having spent a few years studying and working in villages across
three different Indian states, I was still a representative of the urban, westernized
audience with a material, visual understanding of poverty. It took me nearly three months
to find a village because I wanted to find a place that looked poor. My family and friends
emphasized in conversations that I was living in such a poor, remote, backward place that
it did not even have a railway station.
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What this research has taught me about poverty is that the emphasis on its
materiality and seeing it as a "technical" problem to be fixed, as found in many discourse
of development, takes away from describing it also as a product of relations of power.
Those who have the power to define what poverty looks like are the ones who are able to
categorize some people as poor. But once such categorization is completed, it is taken as
a given characteristic of those who are deemed to be poor-a depoliticized fact that takes
away from the social relationships that have constituted it and ignores any discussion of
the lived experiences of people. Even if poverty is given a dimension beyond the
material-by adding the factors of the human development index such as health and
literacy-it still assumes that the problem is an inherent characteristic of the person who
is poor.' Development then becomes about transforming the person and his or her
physical and mental assets, lending itself quickly to judgements about the behaviour of
those deemed to be poor.
Development practitioners and even critics of development have argued that the
language of "development" is necessary to keep poverty as a discussable issue, which, in
turn, is vital to remain engaged in questions of equity and justice (Cooper and Packard
1997). But the way in which development discourse has constructed an understanding of
poverty erases any space for discussing the deeper social, economic, cultural, and
political relationships that frame people's lives. These relationships of power, of
subordination and domination, circumscribe people's choices and chances in life and are
always shaping any "interventions" that development projects seek to undertake.
In discussions of development in Africa, much focus is on poor societies as opposed to poor people. In
contrast, within India, given the diversity of wealth distribution and multiple axes of social exclusion,
poverty has usually been about poor people-with the recognition that large groups amongst the poor also
inhabit other social categories such as adivasi, lower caste, or even rural.
Conclusion 311
Richa Kumar
Throughout this dissertation I have attempted to critique the erasure of questions
of power from the discussion of development projects and development discourse. I have
argued that the teleological narrative of development through the yellow revolution in
Malwa in the last forty years fails to capture the imbrication of multiple human and non-
human actors and their contingent circumstances that result in agrarian change. Instead,
the narrative of the yellow revolution helps powerful state and market actors to
appropriate the entire agency for bringing about change. In addition, its evolutionary bias
does not provide space to include accounts of decline alongside narratives of prosperity,
which form an inherent part of agrarian change as described and experienced by farmers
in Malwa. I also argue that the triumphant narrative of the yellow revolution fails to
recognize that the monetary benefits from the yellow revolution have bypassed most
women in Malwa compared to their male counterparts. The shift to growing a cash crop
has also shifted control over household resources into the domain of men, thus
disempowering women even further in an already unequal patrilineal society.
I have further argued that the discourse of "empowering" farmers by providing
them with market information, which has resulted from the availability of new
information and communication technologies alongside an increasingly popular
neoliberal view of markets in the last decade, views "empowerment" as narrowly
transactional and ignores larger processes of disempowerment that are shaping farmers'
actions in agrarian markets. Finally, I have shown that state-promoted programs and
schemes for the development of adivasis, the poorest and most marginalized social group
in India, who form nearly one-fifth of the population of Madhya Pradesh, have failed
miserably. Their failure, I argue, is not only because they were implemented by
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prejudiced upper caste officials, but also because of their inherent top-down nature that
did not involve adivasis in any aspect of design or implementation.
Instead, I have suggested that in thinking about change, we shift the emphasis
towards the agency of those who are usually the "targets" of development. I have done
so, however, in ways different from ideas of agency in participatory and entrepreneurial
models of development. By recovering and foregrounding the social, economic, political
and cultural projects that those considered to be poor and marginalized participate in, this
research argues that such alternative arenas of struggles that are unrecognized by the
language and practice development be given serious attention. I have described how since
farmers do not have the power to influence the price of soyabean in the market, they
instead engage in battles over weighment and judgements over quality with traders and
private company employees to exercise some power over the final outcome of the sale of
their crop. I have illustrated the assertive negotiations undertaken by adivasi labourers in
their relationships with upper caste farmers during what I call an "economy of haste" that
is created every year at the soyabean harvest. I have also suggested that the mechanism of
democratic politics has been a vital arena of struggle for adivasi groups to make claims
upon the state. This has resulted in the implementation of an employment guarantee act,
which, in combination with the "economy of haste," has enabled adivasi labourers to
negotiate higher wages and obtain more days of employment in the last few years. Lastly,
I argue that cultural projects such as Swadhyay are also important alternative arenas of
struggle where women and some adivasi groups have been able to overcome the lines of
exclusion that frame their lives. The egalitarian ethic of Swadhyay has enabled these
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hitherto marginalized groups to assert themselves and participate on an equal footing in
relation to upper caste men.
The language and practice of development has failed to recognize these
alternative economic, social, political, and cultural arenas of struggle that the poor and
the marginalized are engaged in themselves, and which hold great potential for bringing
about social transformation. In recent years, "participation" has been at the centre of
development discourse. But it is about local people participating in "our" discourse or
that of the development establishment. I am interested in participating in their projects.
This dissertation calls for inverting the notion of participation-how can we, outsiders,
development practitioners, academics, help people in their own projects of change? While
recognizing that there are multiple agents and multiple processes shaping change, could
we participate in the battles that people are fighting for, struggling for, that our resources
enable us to help them with? Not all such struggles may be equitable or just-some may
take the shape of the project of Hindutva2 while others may take the shape of Swadhyay.
But unless we acknowledge these multifarious platforms as alternative arenas for
debating and struggling over questions of power, the legacy of development will continue
to leave a string of failed projects and unused computers in even more villages in the
country.
An important question of scale arises when I suggest that we participate in
people's own projects. Postdevelopmentalists in the 1990s have argued in a similar
manner, but they have denigrated everything at the national or global scale and glorified
the local or the community level. In contrast, I want to emphasize that my notion of
2 I refer here to the politicized version of Hinduism espoused by the Hindu nationalist party in India, the
BJP, which creates a monolithic version of Hinduism against an equally monolithic other.
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participating in people's projects is not a question of scale. People's projects could take
shape at a national or global scale as much as at the community or local level. For
instance, political struggles to push for a legal act such as India's National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) represent a national level people's movement that
is composed of thousands of poor adivasis and lower caste groups and their representative
organisations. At the same time, my personal support to a handful of girls in Ranipura to
help them fulfill their desire to pass the 10th standard exams is representative of a local
project that affects just a few families in a single village. The emphasis, as this research
has tried to argue, is on the locus of agency in both framing the problem and in
conceptualizing the solution as well as on the recognition of the relationships of power
that circumscribe any efforts to bring about change.
I have argued for using the language of "change" more broadly rather than the
teleological, evolutionary language of development in describing social transformation.
Change is multidirectional and it can be perceived and evaluated from a multiplicity of
perspectives. This brings up the question of time. Benedict Anderson (1983) has argued
that a nation-state constitutes homogeneous time which brings together citizens with a
common experience of modernity as members of an imagined community. Against this,
Partha Chatterjee (2004) has argued for a heterogeneous time suggesting that elites in
civil society and subalterns in political society have different experiences framed within
different discourses and interactions with the state. However, within Ranipura itself,
which would be considered far removed from civil society altogether by Chatterjee, there
exist heterogeneous experiences of time. One set of children who go to the private
nursery school in the village learn to speak English. They come wearing neat uniforms
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and well-combed hair, dangling plastic water bottles and learn from colourful books.
Another set of children go to the aanganwadi, the state-run day care centre, and learn to
speak Hindi. They come in torn and disheveled clothes with unkempt hair, snot running
from their noses, carrying an empty tin can for the morning meal of porridge, and play
with a broken bat and ball and unrecognizable rubber toys. The children in the nursery
school do not go through the same experience as the children in the aanganwadi.
Top Left: Children attending the private nursery school in Ranipura. Top Right: Children attending the
state-run aanganwadi in Ranipura. Bottom: Children waiting for porridge at the aanganwadi.
Photos by Richa Kumar.
Once they grow up, despite living in the same village these different children may
not have any shared conception of the world as understood either by Anderson within the
confines of a nation-state, or within the social and cultural realm, which Chatterjee
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alludes towards in his discussion of political society. Rural India is a crucible of
differences, even within each village, let alone across various geographic regions and
cultural divides. The experience of different inhabitants within a single village may not
necessarily conform even to any shared sociocultural understanding-the cross-cutting
lines of exclusion along caste, class, gender, and even religion, might be too strongly
militating against it.
Finally, this research has highlighted the importance of accountability. It is a
question that merits further investigation from an ethnographic perspective and I have
only touched upon it briefly in this dissertation. Accountability is one of the buzz words
of the development apparatus of the 1990s alongside participation and civil society (Clark
et al. 2003). Typically, accountability is narrowly constructed as the need to demonstrate
answerability in terms of expenditure of funds for and the financing of development
projects. Accountability is usually directed towards development agency heads or other
decision-makers. In this research I have argued, instead, for making development projects
accountable for their outcomes to the people they seek to "develop," rather than solely to
the donors who fund them. Doing so means rethinking issues of democratic
accountability.
I have suggested paying attention to the space of democratic politics where
political representatives are accountable to their constituents. In India, the strength and
resilience of democratic practices has grown even more in the last decade, with
increasing participation by lower castes and the poor, as well as through an explosion of
political parties representing their interests. Development agencies have regularly derided
democratic politics as corrupt and full of nepotism. As has been seen in Madhya Pradesh,
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representatives can be co-opted by competing but more powerful interests. They can also
channel benefits to their own friends and family members and they can pursue their own
individual agenda separate from those who put them in power. However, the process of
electoral politics and the possibilities for bringing legislative change through political
mobilization offer an unparalleled avenue for making the state accountable to people and
for creating a space to articulate demands using the language of development as
entitlement. No matter how flawed it may be, unlike development projects, democratic
politics foregrounds the power struggles that take place everyday for control over
resources and makes space for accountability to flow towards people.
In this research I have tried to push for engaging with questions of deprivation
and discrimination on multiple arenas of struggle derived more from the lived
experiences of people. I suggest that broadening the scope of development to include
multiple languages and practices and to give space to political and cultural projects,
considered outside the bounds of development thus far, will be a good way to start.
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